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“Poderia se alegar, naturalmente, que é este um 
critério inumano porque certos indivíduos seriam 
privados de assistência ou de conforto quando a 
cura é impossível.  
 
Mas em realidade, ¿o que é mais inumano? 
¿atender a uns poucos privilegiados com todo tipo 
de placebos caros e deixar à grande maioria da 
população mundial desprovida dos cuidados mais 
essenciais, ou velar por uma distribuição mais 
equitativa da assistência essencial?  
 
És evidente que, una vez mais, se trata de um 
dilema cuja solução deve buscar-se não no cenário 
técnico senão no cenário social” 
(Halfdan Mahler, 1977) 
  
  
 RESUMO 
 
Atualmente, o financiamento e o acesso a medicamentos nos sistemas de 
saúde são temas relevantes nas discussões de políticas públicas. Apesar 
dos esforços dos países para garantir o acesso aos medicamentos sem 
comprometer a sustentabilidade dos sistemas de saúde, nem todas as 
pessoas conseguem ter suas necessidades atendidas. Como resultado, as 
pessoas entram com ações judiciais reivindicando a defesa do seu direito 
à saúde para obterem acesso aos medicamentos. Este fenômeno, 
conhecido como “judicialização do acesso a medicamentos” ou “litígio 
para acesso a medicamentos” tem se tornado uma via alternativa aos 
mecanismos estabelecidos pelo sistema de saúde. A fragmentação dos 
sistemas de saúde tem sido apontada como um dos fatores que mais 
contribuem para a ocorrência de judicialização do acesso a 
medicamentos. No entanto, a extensão do fenômeno varia entre os 
países, independente da forma de organização dos sistemas de saúde. 
Nesse contexto, este estudo visou analisar a judicialização do acesso aos 
medicamentos e as políticas farmacêuticas na Argentina, no Brasil, no 
Chile e na Colômbia. Esta pesquisa adotou uma abordagem qualitativa e 
foi desenvolvida em duas partes. A primeira parte compreende o 
desenvolvimento do referencial teórico para a análise comparativa. O 
scoping study mostrou que a judicialização é um fenômeno complexo 
que envolve aspectos técnico-científicos, legais e sociais. Porém, grande 
parte dos artigos revisados utilizava uma abordagem normativa focada 
nos aspectos técnicos do fenômeno, evidenciando a necessidade de 
estudos adicionais utilizando a abordagem social da judicialização. Este 
estudo também evidenciou a forma como as características das ações 
judiciais e da judicialização tem mudado ao longo do tempo: de um 
carácter coletivo, no caso do tratamento do HIV, para um carácter 
individual, no caso dos novos medicamentos. O modelo teórico foi 
proposto com base nos resultados do scoping study e considerando a 
definição de medicamentos como necessidades em saúde. O modelo 
teórico inclui os elementos (stakeholders e políticas) que influenciam a 
percepção dos medicamentos como necessidades em saúde em três 
níveis: internacional, nacional e demanda local (demand-side) e que, em 
consequência, modulam a ocorrência de judicialização do acesso a 
medicamentos. A segunda parte compreende a análise comparativa, a 
qual foi desenvolvida por meio de uma revisão integrativa da literatura, 
e a realização de entrevistas semiestruturadas com representantes dos 
stakeholders envolvidos na judicialização do acesso a medicamentos na 
Argentina, no Brasil, no Chile e na Colômbia. A comparação das 
políticas farmacêuticas, que incluiu também os Países Baixos, 
evidenciou que, nos últimos quinze anos, todos os países estudados 
tomaram medidas visando melhorar o acesso a medicamentos para a 
população. Durante esse período, o foco das medidas mudou dos 
medicamentos essenciais para os medicamentos de alto custo, os quais 
significam uma importante carga econômica para os sistemas de saúde. 
Apesar dos esforços dos países, o acesso equitativo aos medicamentos 
continua sendo uma meta a ser alcançada, mesmo em países 
desenvolvidos como os Países Baixos. Os resultados mostram que a 
fragmentação do sistema de saúde em diferentes aspectos (organização, 
financiamento, regulação) tem um papel relevante na geração de 
barreiras ao acesso aos medicamentos. A análise cross-country das 
causas e consequências da judicialização do acesso a medicamentos 
demonstrou que, nos quarto países latino-americanos estudados, o litígio 
para acesso aos medicamentos resulta principalmente das limitações dos 
sistemas de saúde na garantia do acesso aos medicamentos cobertos; e 
também pela influência das práticas de marketing da indústria 
farmacêutica. Os resultados mostraram, ainda, que as políticas de 
controle de preços de medicamentos, de proteção de propriedade 
intelectual e de desenvolvimento científico em saúde também são 
fatores que influenciam a judicialização nos níveis nacional e 
internacional. As consequências da judicialização foram mencionadas 
apenas nos níveis nacional e de demanda local. No nível nacional, a 
atualização das listas e a definição de protocolos clínicos foram as 
consequências mais mencionadas. O financiamento de medicamentos de 
alto custo sem evidência de eficácia e segurança foi considerado uma 
consequência negativa. Outras consequências mencionadas foram a 
sobrecarga do Judiciário. No nível demanda local, a reafirmação do 
papel dos pacientes como consumidores de serviços de saúde foi 
apontada também como uma consequência negativa. Por fim, a análise 
comparativa das respostas dos países à judicialização mostrou que, 
apenas no Brasil e na Colômbia, as medidas focadas na incorporação de 
novas tecnologias nos sistemas de saúde foram em resposta ao 
fenômeno. Nesses dois países, as medidas do Executivo e do Legislativo 
foram precedidas de intervenções dos altos tribunais. Apesar das 
diferenças nas intervenções do Judiciário – uma audiência pública no 
Brasil e uma ordem judicial na Colômbia –, as medidas do Executivo e o 
Legislativo foram similares: o estabelecimento de agências de Avaliação 
de Tecnologias em Saúde, a incorporação de novas tecnologias na 
cobertura dos sistemas de saúde e mudanças nas estratégias de 
financiamento dos medicamentos. A percepção comum sobre os 
 resultados dessas medidas é que elas não foram suficientes para reduzir 
a judicialização do acesso a medicamentos. Em conclusão, a 
judicialização do acesso a medicamentos é um fenômeno complexo que 
envolve os interesses de diferentes stakeholders e as relações entre eles. 
Essas características destacam a relevância de se realizar estudos 
adicionais sobre o fenômeno sob uma perspectiva social. Além disso, as 
estratégias focadas na incorporação de novas tecnologias têm se 
mostrado insuficientes para controlar a judicialização do acesso aos 
medicamentos. Portanto, é urgente o desenho de estratégias inovadoras 
que tenham como alvo pontos críticos identificados neste estudo, tais 
como as relações entre a indústria farmacêutica e outros stakeholders 
(prescritores, gestores, tomadores de decisão, e pacientes); o controle de 
preços de medicamentos e o desenvolvimento científico.  
 
Palavras-chave: Direito à saúde. Acesso a medicamentos. Ações 
judiciais. Políticas Farmacêuticas. Argentina. Brasil. Chile. Colômbia.  
 
 
 
 
  
 ABSTRACT 
 
Currently, the financing and access to medicines in health systems are 
relevant issues in what concerns discussions on public policies in certain 
countries. Despite the countries’ efforts to guarantee access to medicines 
without compromising the health systems’ sustainability, some people 
do not have their needs met, and often resort to the Judiciary claiming 
the defence of their Right to Health to get access to the medicines they 
need. This phenomenon, known as “judicialization of access to 
medicines” or “litigation for access to medicines”, has become an 
alternative pathway to the mechanism established by the health system 
to ensure access to medicines. The health system’s fragmentation has 
been described as the main addressing factor of judicialization for access 
to medicines. However, the extension of the phenomenon varies across 
countries regardless of the health systems’ organization. In this context, 
this study aimed to analyse judicialization of access to medicines and 
pharmaceutical policies in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Colombia. The 
study adopted a qualitative approach and was carried out in two parts. In 
the first part, the theoretical framework was developed for the 
comparative analysis. The scoping study showed that judicialization is a 
complex phenomenon that involves technical-scientific, legal and social 
aspects. However, most of the papers reviewed had a normative 
approach focused on the technical aspects of the phenomenon. Thus, it 
evidenced the need for further research on judicialization from a social 
perspective. This study also demonstrated how the characteristics of 
both lawsuits and judicialization have changed over time: from a 
collective approach in the case of HIV treatment to an individual 
approach in the case of new medicines. A theoretical model was 
proposed based on the results of the scoping study and taking into 
consideration the definition of medicines as a health need. The 
theoretical model comprised the elements (stakeholders and policies) 
that influence the perception of medicines as a health need at three 
levels (international, national and demand-side), therefore modulating 
the occurrence of litigation. In the second part the comparative analysis 
was carried out by means of an integrative literature review and semi-
structured interviews with representatives of the stakeholders involved 
in judicialization of access to medicines in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
Colombia. The comparison among the pharmaceutical policies, which 
also included The Netherlands, evidenced that in the last fifteen years 
the studied countries have taken measures to improve the access to 
medicines for the population. During this time, the measures’ focus has 
changed from essential medicines to new and expensive medicines, 
which means an important financial burden for the health systems. 
Despite the countries efforts, equitable access to medicines is still a goal 
to be achieved, even in developed countries as The Netherlands. The 
results showed that the health system’s fragmentation at different levels 
(organization, financing, regulation) significantly contributes to the 
creation of barriers to the access to medicines. The cross-country 
analysis of the causes and consequences of judicialization showed that, 
in the four Latin American countries, it results mainly from the health 
systems’ limitations in ensuring access to the covered medicines; and 
also from the influence of the pharmaceutical marketing. The results 
evidenced that policies on medicines price control, on intellectual 
property protection, and on health scientific development are also 
addressing factors of litigation at the international and national levels. 
The consequences of judicialization were mentioned only at the national 
and demand-side levels. At the national level, the updating of the 
medicines list and the establishment of clinical guidelines were the most 
mentioned consequences. The financing of expensive medicines without 
evidence of efficacy and safety was considered a negative consequence. 
Other consequences mentioned included the overcharge of the Judiciary. 
At the demand-side level, the assertion of the patients’ role as 
consumers of healthcare services was also noted as a negative 
consequence. Finally, the comparative analysis of the responses to 
judicialization of access to medicines showed that, only in Brazil and 
Colombia, the measures focussed on the incorporation of new 
technologies in the health resulted from the judicialization phenomenon. 
In both cases, the Judiciary’s high instance interventions preceded the 
Executive and Legislature measures. Despite the differences between 
the Judiciary’s interventions – a public hearing in Brazil and a judicial 
order in Colombia –, the Executive and Legislature measures were 
similar: the establishment of a Health Technology Assessment agency, 
the incorporation of new technologies in the health systems’ coverage, 
and changes in the financing strategies. The common perception about 
the results of these measures was the fact that they were not sufficient to 
decrease litigation for access to medicines. In conclusion, litigation for 
access to medicines is a complex phenomenon that involves the 
stakeholders’ interests and the relationships established among them. 
These characteristics highlight the relevance of carrying out further 
research on the phenomenon from a social perspective. Furthermore, the 
strategies focused on the incorporation of new technologies have been 
insufficient to control litigation for access to medicines. Thus, 
 innovative strategies focused on critical points such as the relationships 
between the pharmaceutical industry and other stakeholders (prescribers, 
managers, policy-makers, patients), medicines price control and 
scientific development should be urgently implemented. 
 
Keywords: Right to health. Access to medicines. Lawsuits. Pharmaceutical 
Policies. Argentina. Brazil. Chile. Colombia. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Why study judicialization of access to medicines and pharmaceutical policies 
in Latin American countries? 
 
Access to essential medicines has been recognized as part of the 
right to health (CESCR COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL 
AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, 2000) as well as a relevant component of 
the Universal Health Coverage (UHC), for different reasons. Firstly, 
essential medicines are useful to resolve health problems guaranteeing 
efficacy, safety and efficient use of financial resources (WHO WORLD 
HEALTH ORGANIZATION, 2015a). Secondly, essential medicines 
represent an important share of the countries’ healthcare budget and it is 
expected that prices of new technologies become higher (WAGNER; 
QUICK; ROSS-DEGNAN, 2014). 
 
In the last two decades, Latin American countries reformed their 
health systems aiming to increase the health coverage. This includes 
ensuring equitable access to essential health services and medicines 
(ATUN et al., 2015). At the same time, the health systems also cope 
with pressure for incorporating new and expensive medicines; and rarely 
real novelties (PRESCRIRE EDITORIAL STAFF, 2015). Funding and 
access to medicines in health systems are relevant issues in global 
discussions on public policies, which most recently included the 
guarantee access to more expensive medicines, , without compromising 
the health systems’ sustainability (HOGERZEIL, 2004; PAN-
AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION, 2010). However, in some 
regions, this goal is still a challenge because of reduced levels of 
coverage and financial fragility of the health systems (FONDO 
NACIONAL DE RECURSOS, 2010). 
 
In this context, litigation has become an alternative pathway for 
access to medicines in the Latin American region (REVEIZ et al., 2013; 
YAMIN; GLOPPEN, 2011). Some authors have suggested the 
occurrence of judicialization of access to medicines is more probable in 
fragmented health systems (FONDO NACIONAL DE RECURSOS, 
2010). However, all health systems currently face the challenge of 
ensuring access to medicines (SANCHEZ-SERRANO, 2014), and the 
extension of the phenomenon varies regardless of the health system 
organization (unified or fragmented) (BURGIN, 2014; REVEIZ et al., 
2013).  
38 
 
The effects of judicial intervention for guaranteeing the right to 
health, particularly access to medicines, generate controversy. On one 
hand, the Judiciary can disregard the regulations established to 
guarantee rational use of the medicines, specially of the more expensive 
ones (TANAKA, 2008). Additionally, litigation can press for the 
incorporation of new medicines even without enough evidence of 
effectiveness and safety (SANT’ANA et al., 2011a; VIEIRA et al., 
2010). On the other hand, lawsuits can show gaps in the public policies 
and then protect the right to health from the Executive and Legislative 
branches’ omissions (ASENSI, 2010; MACHADO-ALBA; TORRES-
RODRÍGUEZ; VALLEJOS-NARVÁEZ, 2011). In this sense, lawsuits 
for access to medicines can be considered as a modulator of the health 
policies design. 
 
The proliferation of judicialization for access to medicines in 
Latin America justifies carrying out a cross-country analysis of public 
policies that aim to ensure access and financing of medicines, the 
development of litigation for access to medicines and the responses that 
countries have implemented against this phenomenon. 
 
Within this framework, the Brazilian research group 
Pharmaceutical Policies and Services of the Federal University of Santa 
Catarina in partnership with researchers from Colombia, Chile and 
Argentina proposed the present study. 
 
Objectives: 
 
The study aims to analyse judicialization of access to medicines 
and pharmaceutical policies in Brazil, Colombia, Argentina and Chile. 
 
The specific objectives established for this study were: 
 
1. To analyse the approach to judicialization of access to 
medicines and its possible impacts described in articles 
published in scientific journals indexed in the main health 
databases. 
2. To develop a theoretical model for analysing the causes and 
consequences of judicialization of access to medicines, taking 
into account the social, political, and economic elements that 
modulate the role of medicines as health needs. 
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3. To review the historical development of strategies for access to 
medicines in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Colombia in the 
period 2000-2014 and compare them with measures taken in 
The Netherlands. 
4. To conduct a comparative analysis of the causes and 
consequences of judicialization of access to medicines from the 
perspective of the stakeholders involved in the phenomenon in 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Colombia. 
5. To characterize and compare the States’ responses to lawsuits 
related to access to medicines, especially those focused on 
extending the list of medicines covered by the health systems. 
 
The thesis is presented in two parts: 
 
The first part, consisted of two chapters, encompasses the 
theoretical framework of the study, presenting the state of the art in 
judicialization of access to medicines. Chapter 1 presents a scoping 
study that analyses the approaches to the phenomenon (normative and 
social) and its possible impacts (positive or negative), described in 
articles published in scientific journals. This manuscript was published 
in the Social Science and Medicine journal in October 2014 (VARGAS-
PELÁEZ et al., 2014). Chapter 2 presents the development of the 
theoretical model proposed for analysing judicialization of access to 
medicines. It also constitutes a paper that was submitted to the Social 
Science and Medicine journal.  
 
The second part comprises the comparative cross-country 
analysis of public policies for access to medicines and judicialization of 
access to medicines. This analysis involved literature review, 
documental analysis, and interviews with representatives of stakeholders 
involved with judicialization. Since the data collected were source of 
information for three different analyses, chapters 3 through 5 constitute 
this section. For a better understanding, the methodology used for the 
literature review and for conducting the interviews is detailed in chapter 
3; and cited in chapter 4 and 5, in which only the analysis methodology 
is described. 
 
Chapter 3 presents the comparative analysis of the health systems 
and the strategies to ensure access to medicines in Brazil, Argentina, 
Chile and Colombia. This chapter includes a comparison with the Dutch 
health system, which was made possible by a doctoral internship in The 
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Netherlands that aim to learn the methodology used by the WHO 
Collaborating Centre for Pharmaceutical Policy & Regulation, Utrecht 
University (The Netherlands) for carrying out comparative analysis of 
pharmaceutical policies. The analysis included a historical approach to 
the reforms between 2000 and 2014. It also constitutes a paper that will 
be submitted to the International Journal of Health Economics and 
Management. 
 
Chapter 4 analyses the causes and consequences of judicialization 
of access to medicines in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Colombia with a 
qualitative approach and using the theoretical model presented in 
Chapter 2. The results will be submitted as a paper to the Health Policy 
and Planning journal. 
 
To precede in the comparative analysis of judicialization of 
access to medicines, the Chapter 5 presents the comparative analysis of 
the States’ responses to the phenomenon, related to access to medicines, 
especially those focused on extending the list of medicines covered by 
the health systems. The results will be submitted to the Journal of 
Health Organization and Management. 
 
Finally, we present the general discussion of the study and 
suggestions for future research related to judicialization of access to 
medicines. 
 
This doctoral dissertation is part of the research project Public 
Policies and Judicialization of Access to Medicines (Call No. 41/2013 
MCTI / CNPq / CT-Health / MS / SCTIE / Decit - National Network for 
Research on Health Policies: Knowledge Production for Recognition of 
the Universal Right to Health, Line 3 - Monitoring and analysis of 
decisions and regulations related to health; and the Universal Call 
14/2013) involving researchers from the group Pharmaceutical Policies 
and Services of the Federal University of Santa Catarina, Fundación 
IFARMA (Colombia), Faculty of Pharmacy of Universidad Nacional de 
Colombia, Universidad Arcis (Chile), and an independent researcher 
from Argentina. 
 
The PhD student received financial support from the 
Departamento Administrativo de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación, 
Colciencias from Colombia in the form of a doctoral scholarship abroad, 
Call No. 529/2011 and performed a doctoral internship in the 
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Netherlands by Dr Aukje Mantel-Teewesse from the Utrecht Institute 
for Pharmaceutical Sciences, WHO Collaborating Centre for 
Pharmaceutical Policy & Regulation, Utrecht University (The 
Netherlands). 
 
This research project was assessed and approved by the Research 
with Human Beings Ethics Committee (CEPSH by its name in 
Portuguese) of the Federal University of Santa Catarina under Report 
No. 712.031/2014. 
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MEDICINES AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
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1. CHAPTER 1 – Right to health, essential medicines, and lawsuits 
for access to medicines: A scoping study
1
. 
 
1.1. ABSTRACT 
 
Despite countries’ efforts to ensure access to essential medicines, 
some people do not have their needs met, and often resort to the 
Judiciary to get access to the medicines they need. This phenomenon, 
known as “judicialization of access to medicines”, has aroused the 
academia’s interest in law, health and social fields. In this context, this 
scoping study investigates, through qualitative thematic analysis, the 
approach to judicialization of access to medicines (normative or social) 
and its possible impacts (positive or negative) described in articles 
published in scientific journals indexed in the main health databases 
prior to July 2012. 65 of 384 papers met the inclusion criteria of 
focusing on lawsuits for access to medicines or judicialization of access 
to medicines as a phenomenon; empiric studies, review articles or 
theoretical discussions, written in English, Portuguese or Spanish; most 
of them were about Brazil, Colombia and England. Results show that 
judicialization is a complex phenomenon that involves technical-
scientific, legal and social aspects. The judicialization impacts 
mentioned have changed over time. In the late 1990s and early 2000s 
the emphasis of positive impacts predominated both on the normative 
and social approaches, having as main reference the movements that 
claimed from the States the guarantee of access to HIV/AIDS treatment. 
In the mid-2000s, however, there was an emphasis of the negative 
effects of judicial intervention, when lawsuits for access to medicines 
became a problem in some countries. Few studies used the social 
approach to judicialization. For this reason, there is not enough 
information about whether lawsuits for access to medicines are related 
to a real recognition of the right to health as an exercise of citizenship. 
Such aspects need to be further studied. Keywords: Right to health, 
access to medicines, essential medicines, lawsuits, Latin America, 
Europe, South Africa, North America 
 
                                                             
1
 VARGAS-PELÁEZ, C. M. et al. Right to health, essential medicines, and 
lawsuits for access to medicines – A scoping study. Social Science & 
Medicine, v. 121, p. 48–55, nov. 2014.  
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1.2. INTRODUCTION 
 
Medicines are products involved in two contexts of society: 
health and market. In the health context, medicines are considered social 
goods, whose purpose is to prevent and solve health problems (TOBAR; 
SANCHEZ, 2005). In the international sphere, access to essential 
medicines (as defined by the World Health Organization) is part of the 
Right to Health (CESCR COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL 
AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, 2000). 
 
To fulfil the commitments agreed in international treaties on the 
Right to Health, the states have established public health policies and 
specific strategies to ensure access, financing and rational use of 
medicines and health services through health systems (LOBATO; 
GIOVANELLA, 2008). However, despite the adopted measures, 
governments still face difficulties like reduced levels of coverage and 
financial fragility of the health systems, and general problems of access 
to essential health services and medicines by a large part of the 
population (FONDO NACIONAL DE RECURSOS, 2010). 
 
In the market context, medicines are considered products aimed 
at generating profit. In fact, the pharmaceutical industry plays an 
important role in the scientific development, which generates great 
added value, and makes this industry a strategic sector for the economy 
(TOBAR; SANCHEZ, 2005). Furthermore, conforming to the 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS), medicines are considered patentable innovations (WTO 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 1995). 
 
As a consequence, since the last two decades there has been a 
rapid onset of new medicines, which are usually costly because of the 
patent protection, but these do not always have an additional therapeutic 
value (PRESCRIRE EDITORIAL STAFF, 2011). However, the use of 
these products is promoted by the pharmaceutical industry through 
marketing to prescribers and patients (VACCA et al., 2011), and this 
might create a pressure on the health system aimed at the incorporation 
of its products (GLASSMAN et al., 2012). So, access and funding of 
high-cost medicines in health systems are current issues in public policy 
discussions due to both economic and public health impacts (PAN-
AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION, 2010). 
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In this framework, when patients feel that their health demands 
are not satisfied by the health system, they increasingly often have 
recourse to the courts to gain access to treatment (REVEIZ et al., 2013). 
This phenomenon, called “judicialization of access to medicines”, 
became relevant and controversial owing to the different interests and 
stakeholders involved. 
 
This paper aims, by means of a scoping study (LEVAC; 
COLQUHOUN; O’BRIEN, 2010), to analyse the approach to 
judicialization of access to medicines and its possible impacts described 
in articles published in scientific journals indexed in the main health 
databases. 
 
1.3. METHODOLOGY 
 
The search was conducted using the databases Scopus, Pubmed, 
Scielo and Lilacs. The keywords combinations used are shown in 
Table 1-1. Additionally, manual search was conducted using the 
Pubmed tool “related articles”. Only papers published prior to July 2012 
were considered. 
 
Table 1-1 – Search strategy and syntax by database 
 
Data base Keywords 
PUBMED ("Human Rights"[Mesh] OR "human rights") AND ("Drugs, 
Essential"[Mesh] OR "essential medicines") AND ("legislation 
and jurisprudence"[subheading] OR "Judicial Role"[Mesh] OR 
"Patient Advocacy"[Mesh] OR lawsuits) 
SCOPUS "Right to Health" AND "essential medicines" AND (judicial OR 
lawsuits)//Articles or reviews//All fields 
"Right to Health" AND "drug" AND lawsuits//All fields 
"Right to Health" AND Drugs// Articles or reviews//Title, 
abstract, keywords 
"Right to health" AND "essential medicines"//Articles or 
reviews//All fields 
SCIELO “Direito à saúde" AND Medicamentos 
“Derecho a la salud” AND Medicamentos 
Right to health AND (essential medicines OR drugs) 
LILACS "Direito à saúde" AND Medicamentos 
"Right to health" AND (drugs OR "Essential medicines") 
"Derecho a la salud" AND ("Medicamentos esenciales" OR 
Medicamentos) 
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Two independent reviewers selected the papers according to the 
following inclusion criteria: focus on lawsuits for access to medicines or 
judicialization of access to medicines as a phenomenon; empiric studies, 
review articles or theoretical discussions, written in English, Portuguese 
or Spanish. Genres such as monographs, dissertations or theses, and 
articles about other kinds of right-to-health related lawsuits like medical 
malpractice, euthanasia and abortion, or about access to medicines by 
other ways rather than lawsuits, were excluded. No limit was established 
on studied countries. 
 
Descriptive analysis considered publication data, the studied 
country, the journal thematic area, authors’ fields of expertise and kinds 
of institutions. The journals were classified according to the All Science 
Journal Classification (ASJC) available in the SCOPUS database; the 
fields of expertise were obtained by consulting information from the 
articles, the Lattes Platform (for Brazilian researchers), and institutional 
websites. Institutions were categorized as academic (universities), health 
(hospitals and clinics), government agencies (Ministries, health 
department.), or others.  
 
In the thematic analysis (BARDIN, 1977; MINAYO, 1993), the 
approaches to judicialization and type of impacts categories were 
created after a brief reading of the articles, identifying explicit 
definitions of judicialization of access to medicines and the impacts 
mentioned by the authors. These categories were applied in the 
exploration and analysis phases of this study.  
 
This is a review of published papers, for this reason, ethics 
committee evaluation was not necessary. However, the studies that 
included data about patients getting medicines by means of lawsuits 
were analysed to make sure they had ethics committee approval. 
 
1.4. RESULTS 
 
The selection of articles is shown in Figure 1-1.  
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Figure 1-1 – Flow diagram of articles included in the review. 
 
 
 
Most of the articles were published between 2009 and 2011. The 
most frequently studied countries were Brazil (n = 44; 68%), Colombia 
(n = 6; 9%) and England (n = 4; 6%) (Figure 1-2). 
 
 
 
 
Articles screened: 384 
 
Scopus, Pubmed, Scielo 
and Lilacs searches: 368 
 
Hand search: 16 
Duplicates: 98 
 
Excluded on kind of 
publication and language: 22 
 
Excluded on Title: 165 
 
Excluded on Abstract: 23 
Full text articles for 
eligibility: 79 
 
For reference search: 
14 
Excluded on full text 
assessment: 28 
Included papers: 65 
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Figure 1-2 - Articles published by year and by studied country 
 
Source: Authors. The data of 2012 included only papers indexed in the database on 31
st
 of July. 
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The included articles were published in 31 journals. According to 
ASCJ, 17 (54.8%) journals were classified in the Health Sciences 
category, 7 (22.6%) in the Social Sciences category, and 7 (22.6%) in 
both categories. Following the same classification, 35 articles (53.8%) 
were published in Health Sciences journals, 11 (17%) in Social Sciences 
journals, and 19 (29.2%) in journals of both categories. 
 
A total of 116 authors were involved in the 65 articles. Their 
fields of expertise are public health (49; 42.2%), law and political 
sciences (30; 25.9%), pharmacy (21; 18.1%), medicine (19; 16.4%), and 
others (10; 8.6%) (biological sciences, social work, sociology and 
anthropology). 
 
Among the 61 institutions identified, there were 41 (67.2%) 
academic institutions, 12 (19.7%) government entities, 6 (9.8%) health 
institutions, 3(4.9%) international organizations, and others (law firms, 
NGOs and non-profit organizations). 
 
1.4.1. Thematic Analysis 
 
Seven articles had their own definition of judicialization. Five 
described the phenomenon as an increase in judicial decisions that 
determine the medications dispensing through health systems  
(ANDRADE et al., 2008; BIEHL et al., 2012; BIEHL; 
PETRYNA, 2011; CUBILLOS et al., 2012; ROMERO, 2010). Borges 
and Ugá (2010) defined judicialization as "the involvement of the 
judiciary in the political sphere", and for Leite et al. (2009), 
judicialization is the exercise by the Judiciary of attitudes of the 
Executive such as decisions about health resources allocation. 
 
For Ventura et al. (2010), judicialization goes beyond legal 
components and management of health services, it expresses "legitimate 
claims and actions of citizens and institutions for safeguarding and 
promoting the citizenship rights widely affirmed in international and 
national laws". 
 
Five articles had theoretical framework supporting a definition 
for judicialization (ABRAMOVICH; PAUTASSI; FURIO, 2008; 
ASENSI, 2010; BORGES; UGÁ, 2009; MACHADO, 2008; 
MARQUES, 2008). The cited authors were Tate and Vallinder (1995), 
and Vianna (2002). 
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Tate and Vallinder (1995) considered that "judicialization of 
politics" is an expression that indicates expansion of judicial power in 
the decision-making process in contemporary democracies. 
Judicialization from without, the more common form, represents the 
control expansion of the Judiciary on Executive and Legislative powers’ 
issues. Judicialization is based on the mechanisms of checks and 
balances between the powers to maintain State equilibrium and it is 
characterized by the positioning of the judicial above legislative and 
administrative spheres in order to control the action of the Legislature 
and protect the society against abuse of the Executive (TATE; 
VALLINDER, 1995).  
 
For Vianna (2002), judicialization is a citizens’ reply, when the 
State fails to meet their needs by representative democracy means, being 
the judiciary the last option to claim their rights. This can also be 
interpreted as the expansion from political citizenship conception to 
social citizenship conception. 
 
Based on such premises, according to the approach to 
judicialization and the highlighted phenomenon impacts, four categories 
were defined for the thematic analysis (Table 1-2). The predominant 
approach was normative-negative (51; 78.5%), followed by normative-
positive (23; 35.4%); and the social approach, negative (16; 24.6%) or 
positive (4; 6.2%), was less considered. 
 
Table 1-2 – Thematic analysis categories 
 
Impacts 
Approaches  
Normative: Judicialization is the 
interference of Judicial Power on 
the Executive Power. 
Social: judicialization 
understood as a form of 
citizen participation 
Positive 
Judicialization protects the Right 
to Health from policy gaps or 
omissions of the Executive. 
Legitimate exercise of 
citizenship, particularly by 
minorities and vulnerable 
groups 
Negative 
Judicialization does not recognize 
public policies established by the 
Executive, and can deepen the 
existing inequality for access to 
healthcare. 
The lawsuits do not mean that 
people are empowered, and it 
can contribute to reinforce the 
"state paternalism". 
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1.4.2. Normative Approach of Judicialization 
 
1.4.2.1. Positive Impacts 
 
The articles with this approach argued that judicial intervention is 
a useful mechanism for promoting the right to health and for pushing 
governments to fulfil their constitutional obligations and those agreed in 
international treaties (HOGERZEIL et al., 2006). Moreover, 
judicialization may evidence the limitations of health policies and the 
need to update the Health Systems’ programs and clinical guidelines 
(ASENSI, 2010; MACHADO-ALBA; TORRES-RODRÍGUEZ; 
VALLEJOS-NARVÁEZ, 2011). 
 
Some examples are low-prevalence diseases (BAPTISTA; 
MACHADO; DE-LIMA, 2009; MACEDO; LOPES; BARBERATO-
FILHO, 2011; SANT’ANA et al., 2011b; VIEIRA; ZUCCHI, 2009) or 
in the event of non-supply of a drug not covered by the health system, 
although it is necessary to ensure the patient’s health (COSTA, 2004). 
So, under this approach, judicialization is positive if it follows criteria, 
and represents a real advance in terms of enforcement of fundamental 
rights (DALLARI, 2010; VALLE; CAMARGO, 2011). 
 
In this approach, the most cited case was the extension of benefits 
in health systems for HIV diagnosis and treatment, highlighting 
experiences from India (MEIER; YAMIN, 2011), Argentina 
(BERGALLO, 2010), Brazil (BIEHL et al., 2012; MACHADO, 2008), 
Colombia (YAMIN; PARRA-VERA, 2009) and South Africa 
(FORMAN, 2008), countries where the courts played a major role in 
requiring the Executive to create and execute policies to ensure the right 
to health of the HIV+ population. 
 
In Latin America, courts have assumed an increasing role in 
human rights interpretation and protection, in some cases forcing the 
Executive to redefine public policy priorities. The courts understand that 
when administrative inefficiency or the prioritization process of health 
systems fails to guarantee the right to health, judicial intervention is 
justified (CUBILLOS et al., 2012).  
 
Argentinean (ABRAMOVICH; PAUTASSI; FURIO, 2008; 
BERGALLO, 2010) and Colombian authors (VÉLEZ, 2005; VÉLEZ-
ARANGO et al., 2007; YAMIN; PARRA-VERA, 2009, 2010) also 
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emphasize the role of the Judiciary in two situations: omissions of 
private companies responsible for managing health services, and 
Executive omissions in the regulation of these companies. In the latter 
case, the Judiciary recognizes the accountability of the State to 
guarantee the right to health to the population, even if implementation is 
delegated to private actors (CUBILLOS et al., 2012; GAURI; BRINKS, 
2007). 
 
Brazilian authors Oliveira (2001) and Costa (2004) find positive 
the intervention of the Judiciary because it protects the constitutional 
right to health and life from financial constraints imposed by the 
Executive through infra-constitutional regulations like budget laws. 
 
In South Africa, the courts have been reluctant to decide 
individual cases that may affect most of the population. Jurisprudence in 
this country is based on "Ubutu", where the collective benefit 
predominates over the individual benefit. Also, the Constitutional Court 
has demonstrated the potential of social justice of an enforceable right to 
health, when it responds to urgent needs affecting a significant segment 
of the South African population such as guarantee of access to HIV 
treatment (FORMAN, 2008). 
 
1.4.2.2. Negative Impacts 
 
In general, the authors in favour of this approach emphasize that 
the use of the Judiciary as a route for medicines and/or access to 
healthcare services results mainly in negative impacts, because 
judicialization neglects the public policies established by the Executive 
and the Legislature (MACHADO, 2008), and because nothing 
guarantees that policies generated by the accumulation of lawsuits are 
better than or equal to those resulting from a legislative process 
(MANFREDI; MAIONI, 2002). 
 
Judicialization induces distortions in the implementation of such 
policies (MACHADO-ALBA; TORRES-RODRÍGUEZ; VALLEJOS-
NARVÁEZ, 2011; MARQUES, 2008), especially when medicines not 
covered by the health system are supplied (HOGERZEIL et al., 2006; 
LEITE et al., 2009; SANT’ANA et al., 2011b). These distortions can 
compromise the health systems sustainability (GONTIJO, 2010; 
HOGERZEIL et al., 2006; YAMIN; PARRA-VERA, 2010) owing to 
forced relocation and not-efficient use of limited resources (CUBILLOS 
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et al., 2012). This happens because the system is obligated to bear 
higher costs caused by loss of negotiating power in front of drug 
providers (DINIZ; MEDEIROS; SCHWARTZ, 2012; VIEIRA, 2008), 
high-cost of patented medications, or the impossibility of performing 
programmed purchases (DINIZ; MEDEIROS; SCHWARTZ, 2012; 
MACHADO, 2008; PEPE et al., 2010a). 
 
Different authors considered that the courts have a limited role in 
improving equity and operation of health systems because their 
decisions widen the existing gaps and inequalities in the access to health 
services (ABRAMOVICH; PAUTASSI; FURIO, 2008; ANDRADE et 
al., 2008; FLOOD, 2005; GLOPPEN, 2008; MARQUES; DALLARI, 
2007; MCHALE, 2006; VALLE; CAMARGO, 2011; YAMIN; 
PARRA-VERA, 2010).  
 
These regressive effects stemmed from public resources deviation 
without government planning (GLOPPEN, 2008; MARQUES, 2008; 
MEIER; YAMIN, 2011; MESSEDER; OSORIO-DE-CASTRO; 
LUIZA, 2005; TANAKA, 2008; VENTURA et al., 2010; VIEIRA; 
ZUCCHI, 2009). As a result, the implementation of broad population 
coverage programs is compromised (CHIEFFI; BARATA, 2009, 2010; 
ROMERO, 2010) and the health system is able to meet only non-priority 
demands from population sectors with more economic resources and 
more possibility of accessing legal resources (ABRAMOVICH; 
PAUTASSI; FURIO, 2008; BERGALLO, 2010; BORGES; UGÁ, 2010; 
CHIEFFI; BARATA, 2009; CUBILLOS et al., 2012; FERRAZ, 2009, 
2010; FERRAZ; VIEIRA, 2009; PEREIRA et al., 2010; VIEIRA et al., 
2010; YAMIN; PARRA-VERA, 2010). 
 
For Bergallo (2010), the courts order the supply of treatments 
without considering budget constraints nor effectiveness, quality or 
availability in the country; moreover, they do not consider political and 
management deficiencies as causes of the lawsuit. Thus, in some cases, 
judicial intervention puts the plaintiff at risk rather than ensuring his/her 
right to health because the prescription is not always appropriate to the 
patient’s needs (BORGES; UGÁ, 2010), and judges disregard the 
rational use of medicines and possible damages arising from misuse 
(DINIZ; MEDEIROS; SCHWARTZ, 2012; PEPE et al., 2010b). 
 
Particularly, studies about Brazil have shown that sometimes the 
evidence of drug efficacy and safety for the requested indication is 
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limited (DINIZ; MEDEIROS; SCHWARTZ, 2012), especially in cases 
of off-label indications or unregistered medicines in the country 
(CUBILLOS et al., 2012; FIGUEIREDO; PEPE; OSORIO-DE-
CASTRO, 2010; TANAKA, 2008).The courts do not consider these 
aspects in the legal decision-making. 
 
Borges and Ugá (2009), Gloppen (2008), Romero (2010) and 
Anderson (1992) argue that the negative effects of judicialization result 
from judges' limited technical expertise and their lack of understanding 
of the drugs selection process in the health system. Another judges’ 
limitation is the narrow focus with which decisions are made, since they 
only consider specific cases, subordinating the collective to individual 
needs through implementation of public policies. 
 
Other Judiciary’s limitations mentioned are: the difficulties faced 
by the courts to decide on goods provided by the State with public 
funds; the institutional inertia of the Judiciary since it acts only when 
triggered (BORGES; UGÁ, 2009); variability of judgments for similar 
cases (ANDERSON, 1992); the tendency of the courts to make law for 
the best or worst case but not for the modal case (MANFREDI; 
MAIONI, 2002); inadequate interpretation of the right to health by 
judges (FERRAZ, 2010); and non-recognition, by judges, of other 
interests rather than those of patients with drug coverage (SANT’ANA 
et al., 2011a; VIEIRA et al., 2010). 
 
Brazilian authors highlighted two possible conceptions that 
judges have about the right to health: an individual and absolutist 
conception that considers health as a constitutional right which cannot 
be limited by infra-constitutional norms (as regulations that define the 
budget or the health system organization) or by economic restrictions 
(BIEHL; PETRYNA, 2011; FERRAZ, 2010); and a reduced conception 
that considers the right to health as a simple delivery of medication, 
disregarding the importance of comprehensive healthcare (DINIZ; 
MEDEIROS; SCHWARTZ, 2012; GONTIJO, 2010; PEPE et al., 
2010a). 
 
Pharmaceutical industry appears as another actor interested in 
providing medicines through the courts (SANT’ANA et al., 2011a; 
VIEIRA et al., 2010). Some studies found a possible link between the 
increase of lawsuits requesting and inclusion of medicines in the official 
lists of the Brazilian health system  (CHIEFFI; BARATA, 2010; 
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FIGUEIREDO; PEPE; OSORIO-DE-CASTRO, 2010; MESSEDER; 
OSORIO-DE-CASTRO; LUIZA, 2005; PEPE et al., 2010a). 
Consequently, the health system ends up satisfying the pharmaceutical 
market needs, including in its lists recent drugs that meet the needs of a 
small group of people but do not offer a real therapeutic contribution to 
the needs of the collectivity (BAPTISTA; MACHADO; DE-LIMA, 
2009; LOPES et al., 2010; SANT’ANA et al., 2011b). 
 
At this point, there are ethical conflicts mainly related to the great 
budgetary burden over public funding caused by the requested drugs in 
relation to their effectiveness (cost-effectiveness) versus the treatment 
supply for minorities affected by serious and rare diseases (BOY et al., 
2011). 
 
Articles from European countries noticed that judges themselves 
are aware of the limitations of their intervention and the negative 
impacts it could have on the community, so there is some resistance 
from the courts to intervene in matters relating to the allocation of 
resources in the health system (SYRETT, 2004) even though people 
frequently recur to this route (FOSTER, 2007). 
 
In England, the legal challenges regarding the allocation of 
resources are seen by the Judiciary under the logic of reasonableness 
and fairness – judges recognizing the legitimacy of rationalizing 
financial resources, advising policymakers to bring special attention to 
the impacts of decisions made over individual patients (NEWDICK, 
2005). Actually, judges intervene only in those cases where they 
consider that the proportionality principle has been infringed, the rights 
compromised, or when the Executive decisions are irrational (FOSTER, 
2007). 
 
According to Den-Exter and Hermans (1998), in some European 
countries judges, in order to make a decision, consider the principles of 
medical need, urgency and no possibility of delay; however judges do 
interpret such principles in a relative basis, once they recognize the 
limited availability of resources. Some example of lawsuits of this kind 
are Nitecki v. Poland (Application No. 65653/01) and BGE 136 V 395 
et sqq.; 9C_334/2010 (KESSELRING, 2011).  
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1.4.3. Social Approach of Judicialization 
1.4.3.1. Positive Impacts 
For some authors, judicialization is an effective way for people to 
claim their right to health, a legitimate exercise of citizenship 
(MACHADO et al., 2011), and a way to demand overcoming of the 
gaps between what is stipulated in public policy and what has been 
implemented (GLOPPEN, 2008). 
 
In the Brazilian (BIEHL; PETRYNA, 2011; BORGES; UGÁ, 
2010; MARQUES, 2008; VENTURA et al., 2010) and Colombian 
contexts (MOLINA MARÍN et al., 2010; RODRÍGUEZ-TEJADA; 
MOLINA MARÍN; JIMÉNEZ, 2010; VÉLEZ-ARANGO et al., 2007), 
the authors emphasized that the increased lawsuits for access to positive 
health benefits are associated with greater community awareness of their 
rights, and recognition of the Judiciary as a means to demand them, 
particularly regarding access to medicines or services covered by the 
health system. Moreover, this trend would mean the identification of the 
Judiciary as a political arena in response to failures of traditional 
institutional channels of social control and popular participation. 
 
Furthermore, these authors consider that this phenomenon 
empowers individuals and NGOs to claim rights in the courts as a means 
of pressure for the system to ensure medicines supply (MEIER; 
YAMIN, 2011). They also point out that the NGOs’ support to this 
social mobilization allows visualization of the problems related to 
access to medicines because these NGOs get support from the 
community and the media interest (HOGERZEIL et al., 2006). 
Experiences from Chile, Costa Rica (CUBILLOS et al., 2012), Brazil 
(MACHADO, 2008), Argentina (BERGALLO, 2010) and South Africa 
(FORMAN, 2008) were emphasized because, in these countries, 
litigations brought before the courts by organized groups of patients 
unquestionably contributed to the adoption of laws that guaranteed 
access to antiretroviral treatment. 
 
Other aspects described in this approach were the positive effects 
that judicial intervention brings to minorities (e.g. rare diseases) (BOY 
et al., 2011) and vulnerable groups (e.g. women and the elderly) 
(CUBILLOS et al., 2012; VÉLEZ-ARANGO et al., 2007) who usually 
have less power in the traditional political sphere, thus preventing the 
59 
 
"tyranny of the majority" (BOY et al., 2011). In the case of health plans 
in Brazil, Alves, Bahia and Barroso (2009) and Lopes, Lopes-Filho, 
Gubolino, Mattos, and Marin-Neto (2009) pointed out that the courts 
have also been converted into an important space for claiming consumer 
rights. 
 
1.4.3.2. Negative Impacts 
Only Brazilian authors present the negative perception of the 
social point of view of judicialization. For them, the use of the courts as 
a way of access to medicines and health services does not mean by itself 
that the people consider that they are exercising their citizenship and 
that health is a right. 
 
For Leite and Mafra (2010), the access by way of the courts is not 
necessarily an outcome of the patient empowerment; on the contrary, 
according to their study, the general perception of the lawsuits 
beneficiaries was that they were receiving a favour from someone who 
served in the public sphere (aldermen, physicians, staff, etc.). Therefore, 
the authors concluded that the use of lawsuits has a strong tendency to 
"strengthen the relations of dependence and user perception of 
powerlessness." 
 
In this sense, according to Borges and Ugá (2009) quoting from 
Vianna (2002), the invasion of politics by claiming rights, even if in the 
name of equality, would negatively lead to 'passive enjoyment of rights', 
and state paternalism, reducing the citizens to the status of individuals-
customers of a providential state. 
 
In the case of access to medicines, Machado et al. (2011) argued 
that judicialization causes health to become a commodity disputed by all 
citizens, rather than a right guaranteed to the entire population. 
 
Finally, Da-Silva and Terrazas (2008) also emphasized that 
NGOs’ support and participation in the preparation of legal actions 
cannot be considered as a process of legitimate social participation. 
These organizations finance the attorney and the entire judicial process, 
so patients do not have a real link with the NGO. These authors also 
noted that this situation might indicate the influence of the 
pharmaceutical industry in funding these NGOs. 
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1.5. DISCUSSION 
 
A concentration of publications in Brazil was also observed in 
other studies (EMMERICK et al., 2013). This concentration may be 
related to three aspects: the fact that judicialization of access to 
medicines has become a problem of large magnitude in Brazil if 
compared with other countries (HOGERZEIL et al., 2006); the 
proximity of the Brazilian academia to the designing and 
implementation of the Unified Health System (PAIM et al., 2011); and 
the increasing investment in public health research in Brazil (VICTORA 
et al., 2011). So, the large number of publications during the period of 
2009-2011 may be due to greater investment in research with resources 
provided by the Ministry of Health in the period of 2005-2009 
(BRAZIL, 2013). 
 
The public health expertise of most of the studied authors and the 
predominance of health sciences journals may be related to the 
databases consulted, and may justify the greater frequency of normative 
approaches to judicialization, and the emphasis on the health systems 
managers’ view. The above demonstrates the predominance of a 
technical view of the phenomenon, while the social aspects are less 
considered in the analyses. 
 
The thematic analysis results allowed observing that the 
judicialization impacts regarded as positive or negative have changed 
over time. Thus, in the late 1990s and early 2000s the emphasis of 
positive impacts predominated both on the normative and social 
approaches, having as main reference the movements that claimed from 
the States the guarantee of access to treatment for HIV/AIDS, by means 
of both individual and collective lawsuits. 
 
Some particular features of HIV/AIDS cases include: high 
prevalence and incidence of the disease, becoming a public health 
priority; availability of drugs of proven efficacy but under patent 
protection and high prices (EIMER; LÜTZ, 2010); social mobilization 
including patient organizations and other civil organizations like 
"Doctors Without Borders" (FORD, 2004); and the recourse to the 
courts both to press governments to provide treatments, and to challenge 
the protection of drug patents in order to instigate the production of 
generic drugs that would guarantee access to treatment for the HIV+ 
population  (FORMAN, 2008). This can be considered an example 
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where social mobilization claimed the guarantee of a human right by 
lawsuits, and as a result collective interests prevailed over the interests 
of the market. 
 
The emphasis on the negative effects of judicial intervention 
began in the mid-2000s, when there was an "explosion" in the number of 
lawsuits for access to medication in some countries like Brazil and 
Colombia (HOGERZEIL et al., 2006). In this period, the characteristics 
of the claims changed. Individual lawsuits predominated, requesting 
three kinds of drugs: (a) medicines included in the health systems list; 
(b) new drugs indicated for diseases that had therapeutic option of 
recognized efficacy included in the health systems list, and (c) new 
drugs indicated for diseases that did not have therapeutic option in the 
health systems list. Furthermore, lawsuits that challenge the protection 
of drug patents are absent, and there is some evidence of the close 
relationship between pharmaceutical industries and patient groups 
(PEREHUDOFF; ALVES, 2010). The latter aspect particularly 
compromises the legitimacy of the social mobilization and its role in 
pursuing the right to health. 
 
According to CESCR (2000) “[t]he right to health is not to be 
understood as a right to be healthy…” but this right contains both 
freedoms and entitlements, which include “…the right to a system of 
health protection which provides equality of opportunity for people to 
enjoy the highest attainable level of health”. Thus, the right to health 
must be understood as both an individual and a collective right.  
 
Nevertheless, the thematic analysis results show that judicial 
interpretations of the right to health are different in Europe and Latin 
America. European judges tend to prioritize common wealth over 
individual rights (DEN EXTER; HERMANS, 1998), but in Latin 
American countries judicial decisions are usually favourable to 
individual lawsuits, without considering the impacts on the health 
system and the rest of the population. This variation may be a 
consequence of differences between law systems (common law vs. civil 
law); disposition of the courts to become involved in these matters 
(GAURI; BRINKS, 2007); and the health system legitimacy related with 
its good or poor performance (BELMARTINO, 2002; HERNÁNDEZ, 
2002). 
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On the other hand, the implementation of the right to health has 
as background the project of modernity. According to Santos (2008), the 
project of modernity, based on two pillars – regulation and emancipation 
–, had unbalanced development within capitalism. As a consequence, 
there was a strengthening of the regulation pillar over the emancipation 
pillar. Also, within the pillars there were imbalances between their 
principles, in the case of the regulation pillar, market prevails over the 
State and the Community, while in the emancipation pillar, science 
prevails over morality, ethics and arts, generating a close relationship 
between the market and scientific development in the modern society 
(SANTOS, 2008). 
 
Medical-industrial complex is an example of this context and its 
effects on society. The development of scientific knowledge based 
mainly on positivism (biomedicine) led to a reduced conception of 
health, which considers only biological and individual causes of 
diseases, ignoring the important effect of social and environmental 
factors on the population’s health (TESSER; LUZ, 2002). Moreover, 
this is accompanied by the phenomenon known as "medicalization of 
life" which can be understood in at least two ways: (a) the concealment 
of usually conflicting aspects of social relationships by their 
transformation into "health problems", and (b) the expropriation of the 
ability to care for people in general, making them dependent on the care 
given by doctors (CAMARGO JR, 2007). Thus, according to Illich 
(1975), the individual as a "consumer of care medicine is powerless to 
heal or cure their peers", reducing people’s right-to-health perception 
down to right to access to health services and medicines. 
 
At the same time, the subordination of scientific development to 
market interests resulted in the denominated crisis of innovation of 
pharmaceutical industry. This crisis has caused two effects. First, the 
neglect of diseases which affect major portions of the population, but 
who cannot afford to bear the costs of the treatment. Second, the 
entrance to the market of new drugs that often do not have enough 
evidence to guarantee the safety of people's health, nor represent 
significant advances to justify their high costs (ERVITI-LÓPEZ, 2011). 
Given this situation, the South Centre and the WHO have presented the 
proposal of a new model for funding research and drug development 
where these activities are separated from priorities imposed by the 
market (VELASQUEZ, 2012).  
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Furthermore, for the pharmaceutical industry it is more profitable 
now to focus on the research of rare diseases considering the marketing 
monopolies resulting from the patent protection of orphan drugs (HYRY 
et al., 2013). Rare diseases frequently affect specific "items" of the body 
(genes, enzymes, etc.), which can be treated with medicines of 
biotechnological origin (monoclonal antibodies, etc.). The lack of 
transparency about the real costs of research and development of these 
products, however, cause the prices to be charged so high that only 
governments have the capacity to pay them (LIGHT; LEXCHIN, 2012). 
 
In conclusion, judicialization is a complex phenomenon that 
involves technical-scientific, legal and social aspects. This phenomenon 
might be a result of different factors such as health system deficiencies, 
pharmaceutical industry interests and/or citizen empowerment. The 
studied papers analysed judicialization using mainly a normative 
approach (judicialization as interference of the Judicial Power in the 
Executive Power), and the regressive effects of judicialization on health 
systems were the most frequently cited impacts. Few studies used the 
social approach to judicialization (as a form of citizen participation). For 
this reason, there is not enough information about whether lawsuits for 
access to medicines are related to a real recognition of the right to health 
as an exercise of citizenship. These aspects need to be further studied.  
 
Some limitations of this study are the bias that can be induced by 
the large amount of papers from Brazil; and the exclusion of other types 
of publications, since many studies in Latin America about 
judicialization of access to medicines are not published in indexed 
journals but as official documents and academic theses or dissertations 
(REVEIZ et al., 2013). Finally, although the framework for the 
definition of judicialization approaches (normative or social) is from 
authors of the law area, this analysis considers mainly the perspective 
from healthcare professionals. 
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2. CHAPTER 2 – Towards a theoretical model for judicialization 
of access to medicines
2
 
 
 
2.1. ABSTRACT 
 
Although ensuring access to high-priced medicines is a challenge 
that all health systems currently face, not all the countries face the 
judicialization for access to medicines phenomenon. Health systems’ 
fragmentation has been appointed as one of the main causes, but since 
the judicialization occurs in health systems with different integration 
levels, other factors must be taken into account to analyse this 
phenomenon. A theoretical model is proposed for analysing the causes 
and consequences of judicialization of access to medicines, taking into 
account the social, political, and economic elements that modulate the 
role of medicines as health needs. The theoretical model considers 
elements (stakeholders, policies) that modulate the perception of 
medicines as health needs from two perspectives –health and market– in 
three levels: international, national and demand-side. Since the different 
perceptions created about medicines as a health need (according to 
Bradshaw’s categories) do not always coincide, sometimes the patients 
do not get access to the medicines they perceive as a need. In this 
scenario, individuals could seek the judiciary system. If it is sensible to 
patients’ complains, litigation becomes an alternative pathway towards 
access to medicines, which could affect the elements included in the 
model (feedback loop). Our theoretical model considers a broader view 
of this phenomenon and its effects emphasising how power structures, 
interests, interdependencies, values and principles of the stakeholders 
could influence the perception of medicines as health needs and the 
occurrence of litigation for access to medicines, according to each 
particular context. 
 
  
                                                             
2
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2.2. INTRODUCTION 
 
Health rights litigation is a global phenomenon that is on the rise. 
Globally courts are demanded to act to protect and fulfil the right to 
health. However, frequency and characteristics of lawsuits vary across 
the countries. In the Latin American region, for instance, court cases 
related to access to medicines are frequent (YAMIN; GLOPPEN, 2011) 
and have become a challenge for public health policies in some 
countries (BURGIN, 2014; HOGERZEIL et al., 2006; REVEIZ et al., 
2013) 
 
Health system fragmentation and health systems’ difficulties to 
guarantee access to medicines, especially new medicines, have been 
appointed as one of the main driving factors behind the rise of 
judicialization (FONDO NACIONAL DE RECURSOS, 2010). 
However, this phenomenon is frequent in countries with unified (Brazil, 
Costa Rica) or fragmented (Colombia, Argentina) health systems 
(BURGIN, 2014; REVEIZ et al., 2013). Furthermore, though all health 
systems currently face the challenge of ensuring access to high-cost 
medicines (SANCHEZ-SERRANO, 2014), they do not necessarily face 
the judicialization phenomenon or is less intense (e.g. United Kingdom 
or Chile) (BURGIN, 2014; FOSTER, 2007). This means that 
judicialization of access to medicines not only involves technical and 
scientific aspects at national level but also political and social factors 
(VARGAS-PELÁEZ et al., 2014). 
 
Medicines are considered as health needs, and their valuation can 
vary depending on the actors involved (users, prescribers, managers, 
etc.) (SOARES, 2013). Differences materialize in the incorporation of 
certain technologies over others, and lawsuits for access to medicines 
uncovered by the health system. In this way, the judiciary as a guarantor 
of the right to health could obtain an active role in the recognition of 
medicines as health needs and could become a modulator of public 
policies for access to medicines. 
 
This paper aims to present a theoretical model for analysing the 
causes and consequences of judicialization of access to medicines, 
taking into account the social, political, and economic elements that 
modulate the role of medicines as health needs. This theoretical model 
will be used for the comparative analysis of the causes and 
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consequences of juidicialization of access to medicines in Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile and Colombia. 
 
2.3. MEDICINES AS HEALTH NEEDS 
 
Literature presents different approaches to health needs 
definition, and many theoretical essays and empirical studies have 
sought to characterize this construct. However, given its complexity, the 
results are highly variable and even today there is no uniformity in the 
concept of need, both in ontological and epistemological terms, and 
neither in the most appropriate indicators for the measurement of health 
needs (ACHESON, 1978; BUTTER, 1967; DONABEDIAN, 1974; 
JEFFERS; BOGNANNO; BARTLETT, 1971). The theoretical model 
was constructed based on the definitions of ‘needs’ proposed by Max-
Neef et al. (1998), Willard (1982) and Bradshaw (1972). 
 
Max-Neef et al. (1998) argue that it is necessary to differentiate 
actual needs from satisfiers of these needs. Fundamental human needs 
are finite, few and classifiable; they are the same in all cultures and in 
all historical periods; what changes, both over time and through cultures, 
is the way or the means by which these needs are satisfied. Then, each 
economic, social and political system adopts different ways for 
satisfying the same fundamental human needs. 
 
Satisfiers are not the available economic goods. “While a satisfier 
is in an ultimate sense the way in which a need is expressed, goods are 
in a strict sense the means by which individuals will empower the 
satisfiers to meet their needs”. So, in other words, health systems are 
satisfiers of the need for protection (MAX-NEEF; ELIZALDE; 
HOPENHAYN, 1998), and medicines are goods that allow increasing or 
decreasing the health systems’ efficiency. 
 
In the same sense, Willard (1982) argues that human needs are 
not facts (properties, states, processes, relations) about people, but 
values. Needs are goal-oriented and goals are things people value. For 
this reason, disagreements about what people need are disagreements in 
attitude toward, and emotional attachment to, things variously 
considered to be valuable. 
 
Both of these conceptions (“needs as facts” and “goods as 
needs”) are related with how industrial capitalism has organized the 
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goods’ production and consumption, making the goods an end (MAX-
NEEF; ELIZALDE; HOPENHAYN, 1998). Industrial capitalism has 
also created a close relationship between science and market (SANTOS, 
2008), which influences on how health needs are understood. The 
hegemonic scientific development based on the positivist paradigm 
results in the predominance of a reductionist view of health focused on 
the biological and individual causes of disease (TESSER; LUZ, 2002). 
Moreover, scientific progress can lead the professional to be more 
concerned about the techniques and procedures than with the patient’s 
health, arising “a moral flavour as follows: If medical science and 
technology can do it, then people need it” (WILLARD, 1982). 
 
At the same time, the market turns the individual into a healthcare 
consumer that is not able to heal or cure their peers (ILLICH, 1975), 
making individuals dependent on the medical-industrial complex to 
resolve their health problems. Medicines use is increasing by the 
continuous and unlimited valuation of medicines as needs, and then 
patients demand unlimited availability of these products in the health 
systems.  
 
Nevertheless, health systems must meet the need for individual 
and collective protection. Limited resources determine choices 
according to some values (i.e. cost-effectiveness) to achieve the highest 
level of efficiency. Patients consider these choices not always 
legitimate, leading to lawsuits. Judges also consider certain values to 
make their decisions and recognize (or not) a medicine as a health need 
(i.e. constitutional provisions on right to health).  
 
Bradshaw’s (1972) "Taxonomy of social need" is useful for 
understanding the different value assessments about medicines. 
Bradshaw classified social needs, which included health needs, as 
normative (corresponding to a professional standard definition of need), 
felt (corresponding to the individual desire), expressed (also called 
demand, corresponding to the felt need turned into action) and 
comparative (corresponding to a deficit of a population when compared 
to other similar characteristics).  
 
In the case of access to medicines, the normative need 
corresponds to the decision-making of experts to define the medicines 
covered by the health system. The felt need is the need perceived by the 
user after getting a medical prescription. The expressed need (or 
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demand) is determined by the felt need and health services accessibility, 
that is, the services’ structural characteristics that enable the user to 
access them. Finally, the comparative need corresponds, in practice, to 
the health system capacity of responding equitably to people's needs 
(SOARES, 2013).  
 
2.4. THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
In order to consider a comprehensive view of access to 
medicines, the analysis of the health systems as Complex Adaptive 
Systems (CAS) was used as a basis for the theoretical model, because it 
reflect the complex dynamic of health systems, including the influence 
of both external (e.g. historical background) and internal factors (e.g. 
relationships established among the stakeholders) and how the outputs 
of a process within the system could feed back as an input into the same 
system. (PAINA; PETERS, 2012).  
 
The theoretical model (Figure 2-1) considers elements 
(stakeholders, policies) that modulate the perception of medicines as 
health needs from two perspectives –health and market–at three levels: 
international, national and demand-side (individuals, households and 
communities) (BIGDELI et al., 2013). The different perceptions created 
about medicines as a health need (according to Bradshaw’s categories) 
do not always coincide, and as result of this “conflict”, the patients do 
not get access to the medicines they perceive as a need. In this scenario, 
individuals could seek the judiciary system. If it is sensible to patients’ 
complains, litigation becomes an alternative pathway towards access to 
medicines, which could affect the elements included in the model 
(feedback loop) (PAINA; PETERS, 2012). 
 
The international level considers the recognition of the Right to 
Health in the Human Rights treaties, the World Health Organization 
(WHO)’s definition of essential medicines, the Innovation Model and 
the intellectual property protection treaty (TRIPS) and Multinational 
Pharmaceutical Industry. 
 
The national level includes the constitutional definition of right to 
health, the health system model and its components (‘software’ and 
‘hardware’, according to (SHEIKH et al., 2011)) and the national 
pharmaceutical industry. This level also considers the national policies 
related to intellectual property protection, science and technology 
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development and medicines price control. Moreover, due to their direct 
impact on the perception of medicines as needs, the pharmaceutical 
marketing practices were taken into account. All these elements could 
be influenced by the pharmaceutical policy. 
 
The third level, the demand-side level, comprises individuals, 
households and communities. People relate to the health system as 
citizens demanding their right to access to medicines and as healthcare 
consumers. Additionally, the organization of patient support networks 
aiming to overcome difficulties in access to medicines is also 
incorporated (OLMEN et al., 2012).  
 
Finally, the model shows the ways in which the judicialization 
phenomenon, if it happens, could influence the national level (e.g. 
inclusion of new medicines in the health system coverage) and the 
demand-side context (e.g. reaffirmation of the individual as a healthcare 
consumer). 
 
2.4.1 International level 
 
2.4.1.1 Health as a Human Right 
 
Health is recognized as a Human Right in different international 
treaties (HOGERZEIL et al., 2006). The International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights–ICESCR (UNITED NATIONS, 
1966) recognizes “the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health”. To achieve this goal 
the States must: (a) ensure access to essential medicines, according to 
the WHO’s definition; (b) “give sufficient recognition to the Right to 
Health in their national political and legal systems”; and (c) adopt 
legislation or take measures for controlling healthcare market actors 
(providers of goods and services, insurers, etc.) to ensure equitable 
access to health care and health services. However, this does not mean 
that the right to health is limited to the right of access to health services 
(CESCR COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL 
RIGHTS, 2000). 
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Figure 2-1 Theoretical model adopted as framework for the thematic analysis 
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In 2005, the World Health Organization (WHO) Member States 
committed to achieve Universal Health Coverage (UHC), ensuring 
access to health services for all people and protecting them of financial 
hardship paying (WHO WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, 2010). 
For this, the countries must “ensure that health-financing systems 
include a method for prepayment of financial contributions for health 
care, with a view to sharing risk among the population and avoiding 
catastrophic health-care expenditure and impoverishment of individuals 
as a result of seeking care” (WHA WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY, 
2005). More recently, in 2012, the United Nations (UN) General 
Assembly adopted a resolution on affordable universal healthcare, 
recognizing UHC as a priority of the post-Millennium Development 
Goal. In all these discussions, access to medicines has been considered a 
critical component of UHC (GOROKHOVICH; CHALKIDOU; 
SHANKAR, 2013). 
 
Although the UHC initiative aims to fill the current gaps in the 
health systems coverage around the world, these commitments must be 
treated with caution, as there is evidence of the influence that medical-
industrial complex stakeholders (i.e. pharmaceutical industry) have on 
multilateral organisms’ recommendations (COHEN; CARTER, 2010). 
Indeed, the UHC commitments are interesting for industrial medical 
complex as an opportunity for expanding the market for their products 
with the guarantee that the states are responsible for the healthcare 
payment and have resources available in the risk pooling funds. 
 
2.4.1.1 Definition of essential medicines  
 
In 1977, the WHO published for the first time the definition of 
essential medicines. The concept has changed over time, incorporating 
prioritization criteria and availability conditions. The current definition 
states that essential medicines are those that satisfy the priority health 
care needs of the population, which must be selected considering criteria 
of prevalence of the disease, evidence of efficacy and safety and 
comparative cost-effectiveness. In addition, essential medicines must 
always be available in adequate amounts, in appropriate dosage forms, 
with assured quality and at prices the individual and the community can 
afford (WHO WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, 2015a). 
 
Nowadays, discussions about essential medicines have grown 
especially regarding the high price of new medicines. On the one hand, 
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even when new therapeutic alternatives meet the criteria to be 
considered essential, their affordability is compromised because they are 
priced, in some cases, at over ten times the gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita of Low and Middle Income Countries (LMIC) 
(GOROKHOVICH; CHALKIDOU; SHANKAR, 2013). Some 
examples are sofosbuvir and daclatasvir for hepatitis C treatment and 
trastuzumab for breast cancer treatment, recently included in the WHO 
essential medicines list (WHO WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, 
2015b). 
 
On the other hand, the emergence of high-priced medicines for 
the treatment of rare diseases, that cannot be considered essential 
medicines according to the WHO definition, rises the discussion on how 
to guarantee the right to health for people diagnosed with such diseases 
without compromising the health system’s sustainability (STOLK; 
WILLEMEN; LEUFKENS, 2006).  
 
2.4.1.2 Pharmaceutical Industry and pharmaceutical marketing 
practices 
 
The pharmaceutical industry is an economic strategic sector 
because of its huge profit margin (almost 20% in 2013, surpassing the 
banking and the oil industries) (ANDERSON, 2014), and for its research 
and development (R&D) activities and generation of new knowledge, 
that create high added value (TOBAR; SANCHEZ, 2005). 
 
The pharmaceutical industry has a large lobby capacity and 
influence on decision-making concerning both health and trade policies, 
even in developed countries (SANCHEZ-SERRANO, 2014). For 
example, the pharmaceutical industry payments correspond to 50% or 
more of the total funding of regulatory agencies such as the European 
Medicines Agency (EMA) or the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). 
In this context, it is noted that the review time for new patentable 
medicines was significantly reduced, and alternatives of fast-track 
approval requiring less data about efficacy and safety have been created 
for medicines indicated for “serious” or “life-threatening” conditions 
(WILLIAMS; MARTIN; GABE, 2011). 
 
The pharmaceutical industry also lobbies for harmonization of 
regulatory frameworks across countries (i.e. International Conference on 
Harmonization – ICH) in order to open new markets in emerging 
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economies and to outsource some aspects of medicine development, 
including clinical trials, which are cheaper in developing countries 
(WILLIAMS; MARTIN; GABE, 2011). 
 
Pharmaceutical marketing practices have become more 
aggressive over time targeting physicians and, with raising frequency, 
the public. The creation of unhealthy reliance on and over-use of 
medicines have been questioned at different levels, from governmental 
spheres (HOUSE OF COMMONS, 2005) to academic discussions 
(ABRAHAM, 2010; MOYNIHAN; HENRY, 2006). 
 
The marketing strategies of the pharmaceutical industry include 
the redefinition or reconfiguration of health problems as having a 
pharmaceutical solution (disease mongering); the use of medicines for 
non-medical (enhancement) purposes; and the creation of new social 
identities and mobilisation of patient or consumer groups around 
medicines (MOYNIHAN; HENRY, 2006; WILLIAMS; MARTIN; 
GABE, 2011). Other strategies are medicines innovation and 
colonization of health futures, creating the expectation that with tools 
like pharmacogenetics or pharmacogenomics, “personalized medicine” 
will possibly resolve all the health problems, notwithstanding the 
limitation that the biotechnological approach to the medicines 
development has shown (FERNALD et al., 2013; HOPKINS et al., 
2007)  
 
2.4.1.3 The TRIPS agreement, innovation model, and medicines prices  
 
The agreement of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
recognizes medicines as patentable products. The patent protection must 
be available for at least 20 years from the date of application and 
granted as long the product meets the requisites of novelty, inventive 
step and utility (WTO WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 1995). The 
patent guarantees monopoly to the manufacturer who can set the prices, 
usually high, to the medicines in order to recoup investments in R&D 
activities (SANCHEZ-SERRANO, 2014). 
 
This is the reason why pharmaceutical companies have great 
interest in policy-making of intellectual property rights protection at 
international and national levels, especially in the implementation of the 
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TRIPS agreement (TOBAR; SANCHEZ, 2005). Among the concerns 
are the relaxation of the patentability criteria to achieve protection for 
me-too medicines; and the monopoly period extension to delay the entry 
of generic drugs, and the resulting prices reduction (ROSSI, 2006). 
 
Although the pharmaceutical industry’s sales depend on its ability 
to innovate, in recent decades the industry has devoted more efforts for 
developing me-too medicines, which is easier and involves less financial 
risk, than truly innovative medicines development (SANCHEZ-
SERRANO, 2014). This tendency appeared first in chemically 
synthesized medicines, and has recently been observed in 
biotechnological medicines (HOPKINS et al., 2007). 
 
Despite the aim of this protection system is to stimulate 
innovation (WHO 2006), this model does not necessarily translate into 
significant therapeutic advances. Actually, it is estimated that 70% of 
the medicines available on the global pharmaceutical market are 
duplicates, non-essential and minor variations of the parent drug (PAN-
AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION, 2010). Moreover, some of 
the new drugs have produced additional health risks as a result of 
adverse events leading to commercialization suspension, like COX-2 
inhibitors (INSTITUTO CATALÁN DE FARMACOLOGÍA, 2005). 
 
Recently, concerns about the fact that this system has resulted in 
abuses in the definition of exorbitant prices of medicines that offer little 
benefit to patients have risen (SANCHEZ-SERRANO, 2014). While 
pharmaceutical industries justify high prices as a result of high 
investments in R&D activities, this argument has been questioned, 
because evidence indicates that the expenses for marketing activities are 
higher than those for R&D activities (MORGAN et al., 2011). Some 
authors argue that firms set the new drugs’ prices in the early stages of 
the development process. As in the case of luxury goods, the more 
devastating the disease is and more unique and effective the medicine is, 
the greater price it has, regardless of the development cost (SANCHEZ-
SERRANO, 2014). 
 
Other signs of the crisis in the innovation model are the poor 
development of therapeutic alternatives aimed at solving the public 
health needs of developing countries (VELASQUEZ, 2012), and the 
null impact of patents on local capacity for scientific and technological 
development in these countries (WHO WORLD HEALTH 
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ORGANIZATION, 2006). As a result, although pharmaceutical 
spending has considerably increased in recent years, this has not 
translated into better health outcomes of the population (SANCHEZ-
SERRANO, 2014). 
 
2.4.2 National level 
 
2.4.2.1 Right to Health in the National Constitution  
 
Considering the obligations set out in the International Covenants 
on Human Rights, social justice values, equity and efficiency 
interpretations (VARGAS; VÁZQUEZ; JANÉ, 2002), the historical 
background and development model adopted (MEJÍA-ORTEGA; 
FRANCO-GIRALDO, 2007), each State defines in its political 
Constitution the type of citizenship that will be recognized and the way 
in which the social question will be inserted in public policies 
(FLEURY; MOLINA, 2002). These aspects will determine if the social 
rights, including the Right to Health, will be recognized as fundamental 
rights, that is, the state’s role in the fulfilment of these rights 
(PEREHUDOFF; LAING; HOGERZEIL, 2010). National Constitutions 
define if social rights would or would not be claimed through the courts, 
and if these claims would be through specific judicial ways 
(HOGERZEIL et al., 2006; YAMIN; GLOPPEN, 2011).  
 
In states where liberal culture predominates, social policies tend 
to be residualist: the state action, in the form of social assistance, aims 
mostly at the social needs of those who are unable to seek solutions in 
the market resulting in inverted citizenship. In states where conservative 
culture predominates, social policies on social protection are based on 
rights and duties related to the occupational status, in the form of social 
insurance, corresponding to regulated citizenship. Finally, in the social 
democratization of capitalism, state intervention aims to correct 
distributive social inequities and has as scope all the individuals, 
resulting in universal citizenship (FLEURY; MOLINA, 2002). 
 
2.4.2.2 Health System Model  
 
Each country establishes the health system model based on the 
assumptions set out in the Political Constitution as well as the values of 
each society (FLEURY; MOLINA, 2002). Health systems are social 
constructions whose design and performance involves confrontations 
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and negotiations among different stakeholders, such as state 
bureaucracy, healthcare professionals, trade unions, political parties, and 
the industrial medical complex (LABRA, 1999). 
 
Thus, although the health system hardware (finance, medical 
products, information systems, levels and types of human resources, 
forms of service delivery, and governance understood as organizational 
structures and legislation) has been defined, this does not guarantee that 
the population will have access to health services. The health system 
software, that is, ideas, interests, values, affinities and power 
relationships between the health system stakeholders also influence its 
performance, since not all the stakeholders have as main goal to improve 
the health of the population (SHEIKH et al., 2011). 
 
In the same sense, the availability of a list of essential medicines 
that the health system must supply does not ensure that such medicines 
will be accessible. Actually, some barriers for the access to medicines 
related to the health systems performance, like weak governance, 
fragmentation of the healthcare networks, and health sector pluralism 
have been identified (BIGDELI et al., 2013).  
 
2.4.2.3 Judiciary system 
 
The Judiciary system has become an alternative way for access to 
medicines in some countries; however, the level of intervention of the 
courts in issues related to access to medicines depends on their 
characteristics. The judiciary system organization (hierarchy of the 
tribunals, level of decentralization) determines its accessibility. On the 
other hand, some factors like the law system (civil or common law), the 
perception about the health system performance, and the perception of 
the physician’s authority as professional capacitated to decide about the 
best treatment for a specific patient could influence the judges’ 
willingness to accept and grant lawsuits for access to medicines 
(GAURI; BRINKS, 2007; YAMIN; GLOPPEN, 2011). 
 
2.4.2.4 Generic Medicines: National Patents Policies and regulation 
harmonization 
 
Each country, based on the TRIPS agreement, defines in its 
territory the regulations relating to the protection of Intellectual 
property. The agreement allows some flexibility for countries to decide 
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whether they recognize the patentability of medicines, and for second 
uses of medicines already available on the market (WHO WORLD 
HEALTH ORGANIZATION, 2006). In the Doha Declaration of 2001, 
the WTO recognized the negative impact that the patent protection had 
on public health, and highlighted the TRIPS agreement flexibilities (i.e. 
compulsory licensing) that countries can use if facing serious health 
problems (WTO WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 2001). 
Nevertheless, pharmaceutical companies lobby in Free Trade 
Agreements negotiations to limit the applicability of TRIPS flexibilities 
and demand application of the requirements contemplated in the TRIPS-
Plus agreement (i.e. exclusivity of test data) (CORREA, 2006; 
GOLDMAN; LOVE, 2015). 
 
Other strategies to delay the entry of generic products are the 
lobby for the harmonization of the regulation related to bioequivalence 
and bioavailability for chemically synthesised medicines, and 
biosimilarity for biotechnological medicines (SEUBA, 2010); marketing 
strategies for questioning generic medicines quality (HOLGUIN, 2014) 
and payment to generic companies to suspend the release of generics 
(FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 2013). 
 
2.4.2.5 National policies of scientific and technological development 
and National Pharmaceutical Industry 
 
Each country, according to its development model and technical 
capacities, establishes national policies for scientific and technological 
development. These policies may include measures both to promote 
investments by foreign companies in the country, and to stimulate 
national initiatives such as the creation of public pharmaceutical 
industries or encouraging the creation of private pharmaceutical 
companies of national capital to ensure local production of generic 
medicines (TOBAR, 2008). 
 
On the other hand, states can create and maintain public research 
institutes or allocate resources for funding research to generate 
technological knowledge and capacity to produce medicines, and the 
required materials (active pharmaceutical ingredients and excipients) 
aiming to reduce the country’s dependence on external imports 
(PINHEIRO et al., 2014). 
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2.4.2.6 Pharmaceutical policies  
 
In order to harmonize the market and health contexts, 
governments define national pharmaceutical polices. These policies 
express and prioritize medium to long-term goals for the pharmaceutical 
sector, and identify the main strategies for attaining them. They provide 
a framework within which the activities of the pharmaceutical sector can 
be coordinated. They cover both the public and the private sectors, and 
involve all the main actors in the pharmaceutical field (WHO WORLD 
HEALTH ORGANIZATION, 2001).  
 
Pharmaceutical policies are transversal, considering both market 
aspects (local production of medicines, production of generic medicines 
etc.) and sanitary aspects (regulations related to sanitary registration, 
quality assessment etc.). Many also include the promotion of 
International Non-proprietary Name (INN) prescribing, strategies for 
selecting medicines covered by the health system, price regulation 
policies and orientation of science and technology policies to meet the 
health needs of the population (TOBAR; SANCHEZ, 2005). 
 
2.4.3 Demand-side level: Citizens and consumers 
 
In the relationship between users and the health system, users can 
be considered as citizens demanding their right of access to health 
services and medicines, and as consumers of health care (FRENK, 
2010). In both cases, the health services accessibility (e.g. organization, 
geographical distribution), and enabling factors (e.g. socio-economic 
status, perception about the system and the right to health) influence the 
possibility of getting access to medicines (SOARES, 2013). 
 
Despite the demand for health services and medicines is usually 
individual, in most difficult situations people tend to organize and form 
support networks that facilitate overcoming barriers to access. However, 
some studies show that the power of patient activism and collective 
mobilisation have been ‘captured’ by the pharmaceutical industry by 
means of marketing strategies ‘to inform or to educate patients’ that 
highlight the “expert patient” discourse (ABRAHAM, 2010; 
WILLIAMS; MARTIN; GABE, 2011). Thus, patient groups have 
become important stakeholders in the health systems, particularly in the 
case of high-priced medicines, in two ways: (1) their advocacy during 
the process of incorporation of new medicines in the coverage of health 
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systems (PEREHUDOFF; ALVES, 2010), and (2) for the support and 
promotion of access to medicines through the courts (DA-SILVA; 
TERRAZAS, 2008). 
 
2.4.4 Judicialization of access to medicines: Conflict in defining 
health needs?  
 
As a consequence of the interaction among the aforementioned 
elements, different valuations of medicines as health needs rise in the 
society. Applying the Bradshaw's taxonomy, we identify three possible 
combinations (Figure 2-2) useful to explain the causes of judicialization 
of access to medicines from the definition of health needs.  
 
Situation 1 represents the ideal scenario: the medicine is 
prescribed, is covered by the health system, and is supplied to the 
patient. Situation 2 represents two possible scenarios: (a) The patient do 
not receive a medicine covered because the health system is not able to 
ensure access to the medicines covered; or (b) Despite the medicine is 
covered, the patient or the prescriber requests a specific brand. Finally, 
situation 3 also represents two scenarios: (a) The health system does not 
offer a therapeutic alternative that is adequate for the patient’s specific 
situation (e.g. low prevalence diseases or when the patient does not 
respond to the therapies offered by the health system); or (b) The patient 
receives the prescription of a medicine that could be substituted by a 
medicine covered by the health system (e.g. me-too medicines). In both 
situations (2) and (3), the patient can resort to the judiciary to have 
his/her need met. In situation (2), the judiciary system meets the 
comparative need since the patient receives the medicine that all patients 
must receive from the health system. In situation (3), even though the 
judiciary makes the health system recognize the medicine as a need 
(normative need, positive), the comparative need is not met because the 
lawsuit is individual, so it does not guarantee access to that medicine for 
patients in similar conditions. 
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Figure 2-2 Conflict in the definition of ‘need’ in judicialization of access to medicines 
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2.4.5 The Consequences of Judicialization: Feedback Loop 
 
If litigation becomes an effective way to get access to medicines, 
the proliferation of lawsuits may induce some positive and/or negative 
effects, depending on the lawsuits characteristics. Some of the possible 
effects are described below. 
 
2.4.5.1 Demand-side level 
 
At the individual level, the positive impact of a successful lawsuit 
is the satisfaction of the need felt by the patient, because it ensures 
access to medicines. This positive result leads other patients who need 
the same therapy to view the courts as a means of access to medicines. 
This occurs through the creation of support networks and patient groups 
to facilitate access to medicines (DA-SILVA; TERRAZAS, 2008). 
 
When the answer to the lawsuit responds to a healthcare gap in 
rights protection (situations 2a, 3a), judicialization reinforces 
citizenship. However, when the lawsuit serves individual desires for 
particular medicines at the expense of the alternatives available 
(situations 2b and 3b), it reinforces the patients’ identity as medicines 
consumers rather than as citizens that aim to improve the performance 
of the health system aiming to achieve collective impact (BIEHL, 2013). 
 
2.4.5.2 National level 
 
When most of the lawsuits are for situations as described in 
scenario 2a, judicialization has positive effects, such as regulatory 
changes within health systems aimed at strengthening surveillance and 
control of the pharmaceutical market (i.e. medicines price control) and 
control over the medical industrial complex actors (insurance 
companies, hospitals/clinics), which do not comply with their 
obligations to ensure access to medicines (BERGALLO, 2010; 
UPRIMNY; DURÁN, 2014). In addition, because of judicialization, the 
right to health can become a fundamental right (COLOMBIA, CORTE 
CONSTITUCIONAL, 2008a). 
 
Another positive effect is the creation of strategies aiming to 
close public policies gaps evidenced by lawsuits resulting from 
situations as in scenario 3a. These measures include the equalization of 
medicines coverage for all the population, the creation of Health 
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Technology Assessment (HTA) agencies, the development of clinical 
guidelines, the incorporation of some of the medicines required in the 
lawsuits in the health system coverage, and the creation of special funds 
to financing high-priced medicines (FONDO NACIONAL DE 
RECURSOS, 2010). 
 
However, when most of the lawsuits correspond to scenario 3b, 
the measures for updating the covered medicines lists meet the market 
needs of the pharmaceutical industry, rather than fill a health policy gap 
(BORGES; UGÁ, 2010; CUBILLOS et al., 2012). 
 
As consequence of the lawsuits’ rising number and economic 
impacts, judicialization of access to medicines brings up 
pharmaceuticalization of public health policies. Discussions about the 
health system performance focus on medicines accessibility, neglecting 
other strategies that could have a greater impact on the health outcomes 
of the population. 
 
Furthermore, judicialization has a regressive effect on both the 
equity of the resources distribution and the definition of priorities within 
the health system. As most of the lawsuits are individual, and the access 
to the Judiciary system, similarly to the health system, depends on 
individual enabling factors, people with higher socio-economic 
resources usually have a greater possibility of access to justice 
(ABRAMOVICH; PAUTASSI; FURIO, 2008; BERGALLO, 2010; 
UPRIMNY; DURÁN, 2014). 
 
2.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Medicines have become health needs in modern society because 
they are goods considered valuable (WILLARD, 1982). This value 
results from the combination of the social expectation that scientific 
development will resolve the health problems (WILLIAMS; MARTIN; 
GABE, 2011) and the economic and political interests of different health 
system stakeholders that rise around medicines as products. 
 
In recent years, the discussion about the health systems 
performance has been colonized by pharmaceuticals (goods) despite the 
health system (the satisfier) may be more efficient and have broader 
impacts on the population’s health by the implementation of other 
strategies (i.e. promotion and prevention activities). The analysis of 
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judicialization of access to medicines as a complex phenomenon brings 
the opportunity to discuss how the pharmaceuticals have colonized not 
only the health system scope but also the juridical spheres where access 
to medicines has been the subject of intense discussion (BRASIL, 
CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA, 2010a; COLOMBIA, 
CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL, 2008a).  
 
In this sense, our theoretical model considers a broader view of 
this phenomenon and its effects, overcoming the positivist view that 
predominates in the health system research (PAINA; PETERS, 2012) 
and in the judicialization of access to medicines analysis (VARGAS-
PELÁEZ et al., 2014). The model emphasises how power structures, 
interests, interdependencies, values and principles of the stakeholders 
could influence the perception of medicines as health needs and the 
occurrence of litigation for access to medicines, according to each 
particular context. 
 
By applying the Bradshaw’s (1972) taxonomy of social needs, the 
model also allows showing the different nuances that judicialization 
may have according to the characteristics of court cases. For instance, 
the interpretation of the phenomenon as an intervention of the Judiciary 
that aims to protect the right to health of the individuals based on the 
gaps of the health system, or as a strategy of the pharmaceutical industry 
to ensure market for their products (BAPTISTA; MACHADO; DE-
LIMA, 2009). 
 
Due to the different characteristics and consequences that 
judicialization of access to medicines has had across countries, general 
approaches are necessary for seeking common tools to face the 
challenge of guaranteeing equitable access to medicines and healthcare 
services that improve the population’s health. These approaches should 
consider the context of scarce resources, and ensure that the right to 
health be an instrument to guarantee the population’s health rather than 
an instrument of marketing. 
 
Finally, this model is an attempt to show that different factors and 
stakeholders can influence the occurrence of judicialization of access to 
medicines according to the context of each country. But models have 
limitations since they are simplified representations of reality. For this 
reason, this model does not intend to serve as a definitive model, and 
needs to be enhanced by being applied in practical cases.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART II:  
 
JUDICIALIZATION OF ACCESS TO MEDICINES AND 
PHARMACEUTICAL POLICIES: CROSS-COUNTRY 
ANALYSIS. 
 
 
 
 
87 
 
3 CHAPTER 3 – Accessibility to medicines in four Latin 
American countries and The Netherlands: A comparative study  
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Universal Health Coverage (UHC) is a commitment of the World 
Health Organization (WHO) member states with the aim of ensuring 
access to health services for all people and protecting them from 
financial hardship. For meeting this goal, three dimensions of coverage 
are considered: population, health services and technologies, and costs 
(WHO WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, 2010). The access to 
essential medicines is recognized as a significant UHC component for 
different reasons. Firstly, they are useful to resolve health problems by 
guaranteeing efficacy, safety and efficient use of financial resources 
(WHO WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, 2015a). Secondly, 
essential medicines represent an important share of the countries’ 
healthcare budget, and it is expected that the prices of new technologies, 
which are increasingly designated as essential medicines, be higher 
(WAGNER; QUICK; ROSS-DEGNAN, 2014). Global pharmaceutical 
expenditures have increased in the last years, reaching US$1.06 trillion 
in 2014, and it is estimated that it will reach US$1.3 trillion in 2018 
(IMS INSTITUTE FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, 2014). In 
the region of the Americas, the average share of the total pharmaceutical 
expenditure within the total health expenditure was 24.1% (9.3% to 
39.7%) in 2006, where 64.1% of that was funded privately (LU et al., 
2011). 
 
South American countries have established some measures in the 
last 15 years in order to achieve a UHC and guarantee equitable access 
to the medicines. However, the access to essential medicines is still a 
challenge and judicialization of access to medicines has emerged as an 
alternative way for patients to receive the medicines they need. When 
this phenomenon became frequent, for instance in Colombia and Brazil, 
changes in the policies related to the access to medicines were induced, 
such as the inclusion of new medicines in the health system’s coverage 
(TOBAR et al., 2014; VARGAS-PELÁEZ et al., 2014). 
 
In this context, this study aims to review the historical 
development of strategies for access to medicines in Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile and Colombia in the period 2000-2014 and compare them with 
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measures taken in The Netherlands – a country where judicialization is 
not as common as in the Latin American countries. 
 
3.2. METHODOLOGY 
 
An integrative literature review was carried out in order to obtain 
information about the measures for access to medicines taken between 
2000 and 2014 and their results in the studied countries. This review 
was complemented with information collected by means of semi-
structured interviews with the stakeholders from this countries involved 
in litigation for access to medicines
3
.  
 
3.2.1. Integrative Literature Review 
 
The databases PubMed, Scielo, and Scopus were consulted using 
the keywords “public policy”, “health policy”, “access to drugs”, 
“expensive drugs”, “provision of medicines”, “public policy analysis”, 
“health system”, “Brazil”, “Colombia”, “Argentina”, “Chile” and “The 
Netherlands” in English, Portuguese and Spanish. Additionally, the 
WHO Pharmaceutical Sector Country Profiles Data and Reports, The 
Ibero-American Observatory on Health Policies and Systems, The 
European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, and the 
Commonwealth Fund were also consulted. The information collected 
included the structure and organization of the health systems, the 
regulatory changes related to the strategies for access to medicines, and 
data about the results of these strategies, when they were available. 
 
3.2.2. Semi-structured interviews  
 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 50 key actors 
linked to the different stakeholders involved in the judicialization of 
access to medicines phenomenon (Table 3-1). The interviews were 
conducted in Argentina (Buenos Aires, La Plata), Brazil (Rio de Janeiro, 
Porto Alegre, Brasilia, and Sao Paulo), Chile (Santiago) and Colombia 
(Bogota), between August and December 2014. 
 
 
                                                             
3
 For this analysis data from the interviews were used as a complement of the 
literature review, but no specific technique of analysis was applied.  
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Table 3-1 Number of interviewed respondents 
Stakeholder Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Total 
Executive
(a)
 2 1 0 5 8 
Judiciary 3 3 0 2 8 
Health system 
manager 
(b)
 
(Manager) 
6 3 2 2 13 
Patient organization 
(Patient) 
1 1 1 2 5 
Health professional 
organization 
(Professional) 
1 1 2 2 6 
Other 5
(c)
 0 2
(d)
 3
(e)
 10 
Total 18 9 7 16 50 
Source: The authors. 
(a) Executive: Ministry of Health, medicines regulatory agency, superintendence 
of health or healthcare services;  
(b) Health system managers: State Health departments, Obras Sociales (OSs), 
Instituciones de Salud Previsional (ISAPREs), Empresas Promotoras de Salud 
(EPSs)  
(c) NGOs, Senator’s advisor, Expert in pharmaceutical marketing, Expert in public 
policies of health. 
(d) Lawyer involved in judicial cases for access to medicines, University lecturer 
expert in health economics.  
(e) NGOs, University lecturer expert in litigation for health right. 
 
A key actor was defined here as an individual involved in the 
judicialization of access to medicines, working for the stakeholder 
during at least one year, who was willing to offer their expertise, their 
opinions and knowledge to the object of study. 
 
The researchers from each country, who were involved in the 
study, helped identify key actors as potential participants. Additional 
respondents were identified through the snowball technique. 
Respondents were invited to participate in the study by means of e-mail, 
telephone or personally. None of them declined the invitation. All the 
interviews were conducted as individual face-to-face interviews and, in 
almost all the cases, they happened at the participants’ workplace.  
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The interview script included two general questions: (a) “In your 
opinion, what are the possible causes of judicialization of access to 
medicines?” and (b) “In your opinion, what are the possible 
consequences of judicialization of access to medicines?” These results 
are included in chapter 4. The interview scripts also considered two 
specific questions about interventions of the Judiciary and the Executive 
to cope with litigation and to improve access to medicines (Table 3-2). 
These results are described in chapter 5. 
 
All the interviews lasted from 30 to 45 minutes and were 
conducted by the same interviewer in Spanish or Portuguese. The 
interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim. To guarantee 
the quality of the data, all the transcriptions were sent to each participant 
for checking and correction. In order to maintain the participants’ 
confidentiality, only the country name and the represented stakeholder 
were informed. All participants signed informed consent before the 
interview. 
 
3.3. RESULTS 
 
Table 3-3 displays the demographic and economic background, 
administrative divisions, and health indicators of the studied countries. 
A full description of the health systems can be found in Annex A. The 
most relevant aspects of the measures taken by the studied countries to 
guarantee the access to medicines, between 2000 and 2014, are outlined 
below. 
 
3.3.1. Argentina 
 
The Argentinean health system is comprised of three subsectors. 
The public subsector corresponds to the public health system and the 
Federal Program Incluir Salud. The social insurance subsector 
corresponds to the Obras Sociales (OSs) and the National Institute of 
Social Services for Retirees and Pensioners/Integral Medical Care Plan 
(INSSJyP/PAMI). The private sector involves voluntary health 
insurance by direct payment or through the OSs (ABRUTZKY; 
BRAMUGLIA; GODIO, 2009; BELLÓ; BECERRIL-MONTEKIO, 
2011). 
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Table 3-2 Specific questions per country. 
A
rg
en
ti
n
a 
In the last years, the health system has taken some actions such as implementing the Unified System Refund (SUR) which 
incorporated some technologies to the health insurance system and changed the management of requests for expensive medicines. 
In your opinion, have these measures helped to improve the access to medicines and reduce the number of lawsuits? 
 
Has the judiciary also taken initiatives against the large number of lawsuits for access to medicines? If so, in your view, have these 
measures helped to improve the access to expensive medicines and reduce the number of prosecutions? 
B
ra
zi
l 
In 2010, the Specialized Component of Pharmaceutical Assistance was created in the Unified Health System in which there were 
changes both in the list and management of the covered medicines. In your view, have these measures improved the access to 
medicines and reduced the number of lawsuits? 
 
The judiciary has also taken initiatives due to the large number of lawsuits, including a public hearing of the Supreme Court in 
2009 and Recommendation No. 31 of 2010. Have the suggested measures contributed to improving the access to medicines and 
reducing the number of lawsuits? 
C
h
il
e 
In the last years, the health system has taken some measures such as the FONASA’s High-cost Medicines Program, special 
allowance fund and the Plan of Explicit Health Guarantees. In your opinion, have these measures helped to improve the access to 
medicines and reduce the number of lawsuits? 
 
Has the judiciary also taken initiatives against the large number of lawsuits for access to medicines? If so, in your view, have these 
measures helped to improve the access to medicines and reduce the number of lawsuits? 
C
o
lo
m
b
ia
 
Because of the numerous lawsuits for access to medicines, the health system has taken measures such as incorporating some 
technologies to the benefits plan. In your opinion, have these measures helped to improve the access to medicines and reduce the 
number of lawsuits? 
 
The judiciary has also taken initiatives due to the large number of lawsuits for access to medicines, such as Ruling T-760 of 2008. 
In your view, have these measures helped to improve the access to medicines and reduce the number of lawsuits? 
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Table 3-3 General information about the studied countries. 
Country Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia The Netherlands 
Population (2013)(a) 41,446,246 200,361,925 17,619,708 48,321,405 16,804,432 
Administrative division 
23 provinces 
 1 Autonomous 
City  
26 states,  
1 federal 
district  
15 regions 
32 departments 
1 capital district 
12 provinces 
Life expectancy at birth (2012)(c) 76 74 80 78 81 
Healthy life expectancy (2012)(c) 67 64 70 67 71 
Under-5 mortality per 1,000 live births 
(2013)(c) 
13 14 8 17 4 
GDP per capita (Current USD) (2013)(a) 14,715.2 11,208.1 15,732.3 7,831.2 50,792.5 
GDP per capita PPP (2013)(a) Not Available 15,037.5 21,942.2 12,423.9 46,162.1 
Gini index (2011)(a) 43.6 53.1 50.8 54.2 28.9 (2010) 
HDI Rank (2013)(b) 0.808 0.744 0.822 0.711 0.915 
THE as % of GDP (2013)(d) 7 10 8 7 13 
Government expenditure on health as % of 
THE (2013)(d) 
68 48 47 76 80 
Private expenditure on health as % of THE 
(2013)(d) 
32 52 53 24 13 
Government expenditure on health as % of 
general government expenditure (2013)(d) 
32 7 15 16 21 
Government expenditure on health per capita 
PPP (2013)(d) 
1,725 1,454 1,678 843 5,601 
Abbreviations: GDP: Gross Domestic Product. HDI: Human Development Index. THE: Total Health Expenditure. PPP: purchasing power parity value. 
Sources: (a) World Bank indicator. Retrieved from: data.worldbank.org [Accessed: 11 Jun 2015]. (b) United Nations Development Programme – Human 
Development Reports. Retrieved from: http://hdr.undp.org/es/content/table-1-human-development-index-and-its-components [Accessed: 11 Jun 2015]. (c) 
World Health Organization - Global Health Observatory (GHO) data. Retrieved from: http://www.who.int/gho/countries/en/ [Accessed: 11 Jun 2015]. (d) 
WHO, Global Health Expenditure Database. Retrieved from: http://apps.who.int/nha/database/Select/Indicators/en. [Accessed: 12 Jun 2015] 
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According to the 2010 census, 46.4% of the population had health 
coverage by affiliation to the Obras Sociales (including the 
INSSJyP/PAMI
4
), 10.6% had coverage by a private insurance company 
through the OSs (desregulados – unregulated), 5.1% had a voluntary 
private insurance (prepaid medicine), and 1.8% had coverage by state 
health programs or plans. The other 36.1% did not have health coverage 
by the other ways and depended on the public subsector for medical 
attention (ARGENTINA, INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE 
ESTADÍSTICA Y CENSOS - INDEC, 2012). 
 
As a result of the huge fragmentation of the Argentinian health 
system the medicines coverage varies among and within the subsectors. 
Argentina does not have a National Health Technology Assessment 
(HTA) agency or health economic guidelines (AUGUSTOVSKI et al., 
2012). Thus, the HTA activities are completely decentralized and the 
definition of the medicines covered in each health system’s subsector 
depends on different actors: the Ministry of Health, the Provincial 
Health Secretary, the Superintendence of Health Services, the Obras 
Sociales, and private insurers (Prepagas). In addition, there is no 
regulation about how frequent the lists of medicines must be updated.  
 
In the public sector, the coverage of health services and 
medicines varies greatly according to the development level and 
management capacity of the provinces. Since national regulations 
related to the health system are not binding in the provinces, the 
National Ministry of Health must negotiate with the provincial health 
ministries or secretaries about the implementation of the regulatory 
measures in the Federal Health Council (COFESA) (PROGRAMA DE 
LAS NACIONES UNIDAS PARA EL DESARROLLO - PNUD; 
ORGANIZACIÓN PANAMERICANA DE LA SALUD - OPS; 
COMISIÓN ECONÓMICA PARA AMÉRICA LATINA Y EL 
CARIBE - CEPAL, 2011). 
 
In 2000, the Plan Remediar was implemented as a response to the 
social, economic and health crisis. This plan involved the creation of 
primary care centres that offer access to healthcare services and essential 
medicines to vulnerable populations without charges. The plan is funded 
                                                             
4
 National Institute of Social Services for Retirees and Pensioners/Integral 
Medical Care Plan 
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by the National government where purchasing is centralized and 
distribution is made directly to the pharmacies of the Primary Care 
Centres (CAPS) (FERNÁNDEZ PRIETO et al., 2013). 
 
The National Ministry of Health has specific programs for 
funding and supplying high-price medicines, such as the Medicines 
Bank, which delivers cancer medicines to patients with no formal health 
coverage; and the HIV-AIDS Program, which also provides 
immunosuppressant medicines (TOBAR et al., 2012). These programs 
purchase medicines in a centralized way and distribute them to 
provincial health ministries or provincial referral services for the 
treatment of catastrophic diseases. Additionally, provincial health 
ministries undertake public procurements in order to complement these 
national programs.  
 
The coverage of the Federal Program Incluir Salud includes the 
Medical Mandatory Program (Programa Médico Obligatorio – PMO) 
(later addressed here) and the Benefits of High Cost and Low Incidence 
(PACBI). In both provincial and central levels, the PACBI provides 
high-cost benefits and assists in cases whose resolution involves a high 
complexity that requires the coordination of different sectors of the 
Incluir Salud program. Moreover, the PACBI provides highly complex 
surgical services that are performed only once, biological medicines and 
new drugs for chronic administration. The list of covered healthcare 
services and medicines was defined by Resolution 1862 of 2011 
(ARGENTINA, MINISTERIO DE SALUD, 2011). 
 
 
The PACBI is funded by part of the per capita monthly resources 
that the National Medical Benefit Direction (Dirección Nacional de 
Prestaciones Médicas) transfers to the provinces. The Direction retains 
the PACBI’s resources and reimburses the provinces only if they present 
the documentation proving that catastrophic diseases treatments were 
carried out (TOBAR et al., 2012). 
 
In the social insurance sector, the national OSs and the 
INSSJyP/PAMI must provide to their beneficiaries the basic package of 
healthcare services and medicines, which is called Medical Mandatory 
Program (Programa Médico Obligatorio – PMO) and defined by the 
National Ministry of Health (ARGENTINA, PRESIDENCIA, 1995). In 
contrast, for the provincial OSs, the PMO provision is not mandatory. 
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Since the national constitution states autonomy to the provinces, each 
provincial OS defines the coverage of healthcare services and medicines 
for their beneficiaries (PROGRAMA DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS 
PARA EL DESARROLLO - PNUD; ORGANIZACIÓN 
PANAMERICANA DE LA SALUD - OPS; COMISIÓN 
ECONÓMICA PARA AMÉRICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE - CEPAL, 
2011). 
 
Although some benefits have been incorporated into the PMO in 
the last years (emergency hormonal contraception, assisted fertilization 
and obesity treatment) (BÜRGIN, 2013), the list of medicines has not 
been updated systemically since 2004 (ARGENTINA, MINISTERIO 
DE SALUD, 2004). Furthermore, as the PMO is the minimal coverage 
package, each OS can include other medicines according to its economic 
capacity. The OSs are free to update or not their list of coverage.  
 
In order to remedy the inequality among the national OSs and to 
guarantee that all of them be able to provide the PMO, the Solidarity 
Redistribution Fund (FSR) was created. The FSR is funded by the OSs 
through mandatory contributions that vary between 10% and 20% 
according to the their beneficiaries’ salary range (CAVAGNERO et al., 
2006). However, the INSSJyP/PAMI and provincial OSs do not 
contribute to this fund.  
 
High-priced medicines have been financed with resources from 
FSR since 1998. Initially, the Administración de Programas Especiales 
(Administration of Special Programs – APE) was responsible for 
managing the resources to subsidize the coverage of high economic 
impact benefits for the treatment of low-incidence diseases 
(ARGENTINA, ADMINISTRACIÓN DE PROGRAMAS 
ESPECIALES, 1998). The APE therefore was a sort of reinsurance 
against catastrophic diseases to the national OSs (TOBAR et al., 2012).  
 
The list of pathologies covered by the APE was established by 
Resolution 500/2004, comprising 42 pathologies and 20 medicines of 
high economic impacts (ARGENTINA, ADMINISTRACIÓN DE 
PROGRAMAS ESPECIALES, 2004). The APE originally financed 
these medicines by means of, subsidies to the national OSs. However as 
the documentation to support the subsidies was not timely submitted by 
the OSs, this modality was nullified in 2008. Thus, instead of subsidies 
the APE established a reimbursement modality for the pathologies 
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considered in Resolution 500/2004 and maintained the subsidy modality 
for “exceptional cases” (YJILIOFF, 2014). 
 
As a consequence of the limited number of pathologies and 
medicines covered, the subsidies defined by way of exception increased 
significantly, forcing the financing of the uncovered medicines 
(LIFSCHITZ, 2014). Additionally, in practice, the APE destined less 
than half of its resources to the reimbursement of high-cost medicines 
and the funds were not allocated through transparent mechanisms 
(TOBAR et al., 2012). 
 
In view of that, in 2012, the APE was incorporated into the 
Superintendence of healthcare services and substituted by the Sistema 
Único de Reintegro (Unified Reimbursement System – SUR). With this 
reform, other 75 pathologies and 105 medicines were included in the 
coverage (ARGENTINA, SUPERINTENDENCIA DE SERVICIOS DE 
SALUD, 2012a). Later, also in 2012, the Sistema de Tutelaje de 
Tecnologías Sanitarias Emergentes (Supervisory System for Emerging 
Sanitation Technologies) was created as a mechanism to include new 
technologies in the SUR’s coverage (ARGENTINA, 
SUPERINTENDENCIA DE SERVICIOS DE SALUD, 2012c). With 
this reform, other 12 pathologies and 45 new medicines were included in 
the coverage (LIFSCHITZ, 2014).  
 
In the implementation of the SUR, maximum reimbursement 
rates for medicines were established, and the Superintendence of 
Healthcare Services was in charge of developing treatment guidelines 
for the covered pathologies, and updating the medicines list. In 2013, a 
follow-up system for safety and efficacy of the medicines covered by 
the Supervisory System for Emerging Sanitation Technologies was 
created. In this system, the national OSs are responsible for collecting 
the data (ARGENTINA, MINISTERIO DE SALUD, 2013a).  
 
Furthermore, some changes in the reimbursement authorization 
procedure were introduced. Nowadays, in order to apply for 
reimbursement, the national OS must submit online all the documents 
related with the clinic chart of the patient, the prescription, and the 
documents related to the medicines traceability systems in order to 
improve the transparency of the process (YJILIOFF, 2014). However, 
for some actors these measures have been more complicated. 
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The national OSs beneficiaries have 100% coverage of high-cost 
medicines. In contrast, for the provincial OS beneficiaries the access to 
these medicines involved co-payments. For providing expensive 
medicines for catastrophic diseases, the provincial OS make agreements 
with pharmacies and drugstores (TOBAR et al., 2012). 
 
In the private sector, the PMO coverage has been mandatory for 
all private insurance companies since 1996 (ARGENTINA, 
CONGRESO DE LA NACIÓN, 1996), but similarly to the social 
insurance subsector, the medicines coverage is rather variable. While for 
the deregulated affiliates the list of covered medicines varies according 
to the agreement made between the OS and the insurance company, for 
the voluntary private insurance the medicines coverage depends on the 
beneficiaries’ affordability to pay. 
 
Although the Superintendence of Health has been regulating the 
private insurance companies since 2011 (ARGENTINA, CONGRESO 
DE LA NACIÓN, 2011), these companies do not contribute to the FSR, 
and cannot apply to the SUR for reimbursement of high-cost medicines, 
except for deregulated affiliates, when the insurance company can get 
the reimbursement through the national OS. If a voluntary private 
insurance affiliate requires a high-priced medicine, which is not 
explicitly excluded of the policy, the company must finance it with its 
own resources, without possibility of reimbursement. Since 2013, a 
proposal about strategies for the reimbursement of medicines of high 
cost and for low-incidence disease treatment has been discussed 
(ARGENTINA, MINISTERIO DE SALUD, 2013b). 
 
In the last years, lawsuits have become an alternative pathway to 
obtain access to high-cost medicines, especially in both social insurance 
and private sector. When a patient requires a medicine that is not 
included in the OS list or in the insurance policy, he/she can resort the 
Judiciary system. If the court decision favours the patient, the OS or the 
private insurance company must supply the medicine and finance it with 
their own resources (BÜRGIN, 2013). The strategies for access to 
medicines are summarized in Figure 3-1. 
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Figure 3-1 Health System Organization and Access to medicines pathways in Argentina 
 
Source: Prepared by the author based on Belló and Becerril-Monteiko (2011) 
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3.3.2. Colombia 
 
Two subsectors, the General System of Social Security in Health 
(SGSSS) and the private health insurance, constitute the Colombian 
health system. The SGSSS has three regimes: the contributory regime 
focused on formal workers and employees; the subsidized regime 
focused on the low-income population; and the special regimes focused 
on employees of specific economic sectors. Uncovered poor people 
depend on the public sector for access to healthcare services 
(COLOMBIA, 1993b), but access is provided only to emergency health 
services (COLOMBIA, 2007). In 2014, 48.01% of the population were 
covered by the subsidized regime, 43.56% by the contributory regime, 
3.9% by special regimes; and 4.55% were uncovered (ASI VAMOS EN 
SALUD, 2015). In addition, the affiliates to the contributory regime can 
buy private health insurance (medicina prepagada – prepaid medical 
service). 
 
All the insurers of the subsidised and contributory regimes, called 
Health-Promoting Enterprises (EPSs), must guarantee access to the 
medicines and healthcare services included in the Compulsory Health 
Plan (Plan Obligatorio de Salud – POS) with the resources per capita 
(UPC) that they received from the Solidarity and Guarantee Fund 
(FOSYGA) (GUERRERO et al., 2011). In 1993, when the health system 
was created, two different lists were defined. While the POS for the 
contributory regime considered health services and treatments at all 
health care complexity levels, the POS for the subsidized regime (POS-
S) covered only primary healthcare and some high-cost services (i.e. 
some cancer treatments and treatment for chronic renal disease). As for 
medicines, the list specified the active, the dosage form and the 
concentration of the products covered. Both lists were matched in 2012 
after a progressive process (COLOMBIA, COMISIÓN DE 
REGULACIÓN EN SALUD – CRES, 2009, 2010, 2012) ordered by the 
Constitutional Tribunal (COLOMBIA, CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL, 
2008a). 
 
Since the creation of the POS, the updating process was neither 
continuous, periodical nor with a transparent methodology (GIEDION; 
PANOPOULOU; GÓMEZ-FRAGA, 2009). Only in 2011, the process 
for updating the list of medicines came to include strategies for social 
participation. Additionally, the Health Technology Assessment Institute 
(IETS) was created and a frequency of two years for the updating 
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process was set (COLOMBIA, 2011). Currently, the POS covers 
services and medicines required at different healthcare levels, from 
primary care to high-cost treatments like cancer, transplantations and 
some biotechnological medicines (COLOMBIA, MINISTERIO DE 
SALUD Y PROTECCIÓN SOCIAL, 2015a). 
 
The development of clinical practice guidelines has neither been 
organized nor coordinated with the process of POS updating. Only in 
2011, as part of the POS updating, the medicines included in the 
guidelines published by the Ministry of Health were considered. 
However, according to the regulation, the presence of a medicine in an 
official guideline does not mean that this medicine is automatically 
covered by the POS (GIEDION et al., 2014). Although the guidelines 
should be a tool to guarantee rational use of medicines, their application 
is not mandatory to define the coverage in specific cases, especially in 
cases where high-cost medicines are covered only under specific 
indications.  
 
In order to avoid the adverse selection of patients with high-cost 
or catastrophic diseases whose treatment is covered by the POS, the 
National Account of High Cost (Cuenta de Alto Costo – CAC) was 
created in 2007 (VARGAS-ZEA et al., 2012). The CAC is an auto-
managed entity administrated by the insurers. All insurers of both 
subsidized and contributory regimes must report to the CAC with 
information about patients with catastrophic diseases. In addition, the 
EPSs must transfer part of the UPC resources to CAC, which is in 
charge of redistributing such resources following criteria based on 
catastrophic diseases’ prevalence, incidence, cost and number of 
affiliates of each insurer (COLOMBIA, MINISTERIO DE LA 
PROTECCIÓN SOCIAL, 2007). The pathologies comprised in the CAC 
are chronic kidney disease and HIV/AIDS, which are followed since 
2008. More recently, cancer, haemophilia, rheumatoid arthritis and rare 
diseases were incorporated (COLOMBIA, CUENTA DE ALTO 
COSTO, 2015). 
 
If a patient requires a medicine that is not covered by the POS, 
his/her specific case is assessed by the insurer’s technical-scientific 
committee (Comité Técnico-Científico - CTC). If the CTC considers that 
the medicine is needed, the insurer supplies the product and can start the 
process for reimbursement. The contributory regime insurers get 
reimbursement from the FOSYGA, while the subsidized regime insurers 
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get reimbursement from the Health Secretary of the Departments 
(COLOMBIA, 2001, 2007; COLOMBIA, CORTE 
CONSTITUCIONAL, 2008a). 
 
In case the CTC considers that the prescription of that medicine is 
not pertinent and denies the requirement, the patient can resort the 
Judiciary by means of a lawsuit (accion de tutela) invocating the 
defence of his/her right to health. If the Judiciary grants the medicine, 
the insurer must supply it. In this scenario, the insurer can also get 
reimbursement, as above described. However, if the lawsuit is against an 
EPS-S, the judge can order reimbursement from FOSYGA; although 
regulation states that the reimbursement is a responsibility of the Health 
Secretary of the Departments (COLOMBIA, CORTE 
CONSTITUCIONAL, 2013). 
 
In the case of especial regimes, each regime defines the list of 
healthcare services and medicines that will be covered, usually 
considering some therapies not included in the POS. Similar to the EPS, 
whether a patient requires a medicine that is not covered, it is also 
evaluated by the CTC of that special regime. If the request is denied, the 
patient can also resort to the Judiciary. In both cases, it is the special 
regime, with its own resources, that must pay for the medicines. They 
cannot ask for reimbursement from the FOSYGA. 
 
The private sector can be divided into two parts, the private 
insurance (Medicina prepagada – Prepaid medical service) and out-of-
pocket expenditure. Private insurance can only be hired by contributory 
regime affiliates. This kind of insurance usually provides optional 
benefits such as care for events not included in the POS, or different or 
additional conditions of hospitality and technology (COLOMBIA, 
1993a). Nevertheless, the prepaid medical service usually does not cover 
medicines. Then, the user must access medicines by out of pocket 
expenditure, or in case the same company owns an EPS and a prepaid 
medical service, sometimes the patient is advised to request the 
medicine by means of a lawsuit against the EPS (UPRIMNY; DURÁN, 
2014). 
 
 
As a consequence of the pressure induced by exceptional 
pathways for access to medicines, since 2014 a process has taken place 
to change the way how the medicines covered by the health system are 
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described. So, the positive list (explicit inclusions) that describes the 
international Non-proprietary Names (INN), dosage form and strength 
of the medicines covered is being changed for a negative list describing 
only the medicines not covered by the health system (explicit 
exclusions). As a part of this process, the most recent updating of the 
POS eliminated the specification of dosage form and strength of the 
medicines covered. In addition, to avoid the use of exceptional pathways 
for access to medicines, all the medicines of some therapeutic groups 
were included in the POS (e.g. proton pump inhibitors) (COLOMBIA, 
MINISTERIO DE SALUD, 2014a). 
 
3.3.3. Brazil 
 
The health system in Brazil consists of public and private sectors. 
The public sector involves the Unified Health System (SUS) created by 
the National Constitution of 1988 whose principle was universal and 
equitable access to comprehensiveness healthcare (LEVINO; 
CARVALHO, 2011). The private sector, called supplementary health 
system, corresponds to insurance companies and private healthcare 
institutions. Although all citizens could access public services, in 2013, 
72.1% of the population depended exclusively on the SUS for access to 
healthcare services, and 27.9% had some health insurance plan 
(GADELHA et al., 2015). Regarding access to medicines, in the 
Brazilian context the term pharmaceutical assistance involves the set of 
activities related to access to, quality and rational use of medicines for 
outpatient care (BRASIL, CONSELHO NACIONAL DE SAÚDE, 
2004). In 1998, the pharmaceutical assistance was incorporated in the 
SUS for the first time (SANTOS, 2011) by means of the National 
Medicines Policy (PNM) (BRASIL, MINISTÉRIO DA SAÚDE, 1998). 
This policy, based on the principle of decentralized management, aimed 
to prioritize the universal access to essential medicines, to ensure the 
medicines’ quality, efficacy and safety, and promote their rational use 
(KORNIS et al., 2011). 
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Figure 3-2 Health System Organization and Access to medicines pathways in Colombia 
 
 
Source: Prepared by the author based on Guerrero et al (2011) 
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However, the PNM implementation occurred through isolated 
and disjointed programs for the provision of medicines. Consequently, 
while some essential medicines were included in more than one 
program, other medicines were uncovered. Other problems resulted 
from the lack of clarity in the financing regulation and the increasing 
number of services related to medicines supply (KORNIS et al., 2011; 
SANTOS, 2011). 
 
Aiming to resolve these difficulties, the Management Pact 
established in 2006 a specific set of funds for pharmaceutical assistance 
within outpatient care considering three components: the Basic 
Component (CBAF) for financing the medicines required within 
Primary Healthcare; the Strategic Component (CESAF) focused on 
medicines for treatment of transmissible diseases (i.e. tuberculosis, 
HIV/AIDS); and the Exceptional Dispensation Medicines Component 
(CMDE) for financing high-cost medicines. This funding does not 
include resources for medicines for inpatient care (BRASIL, 
MINISTÉRIO DA SAÚDE, 2006). 
 
Despite these measures, the barriers to access to medicines within 
outpatient care persisted. As a consequence, the number of lawsuits for 
access to medicines increased considerably (most of them from people 
getting healthcare by private insurance), generating budgetary 
limitations especially for the states (CHIEFFI; BARATA, 2009; 
FERRAZ, 2010). In view of this scenario, the Federal Supreme Court 
(STF) called a public hearing in 2009 that was attended by 
representatives of health managers, legal professionals, the healthcare 
private sector, pharmaceutical industry and civil society organizations 
(from users, health professionals and educational and research 
institutions) (GOMES et al., 2014).  
 
The Ministry of Health applied some of the measures suggested 
in the public hearing, aiming to extend the coverage and improve access 
to medicines in the SUS. In late 2009, the Specialized Component of 
Pharmaceutical Assistance (CEAF) replaced the CMDE (BRASIL, 
MINISTÉRIO DA SAÚDE, 2009). As part of the CEAF 
implementation, new medicines for the treatment of pathologies already 
covered by the SUS as well as some medicines for the treatment of 
uncovered pathologies were included in the National List of Essential 
Medicines (RENAME). Other measures aiming to keep a balance in the 
budgetary burden of high-cost medicines among the three government 
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levels (municipal, state and Union), including centralized purchasing by 
the Ministry of Health for the most expensive medicines, and 
reorganization of the funding schemes (BRASIL, MINISTÉRIO DA 
SAÚDE, 2010). 
 
Additionally, the National Committee for Technology 
Incorporation (CONITEC) was created. The CONITEC is responsible 
for advising the Brazilian Ministry of Health about health technologies’ 
incorporation into or exclusion from the SUS and development of 
clinical guidelines. The technology assessment is carried out considering 
the evidence of efficacy, safety and cost-effectiveness. Aiming to 
maintain the transparency of the assessment process, all the technical 
reports are submitted for public consultation. The contributions and 
suggestions of the public consultation are analysed and entered into the 
CONITEC’s final report, which is later forwarded to the Secretary of 
Science, Technology and Strategic Inputs of the Brazilian Ministry of 
Health for a final decision (INTERNATIONAL NETWORK OF 
AGENCIES FOR HEALTH TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT - 
INAHTA, 2015).  
 
In order to guarantee comprehensiveness of the pharmacological 
treatment, clinical guidelines (PCDT) were developed or updated for 
each covered pathology. The PCDT states the criteria for diagnosis, the 
algorithm for treatment decision-making and the measures for clinical 
monitoring (i.e. frequency of appointments with a medical specialist or 
clinical tests). From the management perspective, the PCDT is a 
guideline about how to organize the healthcare network for the state and 
municipal health managers (BRASIL, MINISTÉRIO DA SAÚDE, 
2010). 
 
Notwithstanding, in some cases the PCDT criteria become a 
barrier to access to these medicines, because of the SUS limitations for 
supplying secondary care services (LIMA-DELLAMORA; CAETANO; 
OSORIO-DE-CASTRO, 2012; ROVER et al., 2016). Another access 
restriction appears when a patient requires a medicine covered by the 
health system but his/her characteristics do not meet the PCDT’s 
criteria, or when the patient has a pathology that is not covered by the 
CEAF.  
In all the aforementioned situations, patients can resort to the 
judiciary against the state or municipal health department, or less 
frequently to the Ministry of Health, claiming the protection of their 
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right to health (BAPTISTA; MACHADO; DE-LIMA, 2009; MACEDO; 
LOPES; BARBERATO-FILHO, 2011; ROVER et al., 2016). 
 
The SUS does not have specific resources to fund medicines for 
inpatient care (including cancer treatment). The costs of these medicines 
are financed via fee-for-service payments from the SUS to the hired 
providers, which are fixed by the Ministry of Health. Currently, the 
Ministry of Health is working on a new policy for funding these 
medicines, since the emergence and more frequent use of new high-cost 
oncologic medicines cannot be afforded with the current resources 
(BRASIL, MINISTÉRIO DA SAÚDE, 2014)  
 
In the private insurance sector, the coverage depends on the 
client’s ability to pay, and the benefits usually allow direct access to 
specialist physicians and some advantages in hospitality for inpatient 
care. In general, the insurance companies do not cover high-cost 
treatments (i.e. transplantations), that are covered by the SUS (PAIM et 
al., 2011). 
 
The insurance companies usually do not cover medicines for 
outpatient care. In this case, the affiliates buy the medicines in private 
pharmacies according to their ability to pay. In order to make access to 
medicines for chronic conditions (i.e. hypertension or diabetes mellitus) 
affordable for health insurance beneficiaries, the Ministry of Health 
created the program Farmácia Popular (Popular Pharmacy). In this 
case, the Ministry of Health hire private pharmacies by which users can 
access these medicines by a co-payment (SANTOS-PINTO; COSTA; 
OSORIO-DE-CASTRO, 2011).  
 
If a patient requires a high-cost medicine covered by the CEAF, 
and she or he meets the PCDT criteria, then the patient can get access to 
the treatment in the SUS. In contrast, if the patient does not meet the 
criteria, she/he can resort the judiciary against the public system and get 
access by public resources funding (BAPTISTA; MACHADO; DE-
LIMA, 2009; MACEDO; LOPES; BARBERATO-FILHO, 2011; 
ROVER et al., 2016). Recently, lawsuits against insurance companies 
have also occurred requiring medicines or procedures to be excluded 
from the insurance plans. In these cases, the company pays for the 
treatment with its own resources (PANDOLFO; DELDUQUE; 
AMARAL, 2012). 
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Figure 3-3 Health System Organization and Access to medicines pathways in Brazil 
 
Source: Prepared by the author based on: Becerril-Montekio, et al. (2011) 
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3.3.4. Chile 
 
The Chilean health system is constituted of three subsectors. The 
public sector corresponds to the National Health Fund (Fondo Nacional 
de Salud - FONASA); the private sector corresponds to Health 
Insurance Institutions (Instituciones de Salud Previsional - ISAPREs); 
and the third subsector is the Armed Forces’ health system. In 2014, 
77% of the population was covered by FONASA; 17% was affiliated to 
the ISAPREs; and the Armed Forces’ health system covered 3% 
(CHILE, COMISIÓN ASESORA PRESIDENCIAL, 2014). However, 
most of the resources are concentrated in the private sector, since the 
high-income population is affiliated to the ISAPREs (MONTOYA-
AGUILAR, 2013).  
 
Medicines were once supplied solely by the public health system, 
in accordance with the National Formulary, which contains a list of the 
medicines covered (by International Non-proprietary Name) and a 
monograph for each product. If the patients needed other medicines, 
they had to buy them in private pharmacies by out-of-pocket 
expenditure. Nevertheless, since 2004, with the statement of the Explicit 
Health Guarantees (Garantias Explicitas en Salud – GES), some 
medicines have been included in the health system’ coverage. Currently, 
GES covers 80 pathologies (BECERRIL-MONTEKIO; REYES; 
MANUEL, 2011). 
 
The Guarantees include access to the healthcare services and 
medicines defined for each pathology according to the guideline; 
opportuneness in the access to healthcare according to maximum 
waiting time set out in the guidelines; financial protection related to the 
aforementioned co-payments; and quality of the healthcare ensured by 
the accreditation process of healthcare institutions (CHILE, 
SUPERINTENDENCIA DE SALUD, 2015a). The process of choosing 
the covered pathologies takes into account criteria such as the health 
status of the population, the interventions’ effectiveness and their effect 
on extending or improving the quality of life, and if possible, cost-
effectiveness and public’s preferences and priorities. Since there is not 
an official agency in charge of the HTA activities, the Ministry of 
Health commissioned the development of these studies to academic 
institutions, independent researchers etc. (GIEDION et al., 2014).  
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The GES must be guaranteed by the FONASA and the ISAPREs 
for all citizens. Nevertheless, access to the GES depends on some 
conditions. In the public sector, the FONASA offers two possible 
modalities for accessing healthcare services: the Institutional Attention 
Modality (Modalidad de Atención Institucional - MAI) and the Free 
Choice Modality (Modalidad de Libre Elección – MLE) (CHILE, 
SUPERINTENDENCIA DE SALUD, 2015b). The MAI is available for 
all the beneficiaries, but those with higher income (groups C and D) 
must pay co-payments of 10% and 20% respectively. This modality 
supplies the healthcare services in the National Health Services System 
(SNSS) (BECERRIL-MONTEKIO; REYES; MANUEL, 2011). The 
affiliates to the MAI can access to the GES, but the patient does not 
have the possibility of choosing health care facilities or a physician. 
Sometimes, in order to guarantee the opportunity of access to healthcare, 
the FONASA hires healthcare services from private hospitals 
(MONTOYA-AGUILAR, 2013). 
 
In 2014, the Medicines Fund was established in order to 
guarantee timely access to medicines for treating hypertension, diabetes 
mellitus and hypercholesterolemia in the primary care of the public 
health sector (CHILE, MINISTERIO DE SALUD, 2015). 
 
Regarding high-priced medicines, there are three pathways for 
access to these medicines in the MAI. The first one is the GES, which 
include some high-priced medicines for the included pathologies (e.g. 
biotechnological medicines for breast cancer or rheumatoid arthritis 
treatment) (CHILE, SUPERINTENDENCIA DE SALUD, 2015a). The 
second way is the FONASA’s catastrophic insurance (also called 
FONASA’s program for complex healthcare service) which covers 
100% of the cost of some healthcare service such as chemotherapy or 
medicines for HIV infection treatment (CHILE, 
SUPERINTENDENCIA DE SALUD, 2015c). The third way is the 
FONASA’s high-cost medicines program which also covers 100% of the 
treatment cost of eight different pathologies (e.g. trastuzumab for breast 
cancer or biotechnological medicines for rheumatoid arthritis), but this 
program has limited economic resources, thus only a limited number of 
patients has access to this coverage, usually for a short time (3 months) 
(CHILE, FONDO NACIONAL DE SALUD, 2015). 
 
The MLE is available for people from groups B, C, and D. In this 
case, the users can choose private institutions for access to a healthcare 
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service, and must pay some vouchers (according to three levels) which 
are more expensive than the MAI’s co-payments. If the patient gets 
medical attention by means of the MLE, the FONASA is not bound by 
the GES. 
 
As for diseases not covered by the GES, patients can get access to 
health services and medicines by means of a regular coverage offered by 
the FONASA. But they can face difficulties in access, such as, longer 
waiting time and/or increased out-of-pocket expenditure, because such 
care is not supported by legal guarantees (GIEDION et al., 2014). 
 
In the private sector, the ISAPREs offer different health plans that 
cannot be inferior to the healthcare services covered by the MLE of the 
FONASA. From 2004 on, the ISAPREs must guarantee the GES to their 
affiliates, charging the same price from all affiliates. In addition, the 
Solidarity Compensation Fund was created in order to pool health risks 
(related to the GES) among the beneficiaries of such institutions, but it 
comprises only the open ISAPREs (CHILE, COMISIÓN ASESORA 
PRESIDENCIAL, 2014). Nevertheless, similarly to the FONASA, the 
guarantees only apply if the patient accesses a healthcare service in a 
specific network defined by the insurer for the GES. If the patient wants 
to choose the healthcare facility or the physician, he or she does not 
have the right to the GES (MONTOYA-AGUILAR, 2013). 
 
As regards catastrophic pathologies, the open ISAPREs has 
created the Coverage for Catastrophic Diseases (CAEC) since 2000, 
which is funded by payroll mandatory contributions (7%). The CAEC 
does not focus on specific pathologies, thus it could be activated in case 
the cost of the treatment (e.g. co-payments) jeopardizes the economic 
sustainability of the family. However, the coverage is limited, for 
instance, in the case of outpatient medicines CAEC covers only 
immunosuppressant or chemotherapy medicines included in programs of 
the Ministry of Health, and the patient must access healthcare services 
from a specific network defined by the ISAPRE (CHILE, 
SUPERINTENDENCIA DE SALUD, 2015d). The coverage of non-
GES pathologies in the ISAPREs sector depends on each health 
plan/policy (GIEDION et al., 2014). 
 
The Armed Forces’ subsystem has a specific coverage of 
healthcare services and medicines defined by the Ministry of Defence. 
This subsystem does not have a reinsurance or risk equalization system 
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to support the coverage of catastrophic expenditures; however, there are 
welfare services that operate as solidarity funds (GATINI; ALVAREZ 
LEIVA; GONZÁLEZ ESCALONA, 2011). 
 
In 2015, in order to guarantee universal access to high-priced 
medicines for all citizens, regardless of their affiliation to a health 
system (FONASA, ISAPREs or Armed Forces), the High-cost 
Treatment Fund was created by Law Ricarte Soto, and it is being 
currently implemented. Initially, as from November 2015, 11 
pathologies will be covered (COOPERATIVA.CL, 2015). The Fund 
will be managed by FONASA. The selection of medicines will consider 
a social, economic and scientific prioritization process, evidence-based 
medicine criteria, and price (higher than a threshold fixed by the 
Ministry of Health and Ministry of Finances). In addition, for getting 
access to these medicines the patient will be referred to a specific 
healthcare service network defined by the Ministry of Health (CHILE, 
2015). 
 
In the case of ISAPREs’ affiliates, this fund does not comprise 
the medicines covered by the CAEC. In fact, an ISAPRE affiliate must 
resort first to the CAEC, and if it does not cover the medicine, then 
he/she can get access to it by means of the High-cost Treatments Fund. 
Finally, the law also states that if a medicine covered by this Fund is 
incorporated in the GES in the future, the Fund will keep covering it for 
the people that do not have access to the GES (e.g. FONASA MLE 
affiliates) (CHILE, 2015). The strategies for access to medicines are 
summarized in Figure 3-4. 
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Figure 3-4 Health System Organization and Access to medicines pathways in Chile 
 
Source: Prepared by the author based on: Becerril-Montekio et al (2011) and Cid, et al. (2013) 
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3.3.5. The Netherlands 
 
Since the health system reform stated by the Health insurance Act 
(Zvw) in 2006, the Dutch health system has been constituted of two 
sectors: the compulsory social health insurance and the voluntary health 
insurance (SCHÄFER et al., 2010). In 2013, less than 0.2% of the Dutch 
population were uninsured, and most of the population (85%) had 
voluntary insurance (WAMMES,; JEURISSEN; WESTERT, 2015). The 
Armed Forces has an independent health system managed by the 
Ministry of Defence. 
 
In the compulsory health insurance system, all the insurers must 
guarantee access to the medicines included in the national basic care 
package. For selecting the medicines, the Dutch health system has used 
the Health Technology Assessment since the early 1980s, considering 
the Dunning criteria (necessity, efficacy, cost-effectiveness and 
feasibility) (LE POLAIN et al., 2010) (NATIONAL HEALTH CARE 
INSTITUTE, 2015). Until April 2014, the agency responsible for the 
HTA activities was the Healthcare Insurance Board (CVZ), reformed 
into the Health Care Institute Netherlands (ZiN), which is now 
responsible for advising the Minister of Healthcare, Welfare and Sports 
(VWS) on whether to include medicines in the basic package 
(NATIONAL HEALTH CARE INSTITUTE, 2015; ZORGINSTITUUT 
NEDERLAND, 2015) 
 
For financing of and access to medicines, there are two 
reimbursement schemes in the compulsory health insurance, for 
inpatient and outpatient medicines respectively. Outpatient medicines 
fall under the medicine reimbursement system (GVS). The GVS 
determines classification of the medicines (prescription-only or over the 
counter medicines – OTC), and defines the medicines’ reimbursement 
level. The medicines in the positive reimbursement list are classified 
into two lists called Annex 1A and Annex 1B. In Annex 1A, therapeutic 
equivalent medicines are grouped into clusters of interchangeable 
medicines (LE POLAIN et al., 2010). 
 
The reimbursement level is limited to a historically determined 
average product price of the cluster. Pharmaceuticals that are not 
interchangeable and have an added therapeutic value are placed on 
Annex 1B. All medicines on Annex 1B are fully reimbursed. 
Manufacturers have to submit evidence of the therapeutic value in order 
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to be included in Annex 1B’s reimbursement list. In addition, as for 
Annex 1B, manufacturers have to provide evidence on cost-
effectiveness and an assessment of the national budget impact. 
Medicines on Annex 1A and 1B can also be placed on the conditional 
reimbursement list (called Annex 2) if specific conditions apply (e.g. 
prior permission or specific indications) (LE POLAIN et al., 2010). 
 
Inpatient medicines dispensed by hospitals are financed through 
hospital budgets based on diagnosis-related groups. However, “normal” 
medicines are not separately specified within these groups. The Dutch 
government introduced in 2002 policy regulations (“Beleidsregel dure 
geneesmiddelen”) to relieve the financial burden of hospitals for 
expensive inpatient medicines. Since 2006, a “coverage with evidence 
development” scheme has been implemented, in which the medicines 
are initially admitted to the expensive medicine or expensive orphan 
medicine list of the Dutch Healthcare Insurance Board (NZa) only in a 
temporary way (LE POLAIN et al., 2010). 
 
Hospitals receive additional funding of 80% of the costs of these 
medicines (100% for orphan medicines). As a condition, applicants are 
required to conduct outcomes research and thus have to provide 
evidence on appropriate medicine use (“doeltreffende toepassing”) and 
real-world cost-effectiveness (“doelmatigheid”). After four years, a 
reassessment ought to be conducted in order to decide whether (or not) 
to continue the financial compensation for hospitals (LE POLAIN et al., 
2010). 
 
However, if as a result of the reassessment the evidence does not 
support the reimbursement of the medicine, the pressure of stakeholders 
such as the media and the organization of patients can make the decision 
maker decide to maintain the reimbursement. It was the case of 
Myozyme for Pompe disease which created a big controversy 
(COLLEGE VOR ZORGVERZEKERINGEN, 2012; KOUWENBERG; 
BIJL, 2012).  
 
Over the counter (OTC) medicines are not covered by the 
insurance system and must be bought by the patients in the pharmacies. 
However, if the physician indicates chronic use (i.e. intended as use for 
6 months or longer) on the prescription, the patient must pay the first 
two weeks of treatment and after this period the patient gets the 
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medication free of taxes and the community pharmacy will directly 
claim reimbursement at the insurer (SCHÄFER et al., 2010). 
 
Supplementary to the compulsory social health insurance, the 
voluntary health insurance provides coverage of services excluded or 
not fully covered by the compulsory social health insurance, because 
these health care services are not evidence-based or are not considered 
medically necessary (e.g. dental care, alternative medicine, 
physiotherapy, spectacles and lenses, contraceptives). The 
complementary packages vary considerably among insurers and in 
addition to the aforementioned healthcare, it could include the full cost 
of co-payments for medicines (excess costs above the limit for 
equivalent drugs) (SCHÄFER et al., 2010; WAMMES,; JEURISSEN; 
WESTERT, 2015). 
 
In the Netherlands, lawsuits claiming access to uncovered 
medicines are also filled, although they are not as frequent as in the 
Latin American region. Some of these judicial cases claim access to 
medicines for rare diseases (THE NEHERLANDS, RECHTBANK, 
2014) or require specific brand medicines (THE NEHERLANDS, 
RECHTBANK, 2015). The strategies for access to medicines are 
summarized in Figure 3-5. 
 
3.4. DISCUSSION 
 
Our results showed that during the period under analysis, all the 
studied countries took measures aiming to extend the coverage of their 
health systems and access to medicines. In the Latin American 
countries, some of these measures were possible because of the 
economic growth and the increase in public health spending (PIOLA, 
2015). Despite the differences in the economic resources available and 
the health indicators across countries, it was possible to identify 
common characteristics in the measures implemented. These measures 
are discussed below, in accordance with the three UHC dimensions. 
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Figure 3-5 Health System Organization and Access to medicines pathways in The Netherlands 
 
Source: The author 
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3.4.1. Population coverage 
 
Our results suggest that, at least in their regulations, all the 
studied countries offer alternatives of coverage and access to health 
services and medicines for the general population. Nonetheless, in all of 
them, the population coverage is fragmented and depends on the 
socioeconomic conditions of the individual, mainly related to their 
labour status, health status and ability to pay.  
 
Argentina has the highest level of fragmentation, with seven 
different pathways to access the health system, followed by Chile where 
the population is stratified according to the income in the public sector 
and according to their ability to pay and their health status in the private 
sector. In Brazil, although all citizens have access to the SUS, the 
presence of the private health insurance creates fragmentation as regards 
ability to pay and health status. In Colombia, access to the health system 
depends mainly on the income level and labour status within the SGSSS, 
and the income level and health status in the case of private health 
insurance.  
 
3.4.2. Technology coverage 
 
The fragmentation in the population coverage results in the 
fragmentation of the health services and technology coverage, including 
pharmaceuticals, since each pathway involves a particular medicines 
coverage. During the timeframe analysed, some advances in reducing 
the medicines coverage fragmentation were observed in Colombia, 
Chile and the Netherlands. In these countries, the reforms aimed to 
reduce the differences in quality and access to health care and medicines 
between different health systems’ subsectors: contributory and 
subsidised regimes in Colombia, the FONASA and the ISAPREs in 
Chile, and public and private insurance in the Netherlands. 
 
One aspect that is worth remarking is that although the 
equalization of the POS lists in Colombia and the reorganization of the 
Specialized Component of the Pharmaceutical Assistance in Brazil were 
implemented by the Ministries of Health, in both cases the reforms were 
influenced by the Judiciary because of the high frequency of lawsuits for 
access to medicines (see chapter 5) (COLOMBIA, CORTE 
CONSTITUCIONAL, 2008a; GOMES et al., 2014). In contrast, the 
establishment of the GES in Chile and the Basic Health Insurance in the 
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reform of the Dutch Health system emerged from executive and 
legislative powers (GIEDION et al., 2014; SCHÄFER et al., 2010). 
 
Argentina is the country that has more diversity in the list of 
covered medicines among and within the health system’s subsectors. 
The PMO was an attempt to achieve equalization of the benefits for all 
beneficiaries statement of the PMO in the social insurance sector; but 
since this is a minimum coverage, and the financial capacity of the OS 
depends on the level of income of their affiliates, the inequality in the 
access to medicines remains (TOBAR et al., 2014). 
 
During the timeframe analysed, all the countries took measures to 
increase the number of medicines covered by the health systems. The 
process for including new technologies varied across the countries, but 
some measures such as the adoption of the HTA’s principles were 
common, although with different scope and development levels.  
 
In the Netherlands, the HTA is consolidated within the health 
system and has been used as support for the decision making of the 
Ministry of Health for the last 30 years. In contrast, in the Latin 
American countries analysed, although the HTA principles were 
considered in the health systems as criteria to select the medicines, HTA 
agencies have been formally created only in the last years. These 
measures are in part consequence of the claim for transparency and 
efficiency in the updating process of the medicines list, from different 
stakeholders such as insurers, managers, patient organizations and, in 
the case of Colombia and Brazil, the Judiciary Power. 
 
Another important aspect that varies among the countries is the 
scope of the HTA agencies. While the Dutch agency (ZiN), the 
Brazilian agency (CONITEC) and the Colombian agency (IETS) assess 
and advise about inclusion of medicines to be supplied for the entire or 
almost the entire population in their countries, the Argentinian agency 
(SUR) has a restricted scope because its decisions only bind to the 
national OS. 
 
The Latin American countries have adopted clinical guidelines as 
a strategy to guarantee rational use of medicines, especially of the most 
expensive ones, and to support the organization of the healthcare service 
networks. Brazil and Chile are the countries that present more 
development in this sense, since the guidelines design is linked with the 
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updating process of medicines coverage. However, discrepancies 
between clinical guidelines requirements and the real availability of 
health services sometimes become a barrier to the access to medicines 
(GIEDION et al., 2014; ROVER et al., 2016).  
 
A noteworthy aspect is that notwithstanding the level of 
development or consolidation of the HTA process, the health systems’ 
stakeholders do not always consider as legitimate the use of the HTA 
criteria for decision-making about reimbursement or financing. Even 
though the HTA process is a technical process, the relevance of the 
political support for its implementation and compliance with its decision 
in the clinical practice has been recognized (WANNMACHER, 2006).  
 
In the Latin American countries, the lack of legitimacy of the 
HTA process can be explained by concerns over the transparency and 
standardization of the process (ROSSI; UMBACÍA; SÁNCHEZ, 2012) 
and the technical capacity of the agency (YJILIOFF, 2014). 
Nevertheless, the controversy generated by the Myozyme assessment in 
the Netherlands underlines that factors such as the social expectation 
that scientific development will resolve all the health problems 
(WILLIAMS; MARTIN; GABE, 2011) and the large lobby capacity of 
the Big-Pharma over decision-makers, prescribers, and patients 
(SANCHEZ-SERRANO, 2014; WILLIAMS; MARTIN; GABE, 2011) 
have an important influence across countries.  
 
Due to the lack of legitimacy of the HTA process, and the 
governments’ weakness in the control of different actors in the health 
system, the use of exceptional ways to access to medicines such as 
alternative ways designed by the health systems (e.g. CTC in Colombia 
and exceptional reimbursement of the APE in Argentina) and litigation 
become frequent.  
 
This fact generates pressure on the processes of prioritization and 
inclusion of new technologies in the health systems’ coverage. So these 
processes end up following criteria of economic burden because of the 
high costs of the medicines, instead of criteria of efficacy, safety, or yet 
criteria of epidemiological profile and disease burden representing the 
health needs of the general population. 
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3.4.3. Costs coverage 
 
Medicines affordability and financing have become relevant 
issues in the discussion about the organization of the health systems to 
ensure cost coverage and financial protection for the population, since 
once the cost of the new technologies has been identified as the main 
factor for the rising of the healthcare cost (SORENSON; 
DRUMMOND; BHUIYAN KHAN, 2013). This UHC dimension 
involves two aspects: resources available for financing the medicines 
(e.g. risk pool funds, public resources) and out-of-pocket expenditure 
(including co-payments). All the countries have created risk-pooling 
funds in order to redistribute the risk of high cost medicines or health 
services. Nevertheless, none of them has universal population coverage 
or includes all the medicines covered by the health system.  
 
The Dutch Health Insurance Fund has universal population 
coverage, but does not cover inpatient medicines, which are covered by 
means of the hospitals’ budgets. The Colombian CAC only covers 
people from the subsidised and contributory regimes, and only 
medicines included in the POS; in the case of medicines not covered by 
the POS required by the CTC or lawsuits (tutelas), only the contributory 
regime insurers get reimbursement from the FOSYGA, creating 
inequality as the health secretaries of the departments have fewer 
resources.  
 
In the Argentinian context, as aforementioned, the SUR only 
covers national OSs affiliates and covers only a list of medicines defined 
by the Health Superintendence, and in the public sector there are 
specific funds for high cost medicines, but they are fragmented and 
cover only some specific medications. In Chile, besides the fact that the 
CAEC does not have a specific coverage (but explicit exclusions), this 
fund covers only the open ISAPREs affiliates; and in the public sector 
there are other specific funds for high-cost medicines and health services 
which have limited economic capacity, and then, limited population 
coverage. It is expected that some of these problems might be resolved 
with the implementation of Law Ricarte Soto, which constitutes the first 
intent for reducing the financing fragmentation of the Chilean health 
system. 
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The abovementioned fragmentation creates inequalities in the 
access to medicines and also results in financial burdens for some actors 
in the health system. In the Netherlands, there is inequality in the access 
to biotechnological medicines, including the treatment for rare diseases, 
because these treatments are mostly supplied within impatient care and 
the hospitals have autonomy to prioritize the financing of health services 
and medicines (NIEZEN et al., 2006). In the Colombian case, the 
fragmentation of the fund creates inequality in the resources distribution 
because the Departments have fewer resources than the FOSYGA, and 
the subsidised regime beneficiaries are the lowest income population.  
 
A similar situation is observed in Argentina where the lowest 
income population depends on the public sector and has less coverage of 
medicines compared to the social insurance and private subsector 
(TOBAR et al., 2014). In Chile, the highest income and healthiest 
population is covered by the private subsector, which holds most of the 
resources of the overall health system (MONTOYA-AGUILAR, 2013). 
 
In Brazil, where only the public sector covers high cost medicines 
for inpatient care, the creation of the CEAF in 2010 increased the 
resources for financing these medicines. Nonetheless, the inequality in 
the resources distribution and in the access to high-cost medicines still 
remain, because the patients with more resources have easier access to 
specialized care than the low-income population (BIEHL, 2013). 
 
One aspect worth highlighting is that the implementation of 
specific funds to finance high-cost medicines has been accompanied by 
other measures, such as the maximum prices of reimbursement in 
Colombia (COLOMBIA, MINISTERIO DE SALUD Y PROTECCIÓN 
SOCIAL, 2015b), and the establishment of public-private partnerships 
(PPP) aiming at transferring technology for the production of high-cost 
medicines in Brazil (BRASIL, MINISTÉRIO DA SAÚDE, 2014). Even 
with the recognized adverse effects of the patent protection such as the 
emergence of pseudo-innovation and the neglecting of diseases 
prevalent in low and middle income countries, measures related to 
intellectual property protection were not taken (VELASQUEZ, 2012). 
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3.5. CONCLUSION  
 
Our analysis showed that the five countries included in this study 
took measures aiming to improve access to medicines in the three UHC 
dimensions in the last fifteen years, but equitable access to medicines is 
still a major goal to be achieved. Similar to other studies (BOSSERT et 
al., 2014), fragmentation at different levels of the health systems 
(financing, structure, organization, regulation and control) was the most 
common cause of inequality in the access to medicines.  
 
Nevertheless, the most relevant finding in our study is the change 
of focus of the public policies for access to medicines across the studied 
countries from essential medicines to high-cost medicines and its 
potential regressive effects, even for developed countries like the 
Netherlands.  
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4 CHAPTER 4 – Judicialization of access to medicines in four 
Latin American countries: A comparative analysis 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Medicines are important tools to prevent and resolve health 
problems; however, adequate access to medicines for all is still not 
achieved in many countries (BIGDELI et al., 2015). According to 
General Comment 14 of the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights–CESCR (2000), the states have, as a core obligation: (a) 
to ensure access to essential medicines, according to the WHO’s 
definition; (b) to “give sufficient recognition to the Right to Health in 
their national political and legal systems”; and (c) to adopt legislation or 
take measures for controlling healthcare market actors (providers of 
goods and services, insurers, etc.) to ensure equitable access to health 
care and health services (CESCR COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, 
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, 2000). Moreover, in 2012, the 
United Nations (UN) General Assembly recognized Universal Health 
Coverage (UHC) as a priority of the post-Millennium Development 
Goal, considering access to medicines as a critical component of UHC 
(GOROKHOVICH; CHALKIDOU; SHANKAR, 2013). 
 
In the last years, some Latin American countries have taken 
measures in order to improve the access to essential medicines, and 
more recently such efforts have been focused on improving access to 
high-cost medicines (Chapter 3). At the same time, litigation for access 
to medicines has risen in the region, mainly in Colombia and Brazil 
(HOGERZEIL, 2006; YAMIN; GLOPPEN, 2011), and the magnitude 
of the phenomenon is growing in countries such as Argentina and Chile 
(BURGIN, 2014), despite the differences on the legal recognition of the 
right to health (Table 4-1) and health system organization among these 
countries (see chapter 3). 
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Table 4-1 - Right to health and pathways to resort the Judiciary for protecting it in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Colombia 
 
 
Right to health Access to medicines 
Pathways to resort the 
Judiciary 
Argentina 
 
National Constitution, Article 42 
"Consumers and users of goods and 
services have the right to the protection of 
their health, safety, and economic 
interests". 
 
Each province defines in its Constitution 
the recognition of the right to health in its 
territory. 
 
Decree 492/95, Article 1: “The beneficiaries of the agents of 
the National Health Insurance System, covered by Article 1 of 
Law No. 23.660, are entitled to receive medical care benefits 
established in the medical care program to be approved by the 
Ministry of Health and Social Welfare through the secretary of 
health policy and health regulations. This program will call the 
Compulsory Medical Program (PMO) and will be mandatory 
for all agents set forth above”. 
 
Law 24.754, Article 1. “From within 90 days of enactment of 
this law, companies or entities that provide prepaid medical 
services should cover at least in medical care plans the same 
"Mandatory Medical Plan (PMO) arranged to the Obras 
Sociales, as established by Law 23.660, 23.661 and 24.455, and 
their respective regulations. 
 
For the public sector, each province defines its own regulations 
on the coverage of medicines. 
 
 
 
Amparo. It can be 
brought only to federal, 
civil and commercial 
tribunals. 
 
Amparo requires the 
intervention of a lawyer 
125 
 
Right to health Access to medicines 
Pathways to resort the 
Judiciary 
Brazil 
National Constitution, Article 196: 
“Health is a right of all and a duty of the 
State and shall be guaranteed by means of 
social and economic policies aimed at 
reducing the risk of illness and other 
hazards and at the universal and equal 
access to actions and services for its 
promotion, protection and recovery.” 
Law 8080/1990, Article 6: “… the Unified Health System - 
SUS also includes in its field of action: 
I - the execution of actions: (d) of integrated care, including 
pharmaceutical assistance”. 
Civil lawsuit 
It can be filed in any 
tribunal. 
Require the 
intervention of a 
lawyer. 
Chile 
National Constitution, Article 19 No. 9: 
“The right to health protection. The State 
protects free and equal access to the actions 
for the promotion, protection and recovery 
of health and rehabilitation of the 
individual. It will also be responsible for 
coordination and control of health-related 
actions. The prime duty of the state is to 
ensure the implementation of health 
actions, whether undertaken by public or 
private institutions, in the form and manner 
prescribed by law, which may establish 
compulsory contributions. Every person 
shall have the right to choose the health 
care system that wishes to join, be it state 
or private.” 
 
Law N° 19.966, Article 2: The General System of Guarantees 
shall also contain Explicit Health Guarantees concerning 
access, quality, financial protection and timeliness of the 
benefits provision associated with a prioritized set of programs, 
diseases or health conditions indicated by the corresponding 
decree. The National Health Fund (FONASA) and the Health 
Insurance Institutions (ISAPREs) shall mandatorily ensure such 
guarantees to their respective beneficiaries. 
 
Protection resource.  
 
It only can be brought 
to the Supreme Court. 
 
Require the 
intervention of a 
lawyer. 
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Right to health Access to medicines 
Pathways to resort the 
Judiciary 
Colombia 
National Constitution, Article 49: “Health 
care and environmental protection are 
public services charged to the state. To 
everyone is guaranteed access to health 
promotion, protection and recovery. The 
State organizes, manages and regulates the 
provision of health services and 
environmental sanitation to residents 
according to the principles of efficiency, 
universality and solidarity.” 
Law 100/1993, Article 156. “Basic features of the general 
social security health. The general social security health shall 
have the following characteristics: (d) All members of the 
general system of social security health plan will receive a 
comprehensive health protection, with preventive care, 
medical-surgical and essential drugs, which will be called 
mandatory health plan.” 
Tutela action 
 
It can be brought to any 
tribunal.  
Does not require the 
intervention of a lawyer 
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The access to medicines depends on complex and dynamic 
relationships among the health system’s stakeholders. Additionally, the 
health system’s organization and litigation for access to medicines are 
determined by social and political features (VARGAS-PELÁEZ et al., 
2014). In view of that, it is interesting to analyse the possible causes and 
consequences of litigation for access to medicines in these countries, 
from the stakeholders’ perspective, in order to better understand the 
phenomenon and collect information to work towards possible solutions 
to promote equitable access to medicines.  
 
This study therefore aims to conduct a comparative analysis of 
the causes and consequences of judicialization of access to medicines 
from the perspective of the stakeholders involved in the phenomenon in 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Colombia. 
 
4.2 METHODOLOGY 
 
This qualitative study was carried out based on the semi-
structured interviews described in Chapter 3 (see section 3.2.2), 
specifically questions (a) “In your opinion, what are the possible causes 
of judicialization of access to medicines?” and (b) “In your opinion, 
what are the possible consequences of judicialization of access to 
medicines?” The verbatim of the selected segments of speech in the 
original language can be found in Annex B.  
 
Thematic analysis was applied to the verbatim. The analysis was 
conducted manually by two researchers following the methodology 
proposed by Pope et al. (2000): familiarization with the data, 
identification of the thematic framework, indexation, charting and 
mapping and interpretation. The categories adopted for the analysis, 
previously discussed by the researchers in a seminar, correspond to the 
elements (stakeholders and policies) considered in the theoretical model 
proposed in Chapter 2 (Figure 2-1). In addition, the data from interviews 
were sorted by country and stakeholder, in order to identify similarities 
and differences in their perceptions on the causes and consequences of 
judicialization of access to medicines. 
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4.3 RESULTS 
 
Representatives from Argentina, Brazil and Colombia considered 
judicialization of access to medicines as a widespread phenomenon in 
their respective countries, while in Chile the respondents highlighted 
that most of lawsuits related to the right to health are filed against the 
ISAPREs because of unjustified increases in the insurance premiums.  
 
The causes and consequences of judicialization of access to 
medicines mentioned by the stakeholders’ representatives were related 
to aspects from both perspectives considered in the theoretical model: 
health and market. 
 
The causes of judicialization mentioned by the respondents 
concentrate in the categories: health system ‘hardware’ and ‘software’; 
role of the Judiciary; influence of the pharmaceutical industry; and role 
of the users/patients. Regarding the consequences of judicialization, the 
categories related to the effects of the phenomenon on the health system 
and on the users were most frequently mentioned.  
 
The least frequently mentioned categories, comprising both 
causes and consequences, were: definition of the right to health at 
international and national levels; the innovation model at international 
level; the policies related to intellectual property protection; the science 
and technology policies; the medicine price control policies; and the 
concept of health needs. 
 
4.3.1 International level 
 
At the international level, only Colombian representatives 
highlighted the conflict between market and human rights, and the 
global dominance of an economistic view of the fundamental rights, 
which prevent access to medicines. In addition, the interest of the 
pharmaceutical industry the lobby of the pharmaceutical industry for 
both the recognition of health as a fundamental right and the adoption of 
the third payer model in the national health systems, since these policies 
can guarantee market and financing of their new and expensive products 
(Box 4-1).  
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From the market’s perspective, two factors were recognized as 
the main causes of judicialization of access to medicines: the emergence 
of expensive technologies and the pharmaceutical industry’s interest for 
profit. For the respondents, new medicines create huge expectations 
about their impacts on health, although they actually do not represent an 
additional therapeutic value (failure of the current innovation model). 
The aforementioned aspects were highlighted by the majority of the 
stakeholders’ representatives from the four countries, but to a lesser 
extent the Judiciary’s ones (Box 4-1). Consequences were not 
mentioned at this level. 
 
Box 4-1. Examples of the categories at International level 
- Right to health in the International Human Right treaties and essential 
medicines definition 
 
“We identify two opposing doors. One is the market philosophy and the other is 
the human rights philosophy itself… What happens with access to medicines is 
also the expression of the clash between these two philosophies... As regards 
these three pillars [access to medicines, health system’s sustainability, and 
guarantee of fundamental rights], after all, the more expensive the medicines 
are, the more I lean towards the economy rather than the access to the right [to 
health]. That's basically what we've seen as a serious problem, which is not, we 
believe, a problem only in Colombia, but a global... worldwide trend, say, 
towards a purely economic principle for fundamental rights, for access to 
fundamental rights ” (Colombia, Patient). 
 
“… We all know that Big Pharma has been the most important lobbyist for 
pushing UN, WHO, everyone, to make the right to health a fundamental right in 
all countries, as it was clear [for pharmaceutical industry] that the people 
individually would not be able to buy and pay for the costs of their products, 
and the best thing about it was that the states have to pay for [the medicines]” 
(Colombia, Patient). 
 
- The market and the Innovation model and intellectual property 
protection – TRIPS 
 
“The first [cause] is the market issue, the market interest in the sales and 
revenues from the pharmaceutical industry. This is the first major reason, in my 
opinion” (Brazil, manager). 
 
“I think that [judicialization] is closely related to the R&D model; and to how 
the pharmaceutical industry resolved the price issue very easily by means of 
what would be called third-party payer models. Thus, for them, it is no longer a 
problem that medicines may cost COP 600 million pesos or COP 700 million 
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pesos patient/year, because in the end it is not the patient himself that pays, but 
the [health] system” (Colombia, professional). 
 
“The biggest conflict, currently, has to do with expensive medicines, obviously, 
by their costs, because such medicines, as it is known, are on the market without 
scientific evidence of effectiveness. In some cases if there are other medicines 
already on the market, these [new medicines] do not ensure that they are better 
than the ones that are maybe not so costly” (Argentina, NGO). 
 
 
 
4.3.2 National level 
 
4.3.2.1 The right to health in the Political Constitution 
 
In this category three aspects were mentioned as causes of 
judicialization: (a) the Constitution’s broad definition of the right to 
health, which does not explicit limits in Argentina and Brazil; (b) the 
creation of judicial mechanisms to protect the right to health in 
Colombia; and. (c) the government decentralization where the 
population’s health is a Provincial rather than a National Government’s 
responsibility in Argentina (Box 4-2). 
 
Box 4-2. Examples of causes related to the category right to health in the 
Political Constitution 
 
 
“There are many reasons [for judicialization]. First, fundamentally, the rules we 
have are very broad. Constitutional norms and treaties with constitutional 
status… which are very broad in terms of coverage, so virtually any patient that 
requires any benefits, because the rights are so broad, they [the rights] somehow 
allow them [the patients] to ask for [the benefits]” (Argentina, Executive).  
 
"... [The new constitution] was much more open than the previous ones from the 
military regime […] it was a constitution that, for the first time in Brazil's 
history [in 1988], included some rights. Among them, the so-called Article 196 
of the Constitution that, in a very broad and general way, provided health as a 
citizen's right and an obligation of the state, without defining it clearly "(Brazil, 
manager). 
 
“The Constitution of 1991 did two fundamental things in the country. It 
introduced the market in the provision of social services, public services in the 
country and, as a counterbalance, it guaranteed rights... it [the Constitution] 
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made the citizens’ rights explicit, and created the Tutela mechanism to claim 
them in the case of… when it is considered that such rights have been violated” 
(Colombia, NGO). 
 
 
Stakeholders from Argentina, Chile and Colombia mentioned 
consequences of judicialization relative to the national recognition of the 
right to health. The negative consequences included the 
pharmaceuticalization of the right to health, and the inappropriate 
interpretation of the right to health as an unlimited and individual right. 
The respondents pointed out two positive consequences. First, the 
visibility of the right to health as an issue relevant to the policy resulted 
of the media impact towards the judicial cases. Second, the generation 
of jurisprudence related to the right to health, which in the Colombian 
context resulted in the recognition of the right to health as a fundamental 
right (Box 4-3).  
 
Box 4-3. Examples of consequences related to the category right to health in the 
Political Constitution 
 
 
"But I would say that one of the most negative aspects [of 
judicialization] is [...] what I call [...] the pharmaceuticalization of the right to 
health, where it seems that everything is solved with medicines" (Colombia, 
University lecturer). 
 
“The Tutela is [...] for the medicine that can be very expensive compared 
to the one available in the POS, and adds very little to life. That is, the cost-
effectiveness is very low. But it is all about the person; the right [to health] is 
individual and not collective. So we're struggling for things of high cost, low 
impact on public health, and we’re spending the money this way… I mean, 
there's a whole discussion of collective rights vs. the individual rights” 
(Colombia, manager). 
 
“If [the patients] do not have money to hire a lawyer, they resort to the 
newspaper, to the media to denounce the situation [of lack of access to 
medicines]. They [the patients] do not accept to be discriminated because they 
are poor, because they do not have resources, since the state must resolve their 
problems” (Chile, lawyer). 
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4.3.2.2 The health system 
 
4.3.2.2.1 ‘Hardware’ 
 
Taking the organization of the health systems as a cause of 
litigation, the respondents mentioned aspects that result in the barriers to 
access to healthcare services timely. Such aspects include the health 
systems’ fragmentation, the health systems’ decentralization without 
adequate coordination, inefficiency of the health system managers, 
inappropriate organization of the healthcare service networks, and 
limited availability of human resources, particularly specialized health 
professionals.  
 
The lack of a consolidated Health Technology Assessment (HTA) 
agency (in Colombia and Argentina) and the technical weakness of the 
EPSs’ technical-scientific committees (Colombia) were pointed out as 
an important cause of judicialization of access to medicines.  
 
Other causes were mentioned, such as the limited financial 
resources of the health systems to include new, expensive medicines in 
the coverage. In the case of Argentina, limited resources were related to 
the small OSs, and in Chile to the closed ISAPREs (Box 4-4).  
 
Box 4-4. Examples of causes related to the category health system hardware 
 
 
“The problem is… a more economic one, since the resources are scarce. So… 
the lack of protection… is a common denominator” (Argentina, Executive). 
 
[One should consider] “which part of the problem [judicialization] is due to the 
EPS’s inefficiency, poor service provision or deficient management; and which 
part is due to a structural problem related to a human resources deficit, 
particularly regarding specialist and subspecialist” (Colombia, manager). 
 
“Here [in Argentina], there is a National Administration since [president] 
Menen’s office, which is the ANMAT, National Administration of Medicines, 
Food and Technology, that determines, when certain standards are met, if a 
medicines can enter the market or not. But there is no one, no national 
organization, to tell if that [medicine] will be covered or not by the Social 
Security or the State, right? There is nothing. So, that depends on the free will, 
of any doctor [general or specialist] because doctors can prescribe what they 
want (Argentina, NGO). 
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The respondents from Argentina, Brazil and Colombia mentioned 
some negative effects of judicialization of access to medicines on the 
health systems’ ‘hardware’. First, litigation prompts the creation of 
additional administrative processes to meet the judicial demands. So, the 
health system’s operating costs increase and the management becomes 
more complex, generating inefficiency. As a result, the timely access to 
healthcare and medicines by the people that do not use the judicial 
pathway is compromised. 
 
Second, some lawsuits favour the public financing of medicines 
without evidence of efficacy, safety or cost-effectiveness. In these cases 
there are two possible scenarios: (a) the health system’s resources focus 
on financing expensive medicines with poor therapeutic value versus the 
medicines covered by the health system; or (b) lawsuits favour the 
treatment of a limited number of patients (e.g. rare diseases) at the 
expense of the access to essential medicines for the rest of the 
population. According to representatives of the health professional 
organizations from Brazil and Colombia, both scenarios may 
compromise the long-term sustainability of the health systems. 
 
In this sense, in all the studied countries, the health system 
managers’ representatives remarked that the diversion of resources for 
financing the medicines covered by the health system to the financing of 
uncovered medicines accessed through litigation compromises their 
liquidity. This happens in Brazil and Chile because the managers do not 
receive any reimbursement for the uncovered medicines. In Argentina 
and Colombia, this is a result of the belated reimbursement from the 
SUR or the FOSYGA, respectively. Additionally, sometimes the judicial 
decision also causes resource diversion among the health system’s 
subsectors, having a regressive effect mainly when the public sector 
must finance medicines for patients treated in the private sector 
(Brazilian managers’ and Argentinian NGO) (Box 4-5). 
 
Other negative impacts mentioned include the healthcare 
fragmentation when the lawsuit requires only the medicines but no other 
services needed for a comprehensive care (as stated by a Colombian 
patient organization’s representative). A Brazilian health system 
managers’ representative also stated difficulties in guaranteeing the 
quality of the products since the medicines required by lawsuits have a 
different logistics process with poor quality control. 
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Box 4-5. Examples of consequences related to the category health system 
hardware 
 
 
“Listen, regarding [the impacts] on the Obra Social, sometimes the trouble is 
that [the judges] force you to provide a benefit; and for the Obra Social, 
obviously, it is not economically convenient because by being obliged to 
provide a certain part of the benefit, [the Obra social] ends up spending double 
or triple what you [the Obra Social] had to give... For the company, these 
[lawsuits] are prejudicial because the company spends twice more than what it 
was supposed to spend to cover the disease” (Argentina, Manager).  
 
“[Judicialization] obviously also affect the budget, the health ministry’s budget 
can be compromised for punctually conforming to a certain lawsuit, it puts us in 
a frequent constraint situation, since I have to automatically allocate resources. 
There are no resources for [funding medicines required by] lawsuits... It is not 
part of our framework to include them in the budget. So we have to suspend our 
budget execution to meet a specific action” (Brazil, Executive). 
 
“From the State’s point of view, judicialization, in practice, calls forth a 
disorganization of the service. We have a lot of difficulties in handling the 
volume of lawsuits here in the state... We now have a concentration of lawsuits 
here; and this, from the point of view of the State and municipal health 
secretariats, represents an unmanageable volume; we cannot respond to the 
volume of lawsuits that we have here. The State’s structure is not scaled for 
that” (Brazil, manager). 
 
“There is definitely a negative impact [of judicialization] on the financing of the 
[health] system, since the way people get access to the benefits not included in 
the benefit plan is messy, the system has the need to spend a lot of resources on 
therapeutic technologies, including medicines.... whose [costs] are very high 
and, as a consequence, the system has to allocate a great part of the resources” 
(Colombia, professional). 
 
“Then everyone [filing lawsuits] generates this disorganization, and the patient 
is the only one losing, because the pathway we are following now including safe 
and effective technologies in the POS has not been followed, then the Tutela 
[judicialization] starts giving things to everyone, which, at some point, could be 
useful or not” (Colombia, Executive). 
 
“There should be a state body that could supply these expensive medicines, with 
a budget defined as part of the fiscal budget, because ... you'll see, for a private 
entity, especially like us who does not seek profit.... in case we suffer one of 
these penalties [lawsuits] we would fall off the chair, because, as a consequence 
of these judgments, we would have to spend 20 million pesos (~USD 34.000) 
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on a medicine, for one single person, and it is too much money for our budget, 
which must always tend towards a balance.” (Chile, Manager). 
 
 
4.3.2.2.2 ‘Software’ 
 
Representatives of the four countries highlighted two aspects 
related to the health systems’ ‘software’ as causes of judicialization: (a) 
the weakness of the states in guaranteeing the fundamental rights of 
their citizens; and (b) the inertia of the states for taking measures to 
improve the access to medicines timely. The latter aspect was 
particularly remarked by the respondents in relation to the fact that the 
health systems’ list of covered medicines is not updated on a regular 
basis. 
 
The configuration of the list of covered medicines was the most 
mentioned contributing factor to litigation for access to medicines. 
According to a Colombian NGO’s representative, the establishment of 
an explicit list of covered healthcare services and medicines does not 
encompass the healthcare complexity neither recognizes the right to 
health as a general right. As a consequence, it generates adverse 
selection of patients by the health system managers, which results in 
litigation. 
 
In this train of thought, the Argentinian and Colombian 
respondents cited the grey zones of the list of covered services and 
medicines as one of the reasons for the growth of judicialization. In 
Colombia, according to health system managers’ representatives, this 
happens because the list does not explicitly state if the coverage of a 
medicine depends on factors such as its origin (e.g. biotechnological 
coagulation factors). In turn, for the Executive representative, the 
inflexibility of the medicines list, which until 2012 included specific 
dosage form and strength for the covered products, also contributed to 
litigation.  
 
Other causes mentioned were the differences in the medicines 
coverage among the health systems’ subsectors. Yet within the public 
sector in Argentina and Brazil, there are differences in the medicines 
coverage among states and municipalities. Additionally, Argentinian 
health system managers’ representatives mentioned the fact of the PMO 
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comprises a minimum medicines coverage rather than a maximum one 
contributes to litigation for access to medicines. 
 
In the Chilean context the explicit coverage of a limited number 
of pathologies and the non-existence of an explicit medicines list have 
influenced on lawsuits filing for access to medicines (NGO’s). In 
Argentina, litigation rises because the medicines coverage is not linked 
to a specific pathologies list (Executive and health Manager).  
 
Furthermore, the use of Health Technology Assessment criteria 
for defining the list of covered medicines and clinical guidelines is also 
questioned by other stakeholders such as health professional 
organizations, patient organizations and the Judiciary. The accuracy of 
the HTA is particularly criticized because the decision-makers do not 
have consistent data about the real demand for the treatments (Brazil 
and Chile, Judiciary and patient). Additionally, the evaluation process 
was also considered limited because the treatment costs are considered 
to be more relevant than the outcomes; and the assessment usually 
considers only the prolongation of life as an acceptable outcome, 
disregarding the importance of the improvement of the patient’s quality 
of life (Brazilian patient).  
 
In Colombia, the lack of an administrative pathway to guarantee 
the access to uncovered medicines in the reform of the health system in 
1993 was cited as factor that contributed to the origin of litigation in the 
country in 1990s, Nevertheless, the later establishment of 
reimbursement for uncovered medicines, without medicine prices 
control incites the stakeholders, such as the EPSs and healthcare 
services providers, to likewise promote litigation for access to medicines 
in the country. In the case of Argentina, the excessive bureaucracy and 
discretion involved in the SUR’s high-cost medicines reimbursement 
process was cited as a contributing factor to litigation for access to 
medicines. 
 
Representatives from Colombia, Chile and Argentina emphasized 
that privatization of healthcare facilities, introduction of market logic in 
the health system, and poor capacity of the state to oversee and to 
impose sanctions to the health system’s stakeholders are among the 
main causes of litigation in their countries. As a result of the 
aforementioned factors, the organization of the health systems itself lead 
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the health system managers deny the provision of covered services and 
medicines, especially the more expensive ones, in order to earn profit.  
 
On the other hand, especially health system managers’ 
representatives from Argentina, Colombia and Chile mentioned that the 
people do not consider them as legitimate stakeholders. Thus when the 
health system manager denies some medicine, the people think that it is 
because the manager wants to make more profit, but not because the 
medicine is not the best option for the patient.  
 
In Brazil, the patient organization’s representative mentioned that 
litigation occurs because the health system managers do not want to 
spend the money. A Judiciary’s representative added that in some cases 
the health system managers use litigation to favour a third party by 
means of corrupt practices. 
 
The limited number of clinical guidelines defined in the health 
system was also mentioned as a contributing factor to the occurrence of 
judicialization of access to medicines (Argentina, Executive, managers; 
Brazil, professional and patient). The guidelines’ inflexibility also 
favours lawsuits because it generates discrimination of some patients 
because of their age or clinical situation (Chile, patient).  
 
As regards prescription practices, representatives of the physician 
organizations and patient organizations defended the medical autonomy. 
They argued that it is the prescriber who better knows the patient’s 
clinical situation and has the information to decide the best treatment 
option. In this sense, the questioning about the medical prescription by 
the health system actually causes litigation (Patient).  
 
On the other hand, the fact that physicians disregard the impacts 
of their prescription practices upon the access to medicines for the 
population was considered a cause of litigation (Argentina and Brazil, 
Executive, Professional, Manager). This point was especially remarked 
by Brazilian Judiciary’s representatives, who recognized that in some 
cases lawsuits are filed by patients assisted in health facilities of the 
private sector expecting to get quick access to the medicines in the 
public sector. 
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Likewise, some representatives argued that litigation occurs 
because doctors, based on the foundation of their medical autonomy, 
prescribe medicines for off-label uses, unlicensed medicines, or 
medicines still in a research stage, and do not comply with the health 
system’s clinical guidelines (Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, professional, 
Executive, managers, NGO). In addition, Argentinian Executive’s and 
NGO’s representatives and Colombian health system managers’ 
representatives mentioned that the lack of information about medicines, 
financially or intellectually independent of the pharmaceutical industry, 
also contributes to litigation for access to medicines (Colombia, 
managers, Argentina, Executive (Box 4-6).  
 
Box 4-6. Examples of causes related to the category health system software 
 
 
“The second one [cause] is a perverse incentive that is generated by the creation 
of the EPS in Colombia. The perverse incentive, which is what kills them [EPS] 
and kills the way the system was designed in Colombia, is that ... [the nature] 
for profit of these companies implies that if they spend... if they supply fewer 
services [...] or spend less money, they can make more money... so there is a 
widespread opinion resulted from this contract model; it does not mean that EPS 
always does so, but whenever they deny or do not provide a service, people will 
believe that they are profit-oriented, that they want to make more money by 
denying the service” (Colombia, NGO). 
 
"In addition, [there are] other cases of treatments in which it is not clear how the 
coverage is. For example, assisted fertilization is lately [...] within the 
compulsory medical program (PMO), but since a lot of issues were not 
regulated, it is not known whether these medicines, which are expensive, should 
be covered at 40%, 70 % or 100% [...] Then, generally, today most of the claims 
related to assisted reproduction have to do with medicines claims at 100%, 
because, of course, the Obra Social tries to cover 40% in the absence of 
regulation "(Argentina, NGO). 
 
“We noticed that there was certain resistance right at the entrance [of the health 
service unit], you see? ...in the sense that the public servant did not do what they 
had to do. So the public defender office [...] had a view that, in order to achieve 
prestige, it had to resort the Judiciary, so it filed lawsuits. So ... there was a 
favourable movement [at the defender office] but the servant did not want to do 
their job. Inadequate supply ... by the municipality, the state, somehow allows 
some favouritism to some pharmacy owned by someone kin to the health 
secretary or the mayor” (Brazil, Judiciary). 
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“[In the AUGE], for some pathologies the access to medicines is stratified into 
age ranges... In this case there are some things... for instance... [some people] 
within a certain age range are given the medicines and others are not ... So the 
access is not a standard for everyone, and there will be people who, for their age 
or [clinical] situation, will not have access to this program” (Chile, Patient 
organization). 
 
 
Few consequences of judicialization of access to medicines were 
mentioned by Chilean representatives as this is a recent phenomenon in 
the country. In Argentina, Brazil and Colombia lawsuits have made 
some limitations of the public policies evident, and have pressured the 
government to make structural positive reforms. Among these reforms, 
they mentioned the updating of the list of covered medicines, the 
creation of HTA agencies, the establishment of new mechanisms of 
reimbursement, and better overseeing of the health system stakeholders. 
 
On the other hand, representatives from Colombia and Brazil 
mentioned some negative impacts of litigation such as the inclusion of 
new medicines because of their high-cost instead of their impacts on the 
public health. Therefore, the health policies design is highly influenced 
by the heath needs of few patients who are able to access the Judiciary, 
at the expense of the rest of the population’s health needs.  
 
In all the studied countries, litigation was considered positive 
when lawsuits involved covered medicines that for some reason are not 
supplied to the patient, because it forces the health system manager to 
carry out their duties.  
 
Nevertheless, the respondents recognized that when lawsuits 
require uncovered medicines by the health system, litigation jeopardize 
the health system managers’ sustainability. Since the judicial decision 
must be fulfilled in a short time (usually 48 hours), the managers lose 
their bargain power with the pharmaceutical industry and/or healthcare 
services providers.  
 
Furthermore, particularly in Brazil and Argentina, judges often 
grant injunctive relief without resolving the merits of the lawsuit, then 
the health system managers cannot interrupt the supply of the treatment, 
even if it is no longer effective.  
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Representatives of Colombia, Brazil and Argentina also 
mentioned that litigation promotes corruption, as it does not allow the 
proper execution of the overseeing processes. In addition, according to 
representatives from Colombia, litigation, rather than solving the 
underlying problems of the health systems, such as unequal access to 
health services and medicines, makes them worse and reduces the health 
systems’ credibility and governance (Box 4-7). 
 
Box 4-7. Examples of consequences related to the category health system 
software 
 
 
[As a result of judicialization] “Public policy is exaggeratedly litigation-driven, 
and in the macro level of the health system, litigation is marginal in terms of 
access [...] less than 0.5% of the health actions are accessed [...] by judicial 
mechanisms” (Colombia, NGO). 
 
“In the case of [medicines and services] not included in the POS (No POS), the 
contracting mechanisms of health services are fee for service, [...], nobody says 
anything, no one questions anything ... So, from the perspective of a healthcare 
provider or supplier [including the pharmaceutical industry] this is the most 
reasonable logic from the economic point of view, and this is covered by 
something called Tutela in Colombia”. (Colombia, manager). 
 
“In the case of benefits which are included in the Mandatory Health Program, 
there is no doubt that they are in charge of the Obra Social, [...], and if 
something is taken to the Judiciary, [...] it is correct [...]. If the patient is not 
satisfied with what the Obra Social provides and [the medicine] is within the 
Compulsory Medical program, it is quite right that [the patient] resorts to the 
Judiciary, because a contract was somehow broken” (Argentina, manager). 
 
“Well, a large number of individual lawsuits causes disorganization in their 
system [the agents responsible for the health care organization], so they start to 
do something. [...] They become so bothered that they actually start to act, to 
change the public policy, you see? So this is a really positive aspect” (Brazil, 
Judiciary). 
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4.3.2.3 Pharmaceutical marketing  
 
The influence of the pharmaceutical industry in the occurrence of 
litigation was recognized in the four studied countries. The stakeholders’ 
representatives mentioned that the pharmaceutical industry uses lawsuits 
as a way to pressure the health systems for financing new medicines or 
branded medicines.  
 
The interviewees mentioned some pharmaceutical industry’s 
strategies to prompt litigation for access to medicines, including the 
relationship with prescribers, patient organizations and lawyers; and the 
marketing campaigns to discredit generic medicines, which results in the 
requirement of specific brands both by prescribers and patients.  
 
With regard to consequences, Argentinian and Colombian 
representatives remarked that the pharmaceutical industry is the 
stakeholder that mostly profit from litigation for access to medicines, 
since the financing of their products becomes guaranteed (Box 4-8). 
 
Box 4-8. Examples of the category Pharmaceutical marketing 
 
Causes 
 
"There is evidence about [the relationship between] pharmaceutical companies 
and doctors, who are somewhat influenced by the industry, [the doctors] also 
ended up going into that thing [litigation] as they realized that the Judiciary, 
let’s put it this way, looks favourably upon that sort of thing [litigation]" 
(Brazil, manager). 
 
"But we must also see that there are vested interests behind them [patient 
organizations], which also led to judicialization, and yet important, right? In 
other words, the pharmaceutical companies are at times behind the patients and, 
a new medicine that has just come out... at the very next day, they [patients] are 
asking for it. You may think “But how can that be?” right? Of course, the 
pharmaceutical companies want to make up for the research costs, and want to 
put it [the medicine] on the market (Argentina, NGO). 
 
The transnational [pharmaceutical] companies [...] will always push expensive 
drugs and will use all strategies do to so... from patient associations to the 
lawyers paid by such patient associations to demand the medicines. So, the 
transnational pharmaceutical industries are pushing the tutela (Colombia, 
NGO). 
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Consequences 
 
“Some interesting data that we had showed how some pharmaceutical 
companies took advantage by concentrating some very good and extremely 
profitable items and reimbursements, that is, it was clear that some companies 
were doing very well with the reimbursements” (Colombia, NGO). 
 
 
4.3.2.4 National policies for science and technology development, 
intellectual property protection and medicines prices control 
 
The weakness of the research and development (R&D) national 
policies and the lack of medicine price control were recognized as 
causes of litigation for access to medicines in Colombia (Patient 
organization and health professional organization). In contrast, the 
monopoly created by the patent protection was also mentioned as a 
possible cause of litigation in the four studied countries.  
 
Impacts of litigation for access to medicines on these policies 
were mentioned in Brazil and Colombia. In Brazil, R&D policies have 
become interrelated with policies for access to medicines since the 
creation of the Specialized Component of the Pharmaceutical 
Assistance. In Colombia, since 2012 the Ministry of Health have 
established maximum prices for uncovered medicines reimbursement 
from the FOSYGA to the EPS (Box 4-9). 
 
Box 4-9. Examples of the category National policies for science and technology 
development, intellectual property protection and medicines prices control 
 
 
Causes  
 
“When [innovation] is in private hands, we cannot know the value of that 
innovation [...] the interest in profit gets in the way of access, and somehow [...] 
these [developing] countries are compelled to meet the market rules, that is, to 
protect patents [...] which we believe is an encouragement for [carrying out 
research on] certain diseases [as] in the case of orphan medicines or in the case 
of the medicines for a few patients, because it ends up being an interesting 
incentive to innovate; but at the same time other public policies are not 
implemented so as to allocate a lot of money from the State for the same type of 
innovation.” (Colombia, Patient). 
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“So, all this combined with high prices by the State which, as in the case of 
Colombia, did not intervene in the prices but instead was absolutely open to 
abuse, as this indeed caused increased spending on a group of medicines [...] a 
part of few biotechnological medicines and some medicines of known chemical 
structure [...] as consequence of all the variables that we have taken into account 
and because the [Colombian] state has been [...] an accomplice and has also sold 
the ethics of ministers, congressmen, to the industry in order to allow free 
prices” (Colombia, Patient). 
 
“So, take an [oncologic] medicine that was recently licensed as an example, 
which is under monopoly and under patent protection, this procedure, that we 
[ministry of health] pay to the [health care] provider, will probably not be 
enough to fund this medicine and it ends up generating a lawsuit” (Brazil, 
Executive). 
 
Consequences 
 
“Another important issue that we have interest in this set of medicines [included 
in the Specialized Component of Pharmaceutical Assistance – CEAF] is a 
highly strategic action, which is the strengthening of the health industrial 
complex [...] This component [CEAF] contributes a lot to the Brazilian policy in 
the industrial complex of health. We are already at a stage where we are not 
going to the market just to buy medicines, but we are stimulating the national 
production through technological transfer for products of this component” 
(Brazil, Executive). 
 
The important thing [...] is that the Sentence T-760 and the instrument to 
monitor compliance of this sentence have indeed allowed to follow the whole 
issue from the Judiciary, [including] the obligation of government authorities to 
regularly submit reports to the Court [...] has recently brought about, shall we 
say, and certainly for other reasons, changes in the public policy on the control 
of medicine prices and the need that pharmaceutical companies do not fix the 
prices at their discretion, but the state is the one interested in controlling this 
issue (Colombia, Judicial). 
 
 
4.3.2.5 Judiciary  
 
In general, representatives of all stakeholders, except the patient 
organizations, mentioned causes of judicialization related to the 
Judiciary. In this sense, the respondents called attention to the judges’ 
limited technical knowledge about medicines and their vision favouring 
the supply of the required medicine as always the best alternative for the 
patient.  
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Other aspects pointed out as possible causes of litigation included 
the judges’ perception that the medical prescription is a sufficient 
technical support for granting access to the medicines required through 
lawsuits, the judges’ unawareness of possible conflicts of interest in 
which the prescriber could be involved, and the judges’ non-recognition 
of the health insurers’ technical arguments (Professional, NGO, 
Manager, Judiciary; Argentina, Colombia, Brazil)..  
 
According to Argentinian and Colombian representatives, 
litigation is the result of the judges’ awareness of the right to health 
(Executive and NGO). Brazilian and Colombian representatives also 
attributed this to the judges’ wide interpretation of the right to health, 
considering it as an unlimited right and that any measure aiming to limit 
it constitutes a violation. This perception might be a consequence of the 
judges’ unconsciousness of the impacts of their decisions on the access 
to health services by the general population. (Executive, health system 
manager) 
 
The aforementioned aspects were also cited by the Chilean 
patient organization’s representative, who did not consider them as a 
negative aspect; in contrast to the other participants. 
 
Particularly in Colombia, an NGO’s representative remarked that 
litigation occurs in the country because the judges conceive that granting 
access to medicines by means of individual lawsuits is a progressist 
action and denying it is a neoliberal one. 
 
Chilean and Brazilian representatives highlighted as a cause of 
litigation the non-recognition of the health system’ regulation and 
organization by the judges in their decision-making process (health 
system managers, NGOs, Executive and Judiciary). However, for a 
Brazilian Judiciary’s representative, this non-recognition is justified 
when the health system’s regulation does not guarantee access to 
medicines to the population and infringes the right to health.  
 
Other causes of judicialization of access to medicines related to 
the Judiciary mentioned include the easy access to the justice; and the 
judges’ position of always favouring the patients, seen as the weaker 
party involved in the lawsuits, promotes judicialization (Argentina, 
Colombia and Chile; Manager, Judiciary, NGO) (Box 4-10). 
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Box 4-10. Examples of causes related to the category Judiciary Power 
 
 
“I understand that one [the judge] sometimes does not have many elements, say, 
the judge understands about law, but sometimes not much about medicine. So, 
sometimes, we don’t have enough elements to decide whether the Amparo is 
appropriate or not if it is urgent or not. According to my experience, what I do is 
to try to investigate on my own ... I go to Internet and try to find out whether the 
situation is really urgent… but, well, you would always choose, when in doubt, 
for granting the Amparo to the person” (Argentina, Judicial). 
 
“What the Judiciary thinks is that [...] there is a doctor who asks for it [the 
medicine], this person who needs it [the medicine], and there is someone who 
denies it, that is the prepaid medical company [or Obra Social]. [...] Beyond any 
arguments that you as a financier might have, the Judiciary will rule in favour of 
the request and the person in need” (Argentina, manage). 
 
“When I recourse to the court, I step over all these divisions [of the health care 
organization] because if they, in practice, are not working, I ignore that, you 
see? For, in fact, what is our main foundation? The Federal Constitution says 
that such responsibility lies with the Union, the State and the municipality. And 
if they organize themselves internally, I think it's great, as long as it [this 
organization] turns out fine” (Brazil, Judicial). 
 
“The [Supreme] Court reasons out on the basis that the right to health protection 
itself has to provide the means to protect it [health] [...] In Chile, I would say 
that most of these protection resources are won, and I have seen the situation in 
Uruguay, and in Uruguay [...] almost 15% of the protection resources have been 
won, and the remaining part has been lost, the Judiciary is a little more in line 
with the state or insurers, however not here [in Chile] where the Judiciary is 
closely aligned with consumers, users, patients” (Chile, Lawyer). 
 
[In Colombia] “there has been an issue that could be called legal mobilization, 
that is, recognition of the right [to health] in the Constitution [...] and judges 
[have] an idea of granting the right [to health] with the idea that social rights are 
also protectable through the courts” (Colombia, NGO). 
 
 
In general, the cited impacts of judicialization of access to 
medicines on the Judiciary were negative. They include the additional 
expenses and the overcharge that compromise the Judiciary’s 
responsiveness (Executive, managers and health professional 
organizations, representatives of the patient organization, Argentina, 
Colombia). 
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The loss of effectiveness of lawsuits to guarantee access to 
medicines, resulted of the large number of judicial cases was also cited 
as a negative impact of litigation in Brazil and Colombia, but with two 
different approaches. On one hand for a Brazilian health system 
managers’ representative such loss results from the overcharge of the 
health system managers, which reduces the manager’s responsiveness. 
On the other hand for the Colombian patient organization’s 
representative this loss is related to the inefficient punishment of the 
health system managers when do not comply with court decision. 
 
The Judiciary’s representative considered as positive impacts the 
judicial protection of the right to health from omissions of the Executive 
and the Legislature, and the recognition of this fact by the population. In 
contrast, the health system managers’ representative considered that the 
judicial intervention and the wide interpretation of the right to health 
result in abuses by the people who aim to get access to products and 
services, which are not considered healthcare, most of them related to 
the right to free development of the personality (Box 4-11). 
 
In the Brazilian context, one of the positive impacts of 
judicialization was the creation of technical teams to assist in the judges’ 
decision-making. 
 
Box 4-11. Examples of consequences related to the category Judiciary Power 
 
 
“Because this also affects [...] the Judiciary, as we, the Judiciary itself, are 
overwhelmed with the amount of lawsuits that we have of all kinds, right? Both 
civil and penal. Then all these cases that come this way will, of course, sum to 
those [lawsuits] that the Judiciary already has” (Argentina, professional). 
 
"I believe that a court should not be taking this amount [of lawsuits]. This is 
additional work in hours/man, right? And that means that you need more people 
because it [the court] must respond first in 10 days, as it [the lawsuit] is [related 
to] health, and secondly the ones [lawsuits] that set a pre-cautionary measure 
[the deadline to respond] within 24 hours. This obviously implies more work 
charge for the Judiciary personnel, which I think no one had planned... 
[Moreover] no one has either foreseen that the Tutela is no longer respected [...] 
we evolved to the point that nobody complies with the Tutela, and the 
[Constitutional] Court has to pronounce against contempt for the 
Tutela"(Colombia, patient). 
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“The courts, although widely used, were not a guarantee of access [to 
medicines]. And why? Because the state was not able to account for that” 
(Brazil, manager). 
 
 
4.3.3 Medicines as health needs 
 
The conflict of the definition of need, in accordance with 
Bradshaw (1972), and the argument of the infinity of need, discussed by 
Max-Neef (1998) were found in the speech of two respondents. The 
lawsuits are filed because the health system does not recognize certain 
health needs. In turn, must be considered that health needs are unlimited, 
and there is a conflict because the health systems resources to meet the 
health needs of the population are limited (Brazil and Argentina; Patient 
and Professional) (Box 4-12). 
 
Box 4-12. Examples of the category Medicines as health needs 
 
“I believe that if it is necessary that a patient resorts to the Judiciary for a 
request [of a medicine], one can assume that [...] there is a refusal by the state to 
provide [this medicine], and this is the basics, that is, it is the denial of a need” 
(Brazil, patient). 
 
“What we know today is that the resources are very limited [and] the needs are 
unlimited, but we cannot make the health system fall overboard” (Argentina, 
professional). 
 
 
4.3.4 The demand side level 
 
According to representatives from Argentina, Colombia, and 
Brazil, lawsuits for access to medicines occur because the patients 
nowadays have more access to information and can press the physician 
to get some product that he or she has seen on the Internet, for example. 
In this sense, some respondents remarked that most of the information 
currently available about healthcare products is of poor quality 
(Argentina, Colombia and Brazil; Executive, Managers, Professional, 
NGO).  
 
For Argentinian representatives, lawsuits result from the non-use 
of administrative pathways offered by the health system to guarantee 
access to medicines in case the health system manager does not comply 
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with its obligations (Executive, Managers, and NGO). While Colombian 
representatives considered that most lawsuits for medicines included in 
the POS occur because the users do not know what medicines are 
covered by the health system (Executive, health professional 
organization). 
 
In Argentina, according to a Judiciary’s representative, litigation 
for access to medicines occurs because the citizens recognize this branch 
as ‘the saviour’, while an Executive’s representative considered that 
lawsuits for access to medicines are filed because now the citizens are 
more aware of their right to health. In Colombia, respondents mentioned 
that the creation of patient organizations and the unwillingness to pay of 
the higher income population also have an important influence on 
litigation for access to medicines (NGO).  
 
In Brazil, health system managers’ representatives stated that one 
of the causes of judicialization was the organization of the civil society 
in 1990 to require access to HIV treatment, which at that time was 
expensive. In addition, they mentioned that the people are now 
unwilling to change their lifestyle and expect that all their health 
problems are resolved by medicines (Box 4-13).  
 
Box 4-13. Examples of causes related to the category Demand side level 
 
 
“Obviously, with the advancement of information that patients receive, [...] they 
are changing [... from] a patient who was just a common denominator, who was 
a passive patient and would say “Doctor, what do I have? What [medicine] do I 
have to take or what I can take?” to a patient that says “I have this, I have this 
disease, I have to take this medicine, give me the prescription” (Argentina, 
Executive). 
 
“People do not strive to know what rights they have.” (Colombia, Executive). 
 
"This awareness of the right [to health] and [that] the protection of the Tutela 
works fast to effectively give access to the medicines, then it generates the idea 
of ‘I have that right, then I can claim it’, ‘If they [EPS] deny it [the medicine], I 
will claim it'..."(Colombia, NGO). 
 
"There is a belief in society that the Judiciary has the solutions when the other 
branches [Executive and Legislative] fail" (Argentina, Judiciary). 
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In the four countries, the respondents considered that a positive 
effect of litigation for access to medicines is that lawsuits defend the 
right to health of the population and the patient gets access to the 
medicines required. Nevertheless, the respondents also noted that 
judicialization has negative impacts when the Judiciary concedes to the 
patients medicines without evidence of efficacy or safety or medicines 
that should be used in advanced stages of the disease. In such cases, the 
patients are exposed to unnecessary risk to their health or the therapeutic 
alternatives are prematurely used up.  
 
In all the studied countries, the respondents highlighted that 
litigation is an unequal solution to the barriers to access to medicines, 
once lawsuits have an individual scope and the access to both the health 
services and the justice depends on the individual’s socioeconomic 
characteristics. Thus, judicialization of access to medicines, ends up 
benefiting the people with higher income and/or more empowered. They 
have more possibilities of creating patient organizations to claim their 
rights in the court. In this way, representatives emphasized that an 
individual who is benefited by a lawsuit jumps the queue and passes 
over those who must follow the administrative pathway. 
 
In Colombia, the most relevant positive effect of judicialization 
of access to medicines is raising awareness of the right to health. 
However the representative also recognized that, due to the huge 
number of lawsuits, nowadays litigation is no longer an efficient 
pathway to obtain access to medicines and sometimes it ends up 
delaying the user’s access to healthcare (Executive and Patient). 
 
Finally, other negative effect of judicialization of access to 
medicines is the social movement fragmentation into those pro-branded 
medicines and pro generic medicines (Brazil and Colombia; Executive 
and NGO) (Box 4-14). 
 
Box 4-14. Examples of consequences related to the category Demand side level 
 
 
“I consider the improvement in the access to medicines totally positive [...] and 
obviously is the defence of the right [to access to medicines] of patients that 
actually need them [the medicines]” (Colombia, Professional). 
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“It is important that patients understand they have a right [...], that most people 
know that there is a right and that there is a mechanism to demand it" 
(Colombia, Patient). 
 
“One issue [...] about getting [access to] benefits by filing a Amparo is that it is 
not entirely fair, not only because it affects the budget for the remaining 
patients, but also because access to the Judiciary is just for a certain group of 
people who somehow gets to know about it and can get in contact with some 
lawyer groups or organizations, etc.” (Argentina, Executive). 
 
“But there is another problem, which is that not all people have access to a 
lawyer to file a protection resource, so the issue is absolutely detrimental to 
patients” (Chile, lawyer). 
 
“Another issue that can create difficulty is the lack of safety for the user. So 
when [the judge] makes the decision to concede a particular benefit, for 
example, a medicine that has already been incorporated into the SUS [for 
indications not covered by the CEAF], this can put the user's own safety in 
check” (Brazil, Executive). 
 
 
4.4 DISCUSSION  
 
This study analyses factors that influence the occurrence and 
consequences of judicialization of access to medicines in Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile and Colombia from the perspective of the stakeholders 
involved in this phenomenon, using the framework proposed on chapter 
2. Since this theoretical model allows a wide view of the factors 
involved, it is useful to conduct a cross-country analysis of this 
phenomenon.  
 
The comparative analysis showed that in Brazil, Colombia and 
Argentina, judicialization of access to medicines is more extended than 
in Chile. This result coincides with the findings of previous analyses 
(CUBILLOS et al., 2012; HOGERZEIL et al., 2006; REVEIZ et al., 
2013; YAMIN; GLOPPEN, 2011). These differences can be explained 
by two factors: the recent change on the axis of the Chilean 
Constitutional Tribunal for interpreting the right to health (JORDÁN, 
2013a); and the late establishment of an explicit (or positive) list of 
coverage of medicines in the health system. 
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In the first case, while the Judiciary from Argentina, Brazil and 
Colombia, which in the 1990s were sensible to lawsuits of patients with 
HIV that claim access to antiretroviral medicines, the Chilean Courts did 
not concede access to these medicines. Indeed, the earliest successful 
court cases involving access to medicines and health services occurred 
only at the end of the 2000s in this country (JORDÁN, 2013b), when the 
Supreme tribunal moved from an “individualistic/contractual” 
interpretation of the right to health to a “social perspective” one, that 
conceptualizes health as a social right (JORDÁN, 2013a) 
 
Similarly, in the case of the explicit medicines list, the Explicit 
Guarantees in Health (GES) were established in 2004 (CHILE, 2004), in 
comparison with the other three countries, which established explicit list 
in the 1990s (ARGENTINA, PRESIDENCIA, 1995; BRASIL, 1990a, p. 
80; COLOMBIA, 1993b). 
 
The analysis also showed that the aspects of the international 
level, recognition of the right to health in human rights treaties and the 
TRIPS agreement, are poor recognized by the stakeholders, with the 
exception of some representatives from Colombia. The disregard for the 
aforementioned factors, especially the second one, neglects to a certain 
extent the effects that the crisis of the current innovation model has on 
the occurrence of judicialization of access to medicines. 
 
At the national level was observed that judicialization for access 
to medicines emerged in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Colombia 
regardless of aspects such as the recognition of the right to health in the 
constitution or the proportion of population covered by the public and 
private sectors. In the first case, only in Brazil health was explicitly 
considered a fundamental right when the study was carried out 
(BRASIL, 1988). In the second case, in both Chile and Brazil most of 
population depend on the public sector for accessing healthcare services 
in (chapter 3). 
 
In the four studied countries, causes in common were described 
such as the health systems’ limitations in guaranteeing universal, 
equitable and timely access to health services and medicines covered by 
the health systems. According to our results, these limitations are related 
to management inefficiencies, health services networks fragmentation; 
stakeholders’ corruption and weak state regulation capacity. This results 
in loss of credibility of the health system. 
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The respondents’ speeches showed that the measures to regularly 
update the lists are insufficient for controlling litigation for access to 
medicines. Notwithstanding, the combination of the health system’s lack 
of credibility and the expectations created by the pharmaceutical 
marketing about the medicine outcomes makes the discussion about the 
judicialization causes concentrate on the comprehensiveness of the list 
of covered medicines.  
 
In fact, our results evidence that the pharmaceutical industry, by 
means of the marketing practices, reinforces the “fallacy of the outdated 
medication list” and challenges the HTA criteria. In this way the 
discussion about medicines inclusion in the health system focus on the 
premise of “the health system does not cover expensive medicines” 
rather than on the population criteria considered on the Health 
Technology Assessments.  
 
On the other hand, the role of the physicians’ prescription 
practices in the occurrence of judicialization of access to medicines was 
recognized in the four studied countries. Nevertheless, strategies both to 
counter the pharmaceutical marketing and to make transparent the 
relationship between the pharmaceutical industry and prescribers were 
not cited by the respondents. These strategies could contribute to reduce 
the frequency of lawsuits claiming uncovered medicines.  
 
Furthermore, our results show that the question “why the new 
medicines are that expensive?” as well as the relationship among the 
public policies for guaranteeing access to medicines and the intellectual 
property protection and the science and technological development 
policies are aspects frequently neglected in the discussion of litigation of 
access to medicines.  
 
The disregard of some sectors for these political economy 
features of the right to health, had been previously described in 
Colombia (LAMPREA, 2015), and our result suggest a similar situation 
in Brazil, Argentina and Chile. In addition, this neglect compromises the 
ability of countries to create strategies at a national and a regional level 
aiming to defend their health sovereignty against the pharmaceutical 
industry’s abuses.  
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In the case of the Judiciary, the aforementioned aspects influence 
their decision making. Although the judges’ desire is to promptly protect 
the patients’ right to health, they usually do not recognize that their 
decisions can have adverse effects in special when uncovered medicines 
are grant. This comes from the fact that the health system manager has a 
short time to respond, and needs to use exceptional pathways for 
procurement, which are usually difficult to control, favouring diversion 
of resources and corruption.  
 
Furthermore, the Judiciary’s representatives argued that it is 
ethically unacceptable to sacrifice the individual right to health in order 
to protect the collective right to health. This evidenced the conflict of 
this view with the Executive’ and health system managers’ perspective 
that consider that what is actually unethical is to sacrifice the collective 
right to health in order to protect the individual right to health. In 
addition, they argued that the exposition of the patient to unsafe or 
unnecessary medicines, indeed, constitutes a violation of the right to 
health. 
 
As regards the consequences of judicialization of access to 
medicines, our results coincide with the impacts reported in other 
studies. Particularly our study showed the impacts related to inequality 
induced by litigation in the distribution of the health system resources. 
In the present study, the respondents recognized that litigation is an 
unequal solution to access to medicines, because the lawsuits are 
individual, and access both to healthcare and justice services highly 
depend on the socioeconomic characteristics of the population. 
Moreover, it is possible to observe that those who get the access to 
medicines granted by the judge jump the queue and pass the people who 
follow official or predefined pathways of the health system.  
 
Concerning the positive impacts of litigation, one of the most 
emphasized ones was the pressure that this phenomenon exerts over the 
health system managers to fulfil their responsibilities (VARGAS-
PELÁEZ et al., 2014). Nevertheless, the respondents also highlighted 
other impacts such as the health system’s governability loss, which can 
compromise the implementation of corrective measures to control 
litigation and to improve the health system’s performance. 
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Following the theoretical model, a remarkable finding of our 
study includes the fact that only in Brazil judicialization has had impacts 
over R&D policies, including measures as the establishment of public-
private partnerships for technology transfer in order to locally produce 
the medicines considered a priority for the public health system (SUS) 
(BRASIL, MINISTÉRIO DA SAÚDE, 2014).  
 
In Colombia, litigation also encourages the recognition of the 
right to health as a fundamental right, the development of policies for 
controlling medicines prices, and the creation of a specific commission 
of the Judiciary that supervises the measures taken by the Ministry of 
Health to meet the commitments established by ruling T-760/2008 
(UPRIMNY; DURÁN, 2014). 
 
4.5 LIMITATIONS 
 
This qualitative study does not aim to generalize its findings, but 
describe the perceptions of the stakeholders involved in judicialization 
of access to medicines. Some limitations of this study include the fact 
that most of the interviews were conducted only in the capital cities, 
with the exception of Brazil, and the fact that pharmaceutical industry’s 
representatives were not invited to participate. 
 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
 
According to the results of this study, the causes of judicialization 
of access to medicines more often described by the studied countries’ 
representatives were those related to the organization of the health 
system (‘software’ and ‘hardware’). They mentioned especially issues 
about the definition of the list of medicines covered by the health system 
and the non-social legitimacy of the Executive and health system 
managers. The influence of the international context and the national 
economic and social policies on judicialization was little known. 
Additionally, it is possible to conclude that the Judiciary sees itself as a 
protector of the right to health. As so other stakeholders, especially 
patients and health professionals perceive it. 
 
The analysis of judicialization of access to medicines using the 
theoretical model proposed in chapter 2 allowed a comprehensive view 
of the phenomenon. In this way, our analysis explored the influence of 
different factors from the health and market perspective at different 
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levels (international, national and demand-side), which can influence the 
occurrence of judicialization as well as the feedback effects that the 
phenomenon can bring.  
 
Our analysis shows some similarities in the causes and 
consequences of litigation for access to medicines in the studied 
countries, despite the differences on the contexts and the possible 
aspects that define the extension or occurrence of this phenomenon in a 
specific time frame. The result suggest that this kind of analysis, 
applying the theoretical model adopted, creates the possibility of 
identifying critical points that can guide the policy making at both 
national and international levels to improve the performance of the 
health systems and control the lawsuits for access to medicines.  
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5 CHAPTER 5 – Responses to judicialization of access to 
medicines in Latin America: The cases of Brazil and Colombia 
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Litigation for access to medicines has risen as an alternative 
pathway for patients regardless of whether or not the medicine is 
covered by the health system (chapter 3). The extension of litigation for 
access to medicines varies from country to country. In Chile, it is still 
incipient since most lawsuits related to the right to health result from 
arbitrary adjustments by health insurance premiums in the private sector. 
In Argentina, the phenomenon concentrate in the social security 
subsector, and the stakeholders recognize that the number of lawsuits is 
getting out of control. Meanwhile, in Brazil and Colombia, litigation for 
access to medicines is more intense (Chapter 4), and both countries 
stand out because of the impacts that the phenomenon have had over the 
health systems (HOGERZEIL et al., 2006; REVEIZ et al., 2013). 
 
The comparative analysis of the causes and consequences of 
litigation for access to medicines in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
Colombia showed that, despite the countries’ differences in their 
constitutional recognition of the right to health and the health system 
organization, there are similarities among them. Health systems’ 
limitations to incorporate new medicines were mentioned by all 
interviewed stakeholders as a cause of litigation. Additionally, 
regressive effects of the phenomenon on equal access to healthcare and 
medicines especially when new and expensive medicines are required 
was mentioned as a consequence of litigation in all the studied countries 
(see chapter 4).  
 
Within this framework, in order to proceed in the comparative 
analysis, this study aims to characterize and compare the States’ 
responses to litigation for access to medicines, especially those focused 
on extending the list of medicines covered by the health systems.  
 
5.2. METHODOLOGY 
 
In this cross-country study, two methodologies were used. Firstly, 
an integrative literature review was carried out to identify the 
regulations related to the measures taken to guarantee access to 
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medicines in response to litigation, following the methodology 
described in Section 3.2.1.  
 
This information was supplemented with semi-structured 
interviews conducted with representatives of the stakeholders involved 
in the phenomenon of litigation for access to medicines described in 
Section 3.2.2. They were asked about the impacts of the measures 
adopted by the Executive and Judiciary branches (see Table 3-2).  
 
Documentary analysis was applied to the regulations identified in 
order to identify the assumptions of the policy-makers related to the 
extension of the access to medicines and the expected impacts of public 
policies. The results of this analysis were contrasted with the 
interviewees’ statements. 
 
5.3. RESULTS 
 
In Argentina, the recently implemented Unified Reimbursement 
System (SUR) (ARGENTINA, SUPERINTENDENCIA DE 
SERVICIOS DE SALUD, 2012b) and the Supervisory System for 
Emerging Sanitation Technologies (ARGENTINA, 
SUPERINTENDENCIA DE SERVICIOS DE SALUD, 2012c) aim to 
improve the Health Technology Assessment (HTA) process and 
streamline the resources flow within the social security subsector for the 
financing of new technologies. However, according to the Argentinian 
stakeholders’ representatives, these measures were not established in 
response to litigation for access to medicines, but in response to the 
‘Obras Sociales’ corruption detected in the reimbursement processes. 
 
In addition, the Argentinean respondents recognized that although 
litigation for access to medicines is a concern for some sectors of the 
Judiciary and the Supreme Court has ruled some lawsuits related to 
access to medicines, there were not any statements from this branch 
about substantive issues of the phenomenon. In the respondents’ 
opinion, there are two reasons for this. Firstly, the Argentinian Supreme 
Court is conservative in its statements; and secondly, in this country the 
Executive and the Legislature are responsible for resolving the health 
system problems. 
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Despite the aforementioned observations, the respondents noted 
that in order to control the phenomenon’s growth the Judiciary has 
limited the jurisdiction over right-to-health claims to civil and 
commercial courts. These measures reduced the number of gateways to 
the Judiciary. Furthermore, according to the respondents, the Judiciary 
recognized its limitations in dealing with right-to-health claims and 
proposed the creation of specialized tribunals to meet these claims. 
Nevertheless, these tribunals have not been implemented yet.  
 
In Chile the respondents observed that, although the rate of 
successful lawsuits for access to medicines in the Supreme Court was 
high, there were not any statements related to the right to health. This 
was in part because, according to the Constitution, the Judiciary is not 
responsible for creating or executing measures related to the health 
system.  
 
As litigation for access to medicines is not extend in Chile as in 
the other analysed countries, the measures taken by the Chilean 
Legislature (CHILE, 2004) and Executive (CHILE, MINISTERIO DE 
SALUD, 2010, 2013) for the implementation and expansion of the 
Health Explicit Guarantees (GES) were not influenced by the 
phenomenon. These measures were taken in response to the health 
system’s unequal technology coverage between public and private 
sectors. According to the respondents, the specific measures to extend 
the coverage of expensive medicines are the result of the social 
mobilization that has caught media attention. The best example is Law 
Ricarte Soto that has recently come into force and was under discussion 
at the time when the interviews were conducted (CHILE, 2015).  
 
In Colombia and in Brazil public policies for expanding the list of 
medicines covered by health system in response to litigation for access 
to medicines were identified. The comparative analysis of the measures 
taken by the three branches (Judiciary, Executive and Legislative) in 
these countries is presented below.  
 
5.4.1 Measures taken by the Judiciary branch in Colombia and 
Brazil 
 
The Judiciary was the branch that first took measures in response 
to litigation for access to medicines in Colombia and Brazil. These 
measures came into force with little time difference between the 
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countries. In Colombia, ruling T-760 came into force in July 2008, and 
the public hearing in Brazil occurred in April 2009 (Table 5-1). 
However, the measures had different characteristics. In Brazil, the 
Supreme Court opted for a public hearing, a participatory way, in which 
all stakeholders could expose their perspective on the phenomenon of 
right-to-health judicialization and openly discuss the matter (BRASIL, 
SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL, 2009); Colombia's Constitutional 
Court issued a court order of mandatory compliance to the Executive 
take corrective actions to resolve the failure in the health system that 
compromised the population’s right to health (COLOMBIA, CORTE 
CONSTITUCIONAL, 2008a). 
 
Another difference that was found between those measures is the 
acknowledgement of the Judiciary’s role in the development of the 
phenomenon. So, in Brazil the National Justice Council by means of 
Recommendation No. 31, 2009 (BRASIL, CONSELHO NACIONAL 
DE JUSTIÇA, 2010a) sent order to all instances of the Judiciary to take 
actions to better support decisions related to the right to health. In 
contrast, the Constitutional Court of Colombia makes no explicit 
mention of recommendations for the Judiciary’s members. 
 
From the interviews in both countries, it was observed that ruling 
T-760 was widely known by the Colombian respondents, while both the 
STF public hearing and CNJ Recommendation 31/2009 were just 
recognized by representatives of the Ministry of Health, managers and 
the Judiciary in Brazil.  
 
Regarding the impacts of these measures, similarities were found 
too. In both countries, the measures adopted by the Judiciary favour 
and/or press the Executive to take measures for: 
 
a) Updating the list of medicines of the health systems;  
b) Establish the frequency of updating;  
c) Increase the transparency of the list updating process, ensuring 
the participation of all stakeholders, including the civil society;  
d) The creation and/or restructuration of the Health Technology 
Assessment Agencies: National Commission for Health 
Technology Incorporation in the SUS – CONITEC in Brazil, and 
Health Technology Assessment Institute – IETS in Colombia; 
e) Improve the medicine financing mechanisms. 
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Table 5-1 Measures taken by the Judiciary branch in Brazil and Colombia in response to judicialization of access to medicines 
 
Entity Regulation Premises 
Federal Supreme Court  
(BRASIL, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL 
FEDERAL, 2009) 
Public Hearing No. 4 2009 
 
Date: 27th -29th of April and 
4th-7th of May 2009 
Litigation for access to healthcare services is a complex 
phenomenon that involves technical, scientific, management, 
political, economic and legal issues.  
 
The State is responsible for the protection of the right to health 
of the population 
 
There are situations not considered by the health system and the 
public policies (e.g. uncovered medicines, unlicensed 
medicines, medical treatment aboard) in which it is not clear if 
the state has the obligation of financing them. 
 
The RENAME’S updating process needs to be periodical, 
efficient and transparent. 
 
Litigation may involve Unified Health System frauds. 
  
National Justice Council (BRASIL, 
CONSELHO NACIONAL DE 
JUSTIÇA, 2010a) 
Recommendation No.31 2009 
 
Date: 30th of March 2010 
The Judiciary members are also responsible for ensuring 
efficiency in the solution of lawsuits by guaranteeing that their 
decisions are subsidized by technical information.  
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Entity Regulation Premises 
Constitutional Court 
(COLOMBIA, CORTE 
CONSTITUCIONAL, 2008b) 
Ruling T-760 de 2008 
 
Date: 31st of July 2008 
The right to health is a fundamental right. 
 
All people have the right to access to the same list of benefits 
(healthcare services and medicines) regardless of the health 
system regime that they are affiliated  
 
The Executive’s lack of regulation and overseeing over the 
health system stakeholders is the leading cause of 
judicialization. 
 
The reimbursement system favours the EPS and encourages the 
filing of lawsuits (tutelas). 
 
The POS list has not been comprehensively or periodically 
updated. 
 
The flow of resources from the reimbursement system is not 
working, so the FOSYGA’s arrears with the EPS must be paid 
in the short term.  
 
This ruling must be widely disseminated. 
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In the Brazilian context different strategies to provide technical 
support for judicial decisions were implemented as a result of 
Recommendation nº 31/2009. Some examples mentioned by the 
respondents include the Technical Support Centres (Núcleos de Apoio 
Técnico - NATs), the Health Dispute Resolution Chamber (Câmara de 
Resolução de Litígios em Saúde – CRLS) in Rio de Janeiro, the 
Interinstitutional Committee for Administrative Resolution of Health 
Demands (Comitê Interinstitucional de Resolução Administrativa de 
Demandas Da Saúde – CIRADS) in Rio Grande do Norte, and the 
implementation in the state of Santa Catarina of measures to evaluate 
the demands and file a lawsuit only after assessing the case and 
verifying previous treatment alternatives used and available in the SUS. 
 
In addition, the National Justice Council created the National 
Judicial Forum for Health. This aim the monitoring and resolution of 
health care claims. Furthermore, it intends to conduct studies and 
proposition of concrete and regulatory measures to improve procedures, 
effectiveness of court proceedings and prevention of new conflicts” 
(BRASIL, CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA, 2010b).  
 
Nevertheless, the respondents recognized that the effects of these 
measures are limited. They cited as cause the little dissemination of 
information about them; lack of knowledge of judges and lawyer about 
specific aspects of the right to health; and judiciary decentralization. The 
judiciary decentralization resulted in huge variability in the 
implementation of these measures among the states. Particularly, in the 
view of the health system managers’ representatives, these measures did 
not have the expected effects. For them the Judiciary did not take a stand 
against the broad interpretation of the right to health and its effect on the 
equity of the health system. 
 
In Colombia, the respondents mentioned that ruling T-760 had 
positive impacts such as the recognition of the right to health as a 
fundamental right. Health became an important issue in the public 
agenda and lead to higher consciousness of the right to health in society, 
especially in the subsidized regime that serves the most vulnerable 
population. At the same time, ruling T-760/2008 allowed social 
cohesion by the approach of civil society groups working around the 
right to health, actively monitoring the Executive branch’s compliance 
with the orders stated in the ruling. 
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Ruling T-760/2008 also changed the reimbursement mechanism 
of medicines required by lawsuits, establishing that if the medicine is 
supplied under a lawsuit the FOSYGA would only reimburse 50% of the 
value to the Health-Promoting Enterprises (EPSs). If the medicine is 
provided by a decision of the Scientific and Technical Committee (CTC) 
the EPS would receive 100% of the value.  
 
This change makes it advantageous for EPS process the 
requirement of uncovered medicines through the CTC. According to the 
respondents, the measure facilitated access to medicines for the patients 
that because of their clinical situation require uncovered medicines. 
Nonetheless, for the respondents an undesirable effect of this decision is 
the reinforce of the perverse incentive that makes the EPS prefer to 
provide uncovered medicines instead of using the resources given to 
finance the POS benefits.  
 
The respondents mentioned other undesired effects of ruling T-
760. The increased number of lawsuits claiming access to medicines 
became more evident due to the broad dissemination of the measures in 
the media. Also, they pointed out that the Court's pressure to speed up 
the payment of pending reimbursement by the FOSYGA to the EPS 
favours corruption, since this order limits the ability to audit payments. 
Finally, the respondents mentioned that ruling T-760 does not solve the 
underlying problems of the health system derived from the system 
management, which is delegated to private companies. 
 
Moreover, according to a NGOs’ representative, ruling T-760 
favours an individualist interpretation of the right to health, which in 
some cases limits the ability of the Ministry of Health to take collective 
framework measures. In other words, in order to comply with the 
Constitutional Court orders, the Ministry of Health must adopt very 
specific measures that sometimes are counterproductive to the equity of 
the health system.  
 
5.4.2 Measures taken by the Executive and Legislative branches 
in Brazil and Colombia 
 
The measures taken by the Executive and Legislature in these two 
countries were also close in time and had similar objectives: to adopt 
HTA criteria for the inclusion of new technologies in the health system 
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coverage; make the HTA process more efficient and transparent; expand 
the list of medicines supplied by the health system; streamline the flow 
of resources within the health system for ensuring its sustainability; and 
guarantee equity in the access to medicines (Table 5-2). 
 
The Legislature also participates in the health system reforms but 
in different ways. In Brazil, the Legislature defined what pharmaceutical 
assistance means within the SUS, as a way to fill the regulatory gap in 
Law 8080/1990. For the Judiciary, the Law 8080/1990 put the 
"integrated care, including pharmaceutical" as one of the SUS actions 
without regulating it. In Colombia, in turn, the Legislature undertook a 
general reform of the health system that, among other aspects, 
considered the creation of the Health Technology Assessment Institute, 
and the extinction of the Commission of Regulation in Health (CRES) 
which was in charge of the POS updating process until 2012.  
 
In Colombia, all the respondents recognized the influence of 
judicialization and Ruling T-760 on the creation and implementation of 
these public policies by the other branches. Indeed, all the subsequent 
regulations cite Ruling T-760/2008 in their preambles. In turn, in the 
Brazilian context, the influence of the Judiciary’s initiative on the 
measures taken by the Executive and the Legislative is controversial. 
 
As regards the impacts of these measures, the respondents’ 
opinions were similar in Colombia and Brazil. For instance, in both 
countries most of the respondents considered the expansion and 
updating of the list of medicines a positive effect of the policy, which 
resulted in a decrease in the number of lawsuits for the now covered 
medicines.  
 
In Colombia, the two biggest POS’s updating process happened 
after ruling T-760 came into force. The update of 2011 incorporated 
some expensive medicines; and the update of 2013 eliminated the 
specifications of strength for solid dosage forms (tablets, capsules, etc.) 
and for some therapeutic groups all the ‘me too’ medicines were 
incorporated.  
 
166 
 
 
Table 5-2 Measures taken by the Executive and Legislative branches in Brazil and Colombia in response to judicialization of 
access to medicines 
 
 
Entity Regulation Propositions 
Brazil 
Ministry of Health (BRASIL, 
MINISTÉRIO DA SAÚDE, 
2009) 
Ordinance No. 2.981 
of 26th of 
November/2009 
The Specialized Component of the Pharmaceutical Assistance aims to 
improve the tools and strategies for ensuring and expanding access to health 
services, including medicines (particularly expensive ones).  
National Congress (BRASIL, 
2011b) 
Law No. 12.401 of 
28th of April/2011 
The therapeutic assistance and health technology incorporation process 
should be defined to resolve the gap in the SUS regulation related to this 
issue. 
Presidency of the Republic 
(BRASIL, 2011a) 
Decree No. 7.508 of 
28th June of 2011    
The RENAME consists of the list of medicines covered by the health system 
(SUS), which must be periodically updated and whose financing is 
negotiated and supported by the three governmental levels for a financial 
balance among them. 
Presidency of the Republic 
(BRASIL, 2011c) 
Decree No. 7.646 of 
21st of 
December/2011.   
The HTA agency performance must be improved; the HTA process must be 
more efficient and participative. 
Ministry of Health (BRASIL, 
MINISTÉRIO DA SAÚDE, 
2013) 
Ordinance No.  
1.554 of 30th of 
July/2013. 
Takes into consideration that the minimum slice of the budget of the 
different government levels must be spent on health, and the list of 
medicines must be updated every two years. 
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Entity Regulation Propositions 
Colombia 
Commission of Regulation in 
Health – CRES (COLOMBIA, 
COMISIÓN DE 
REGULACIÓN EN SALUD – 
CRES, 2009) 
Agree No.  004 of 
2009 
 
Date: 30th of 
September of 2009 
The benefits plan of the contributory and subsidized regimes are equalized 
for people between 0 and 12 years old in order to comply with the order of 
the Constitutional Tribunal. 
CRES (COLOMBIA, 
COMISIÓN DE 
REGULACIÓN EN SALUD – 
CRES, 2010) 
Agree No. 011 of 
2010 
 
Date: 1st of February 
of 2010 
The benefits plan of the contributory and subsidized regimes are equalized 
for people between 12 and under 18 years old in order to comply with 
Decision T-760/2008 of the Constitutional Tribunal. 
National Congress 
(COLOMBIA, 2011) 
Law 1438 of 2011 
 
Date: 19th of 
January of 2011 
The Benefits Plan must be fully updated every two years according to the 
changes in the population’s epidemiological profile and disease burden, 
availability of resources, balance and extraordinary medicines that are not 
explicit in the Benefits Plan. 
 
The Health Technology Assessment Institute (IETS) must evaluate health 
technologies based on scientific evidence, guides and protocols on 
procedures, medicines and treatment according to the Benefits Plan. Its 
guidelines will be used as a benchmark for defining benefit plans, for 
technical concepts of the Scientific Committees and the Scientific and 
Technical Board, and for providers of health services. 
CRES (COLOMBIA, 
COMISIÓN DE 
REGULACIÓN EN SALUD – 
CRES, 2011a) 
Agree No. 27 of 2011 
 
Date: 11th of 
November of 2011 
The benefits plan of the contributory and subsidized regimes are equalized 
for people older than 60 years old to comply with the orders of Decision T-
760 of the Constitutional Tribunal. 
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Entity Regulation Propositions 
CRES (COLOMBIA, 
COMISIÓN DE 
REGULACIÓN EN SALUD – 
CRES, 2011b) 
Agree No.29 of 2011 
 
Date: 28th of 
December of 2011 
Aiming to meet the statement of Article 25 of Law 1438/2011 (related to the 
public consultation for the list updating) and the orders of Decision T-760 of 
the Constitutional Tribunal, the new list of medicines include the 
suggestions from the public consultation and was considered adequate. 
CRES (COLOMBIA, 
COMISIÓN DE 
REGULACIÓN EN SALUD – 
CRES, 2012) 
Agree No. 32 of 2012 
 
Date: 17th of May of 
2012 
 
The benefits plan of the contributory and subsidized regimes are equalized 
for people between 18 and 59 years old to comply with the orders of 
Decision T-760 of the Constitutional Tribunal. 
 
Ministry of Health 
(COLOMBIA, MINISTERIO 
DE SALUD, 2013) 
Resolution No.5521 
of 2013 
 
Date: 27th of 
December of 2013 
 
Takes into consideration that the minimum slice of the budget of the 
different government levels must be spent on health, and the list of 
medicines must be updated every two years. 
 
Defines, clarifies and fully updates the Mandatory Health Plan (POS).  
 
Includes new technologies, some of them with coverage specifically to some 
indications only. Eliminates the concentration specification and dosage form 
of the covered medicines, and includes full therapeutic subgroups (proton 
pump inhibitors, H2-receptor agonists, calcium channel blockers, ACE 
inhibitors such as mono-drugs, HMG-CoA reductase inhibitors). 
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In Brazil, before the decree No. 7.508/2011 came into force, there 
were three different lists of medicines; the National List of Essential 
Medicines (RENAME); the list of medicines for the treatment of HIV 
and sexually transmitted diseases; and the CEAF medicines list. From 
2012 all list were unified and the RENAME became the list of 
medicines supplied by the SUS. In addition, the process of HTA of new 
technologies or medicines for their inclusion in the SUS was centralized 
in the Brazilian National Committee for Health Technology Assessment 
(CONITEC). 
 
This kind of expansion of the medicines list is based on a change 
in the essential medicines’ definition, which creates controversy. 
Representatives of the Executive in both countries argue that the change 
in the definition is positive. Their arguments include first the fact that 
the cost is not a reason for excluding medicines that have evidence of 
safety and efficacy. Second the availability of different dosage forms is 
good for the prescribers and the patients as it facilitates the dose 
adjustment for each patient and prevents the fractioning of dosage forms 
and wasting of resources.  
 
Nevertheless, according to a health professional organization’s 
representative these measures distort the concept of essential medicines 
because the inclusion of new medicines does not respond to the 
technical criteria for cost-effectiveness. On the contrary, the inclusion 
process responds to the pressure that the pharmaceutical industry exert 
by means of litigation of access to medicines. In addition, difficulties for 
managing a big list of items was cited as a negative effect of this update 
process in Colombia. 
 
In both countries, another controversial decision is the coverage 
for specific indications. Some medicines, particularly the expensive 
ones, are provided by the health system only for clinical situations that 
have sufficient evidence of efficacy and safety. The indications are 
defined by means of compulsory clinical guidelines (Brazil) or 
specifications from the list (Colombia). For some respondents this 
ensures the rational use of medicines and economic resources 
(Executive, Professional, NGO). 
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In contrast, some respondents pointed out that this measure 
generates inequality in the access to medicines (Patients, Professionals). 
As example, they cited the case of patients who have uncovered 
pathologies, but that could have benefits with the medicines available in 
the lists for other diseases. This generates lawsuits claiming covered 
medicines for off-label uses. Another factor cited in the Brazilian 
context is the limitation of SUS in providing appointments with a 
specialist, which is required in the clinical protocols (Patient). 
 
The last common aspect between these two countries was the 
Judiciary’s representatives’ unawareness and/or perception that the 
measures taken by the Ministries of Health are still insufficient. 
 
Regarding the positive consequences of the CEAF 
implementation, the respondents mentioned the coordination of the 
policies for access to medicines with the policies aiming at 
strengthening the local industrial medical complex. The redistribution 
among the three government levels of the expensive medicines’ 
financial burden was also mentioned as a positive result (Executive). 
Furthermore, the representatives agreed on improvement of the access to 
medicines in all the Brazilian states as result of the CEAF 
implementation. However, managers’ representatives noted that the 
incorporation of technologies had limited effects upon the financial 
burden that they face as consequence of the claim for access to 
expensive medicines through lawsuits.  
 
In Colombia, representatives considered the changes in the 
doctor’s prescription practice as an adverse effect of the POS’s updating 
(Executive and Managers). Due to the inclusion of new medicines in the 
list, the physicians now indicate longer treatments. This is also in part 
because of the unavailability of mandatory clinical guidelines. This 
tendency ends up increasing the health system’s spending on expensive 
medicines.  
 
In addition, the equalization of the POS lists was considered an 
advance in terms of equity in the access to medicines and health services 
between the subsidized and the contributory regimes. Nevertheless, the 
non-equalization of the Unit per Capita (UPC) of the subsidized regime 
compromises the financial sustainability of the EPS-S. This generates 
uncertainty about the real impacts of this measure on access to 
medicines in the subsidize regime (NGO).  
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Furthermore, according to these respondents, the equalization of 
the POS lists can also increase the number of lawsuits, as it expands the 
access to specialized care therefore the number of patients requiring 
expensive medicines. Finally, this measure also changed the profile of 
the lawsuits, as now the patient does not require the financing of the 
medicine but claims continuous and timely access to it (patient).  
 
5.4. DISCUSSION 
 
This study carried out a cross-country analysis of measures taken 
in response to judicialization of access to medicines. We defined health 
system as a complex set of stakeholders, rules, and values (SHEIKH et 
al., 2011). For this reason, we adopted a qualitative approach as it allows 
to understand how health system actors understand and experience 
particular services or policies, and what social and political processes, 
including power relations, influence them (GILSON et al., 2011).  
 
The results show that that judicialization presents differences and 
similarities in the four analysed countries. In Chile, the incipient 
expansion of lawsuits for access to medicines can be explained because 
only in the last years, the Supreme Court has adopted a progressist 
interpretation of the Right to Health, recognizing its protection as an 
obligation of the state (JORDÁN, 2013a). In turn, in Argentina and 
Colombia, despite the introduction of the market logic in the health 
system since 1990, the Judiciary’s interpretation of the right to health as 
a fundamental right has been frequent (BERGALLO, 2010; YAMIN; 
PARRA-VERA, 2010). In Brazil, the right to health had been 
recognized as a fundamental right in the Constitution since 1998 
(BIEHL, 2013). 
 
However, our results show that the Judiciary’s high instances for 
taking a position and/or actions to control or understand the 
phenomenon vary among the studied countries, regardless of 
phenomenon’s growth, as in the comparison between Chile and 
Argentina.  
 
Furthermore, in Brazil and Colombia, where the high courts have 
taken actions in response to litigation for access to medicines, we also 
found differences in the intensity of the expansion of the Judiciary’s 
control over the Executive and Legislative powers, or judicialization 
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from without, according to Tate and Vallinder (1995). In Brazil, the 
Supreme Court opted for a participative way as a first intervention 
(public hearing) comprising all the stakeholders. This resulted in binding 
measures only for the Judiciary (PRADO, 2014), while in Colombia the 
Constitutional Court’s approach was vertical (judicial decision) whose 
orders focused on the Executive branch (LAMPREA, 2014).  
 
In this sense, the Colombian Judiciary took a position above the 
legislative and administrative spheres because of the characteristic of the 
measures and the recognition obtained by the social actors, as 
consequence of the media dissemination of Ruling-T760. This is 
perhaps the reason why there is a consensus in the actors’ view about 
the important role of the Judiciary in the health system’s reform in the 
last ten years. In turn, in Brazil the stakeholders do not considered 
crucial the effects of the public hearing over the measures taken by 
health system in the same period.  
 
Moreover, it is worth noting that in the Brazilian context the 
Judiciary recognizes its responsibility in the adequate use of the health 
system’s resources. In Colombia conversely, the Judiciary did not 
recognize its role in preventing and controlling abuses by different 
stakeholders against the health system through litigation. This branch 
only pointed out the failures of the health system as a cause of the 
limited access to medicines. 
 
The incorporation of medicines in the list of the health systems in 
Brazil and Colombia increased the number of items covered for the 
health care of the population. Currently the POS in the Colombia health 
system comprise 367 medicines and 793 dosage forms (COLOMBIA, 
MINISTERIO DE SALUD, 2014b). In Brazil in 2014, the RENAME 
comprised approximately 886 dosage forms (BRASIL, MINISTÉRIO 
DA SAÚDE, 2015); 194 drugs and 383 dosage forms of them were 
financed by the CEAF (BRASIL, MINISTÉRIO DA SAÚDE, 2014). 
 
The controversy related to the change in the essential medicines’ 
definition is present in both countries, although in this study only one 
Colombian representative expressed arguments against this change. In 
the literature, other sectors of the Colombian civil society have stood 
position in the same sense as Rossi et al. (2012). In Brazil, Figueiredo et 
al. (2014) considered that the new updating process do not follow the 
principles of HTA in a proper way. Furthermore, Santos-Pinto et 
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al.(2013) also disagree with the inclusion of a huge number of dosage 
forms, because it makes the management of the medicines logistic more 
difficult.  
 
However, the essential medicines’ definition of the World Health 
Organization has evolved, and currently new medicines can be 
considered essential if there is evidence of their efficacy and safety, 
despite their high cost (e.g. trastuzumab and sofosbuvir) following 
criteria such as the disease epidemiological profile and burden (WHO 
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, 2015b). In this train of thought, 
Brazil and Colombia are following similar criteria to those proposed by 
the WHO.  
 
The aforementioned aspects guarantee that the health system will 
supply medicines for the majority of the population. Nevertheless, the 
health system must also guarantee alternatives for those patients that 
because of their particular clinical situation, the medicines useful and 
safe for most of the people are not adequate alternative of treatment (e.g. 
cases of intolerance or non-response). The adoption of a broad list gives 
the opportunity of individualize the therapy and adjusted it for the 
specific needs of the patient and guarantee the comprehensiveness of the 
treatment (DO NASCIMENTO JÚNIOR et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, the access to medicines not only depends on 
technical-scientific assessment, but it is the result of a complex 
relationship and balance among the different health system stakeholders 
and the particular values of equity and justice present in a society. In this 
way, the decision to make a small list of medicines is not a guarantee of 
access to or rational use of medicines. A rigid list may lead to distortions 
in the market and limit the bargain capacity of the health system 
manager. Thus, the expansion of the medicines list in terms of dosage 
forms give to the health system manager the possibility of using the 
market forces in favour of the efficient use of the resources.  
 
Taking into consideration a wide view about the access to 
medicines, it is also possible to note that the ministries of health and 
health system managers are not only responsible for guaranteeing the 
availability of the product. As the establishment of a list or clinical 
guidelines does not guarantee its compliance, this situation shows that 
the measures to control other stakeholders, such as the pharmaceutical 
industry and the prescribers, are necessary to guarantee the successful 
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and effective application of the HTA criteria in the daily routine of the 
health systems for ensuring the medicines’ effectiveness and safety. 
 
In this sense, some urgent measures must be taken to make 
relationships transparent between the pharmaceutical industry and other 
health system’s stakeholders (policy-makers, managers, prescribers, 
patients, etc.) with strategies for disseminating information about the 
medicines independently of the pharmaceutical industry.  
 
In both Colombia and Brazil, according to the respondents, the 
measures taken in response to litigation for access to medicines have 
resulted in some advances. However, the health systems still need to 
overcome challenges regarding rational use of medicines and equity in 
the distribution of the health system resources. 
 
In conclusion, a wide extension of litigation for access to 
medicines is not enough to trigger macro interventions of the Judiciary 
in response to the phenomenon. Furthermore, the analysis of the 
experiences of Brazil and Colombia allows inferring that in order to 
control the phenomenon of litigation it is not sufficient to direct the 
attention for possible solutions towards the incorporation of new 
technologies in the health systems’ coverage.  
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Final Consideration 
 
Lessons learned  
 
The present PhD thesis aimed to explore and compare litigation for 
access to medicines in Latin American countries. This phenomenon rose 
in Latin America in the 1990s, when the first lawsuits claiming access to 
antiretroviral medicines were filed. Since then, particularly from the 
2000s, the phenomenon has steadily increased, catching the attention of 
health system’s stakeholders: policy makers, health system managers, 
health professionals, patient organizations, the academia, and the newest 
health system’s stakeholder: the Judiciary.  
 
Conducting studies on this phenomenon appears to be significant taking 
into account that the costs of new health technologies, including 
medicines, have been identified as a key driver of the rising health 
expenditure. Within this framework, the countries need information 
about litigation for access to medicines in order to design strategies 
aiming to meet the Universal Health Coverage’s goals, to guarantee 
equity in the access to medicines and sustainability of the health system.  
 
Litigation for access to medicines is a complex phenomenon that 
involves technical-scientific, legal and social aspects. However, similar 
to research about health systems and access to medicines, most studies 
about litigation are based on the positivist paradigm and highlight only 
the technical and scientific aspects of the phenomenon. Additionally, 
academic analyses use in general the normative approach which 
understands litigation as the interference of the Judiciary (a non-
technical body) on the Executive (a technical body) branch in the 
definition of health policies. In this sense, social and legal aspects of 
litigation are frequently neglected in the analyses. 
 
Recently the social nature of the access to medicines has been 
increasingly recognized. This new approach acknowledges that the 
access to medicines, in addition to technical issues, depends on the 
interaction between the stakeholders’ interests and values related to the 
medicines in their two roles in society: social goods and commodities.  
 
With the aim of applying this framework to the analysis of litigation for 
access to medicines, this PhD thesis proposed a theoretical model based 
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on the definition of health needs, a topic rarely discussed in the health 
area. The model considers the following premises:  
 
(a) Human needs are not facts (properties, states, processes, 
relations) about people, but values. 
 
(b) Health systems are satisfiers of the human need for protection, 
and medicines are goods that allow increasing or decreasing the 
health systems’ efficiency. 
 
(c)  When the definitions of medicines as a health need (according 
to Bradshaw’s categories) do not coincide, the patient can resort 
to the Judiciary claiming access the medicines. 
 
So, the theoretical model shows how the different factors and 
stakeholders related to the medicines influence the perceptions of the 
medicines as a health need, and modulate the occurrence of litigation for 
access to medicines. The theoretical model considers stakeholders and 
policies at different levels (international, national, and demand-side). 
This was useful to analyse the phenomenon at a local level and carry out 
cross-country comparisons.  
 
The first part of the cross-country analysis evidenced that in the last 
fifteen years Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and The Netherlands 
have taken measures aiming to improve the access to medicines in the 
three Universal Health Coverage dimensions. However, barriers to the 
access to medicines persist, despite the countries’ efforts to achieve 
equitable access. The analysis suggests that the causes of inequity are 
similar among the countries, and are related to the health systems’ 
fragmentation in different features such as financing, coverage, 
regulation and control. Furthermore, the results show that in all the 
studied countries lawsuits have become an alternative way for access to 
medicines, however the number of lawsuits and the involvement of the 
Judiciary varies across the countries.  
 
The comparative analysis of the causes and consequences of 
litigation for access to medicines in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
Colombia corroborate the aforementioned findings. These causes and 
consequences related to health systems’ ‘software’ and ‘hardware’ 
issues were the most frequently mentioned. Among them, the issues 
related to the definition of the list of covered medicines and the use of 
177 
 
this pathway by the pharmaceutical industry to force the inclusion of 
new products were especially highlighted.  
 
Besides, the proposed theoretical model allowed a comprehensive 
view of the phenomenon. The results evidenced that other factors such 
as the non-social legitimacy of the Executive and health system 
managers and the disposition of the Judiciary to intervene in issues 
related to the right to health have also an important influence in the 
occurrence of litigation and its consequences. Due to the different 
characteristics and the consequences that litigation has had across the 
countries, general approaches are necessary to seek common tools to 
face the challenge of guaranteeing equitable access to medicines and 
healthcare services that improve the population’s health. 
 
In this sense, the comparison of the countries’ responses to 
litigation for access to medicines shows that a the phenomenon’s growth 
is not a triggering factor for macro interventions by the Judiciary branch, 
as in Argentina. Furthermore, the Brazilian and Colombian experiences 
allows inferring that in order to control the phenomenon of litigation it is 
not enough just to incorporate new technologies in the health systems’ 
coverage. The respondents’ experience demonstrates that the influence 
of other factors such as values and relationships among the stakeholders 
also needs to be discussed for a broader solution to the problem. 
 
In conclusion, the complexity of the phenomenon requires 
comprehensive actions involving different actors in their discussions. 
The lawsuits can both demand the fulfilment of the health system’s 
obligations and claim the health system’s provision of new medicines 
whose efficacy and safety are uncertain. On the other hand, the 
sustainability of the health systems is essential both to guarantee the 
right to health and to guarantee itself the incorporation of new 
technologies. For this reason, it is worth remarking that in order to 
respond to litigation the countries need broad strategies. Such strategies 
should consider both measures for adequately overseeing the 
stakeholders in the execution of their duties and measures for regulating 
medicine prices and guaranteeing that intellectual property protection 
really generates innovations. 
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Next steps 
 
The results of this study evidenced the complexity of litigation for 
access to medicines and some gaps in the literature about this issue. 
First, this study evidenced the necessity of conducting research under a 
social approach to the phenomenon as a fundamental source of 
information so as to achieve a comprehensive understanding of litigation 
for access to medicines. This type of research can be especially useful 
for exploring the impacts of the phenomenon at a demand-side level.  
 
Taking into account the limited information about the profile of the 
lawsuits claiming access to medicines in the studied countries, except 
for Brazil, further research is also needed to characterize them. These 
studies will provide information for defining strategies to control 
litigation. 
 
For the governments, the present study demonstrates the necessity to 
adopt a comprehensive approach to litigation, and to implement 
innovative strategies. Some strategies identified as potential solutions to 
the phenomenon include: 
 
(a) Implementation of measures to promote a transparent 
relationship between the pharmaceutical industry and other 
stakeholders; 
(b) Design of strategies to disseminate information not influenced 
by the pharmaceutical industry about medicines; 
(c) Coordination of R&D policies and health system goals.  
(d) Development of cooperation strategies between the Executive 
and the Judiciary in order to identify lawsuits due to failures in 
the health system, and lawsuits caused because of the pressure 
exerted by the pharmaceutical industry. 
(e) Creation of courts specialized in issues related to the right to 
health. 
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ANNEX A – HEALTH SYSTEM ORGANIZATION: 
ARGENTINA, COLOMBIA, BRAZIL, CHILE AND THE 
NETHERLANDS 
 
1. The Argentinian health system 
 
The Argentinian health system is constituted by three subsectors. 
Public subsector corresponds to the public health system and the Federal 
Program Incluir Salud. Social insurance subsector correspond to Obras 
sociales (OS) and the National Institute of Social Services for Retirees 
and Pensioners/Integral Medical Care Plan (INSSJyP/PAMI). Private 
sector involves voluntary health insurance by direct payment or through 
the OS (ABRUTZKY; BRAMUGLIA; GODIO, 2009; BELLÓ; 
BECERRIL-MONTEKIO, 2011). According to the 2010 census, 46.4% 
of the population had health coverage by affiliation to an Obra Social 
(including PAMI), 10.6% had coverage by a private insurance company 
through OS (deregulated), 5.1% had voluntary private insurance 
(prepaid medicine); 1.8% had coverage for state health programs or 
plans. The other 36.1% did not have coverage in health for the other 
ways and for medical attention depend on the public subsector 
(ARGENTINA, INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE ESTADÍSTICA Y 
CENSOS - INDEC, 2012).  
 
 
1.1. PUBLIC SECTOR:  
 
In the public sector each of the 23 provinces and the Autonomous 
City of Buenos Aires are responsible for providing healthcare services in 
their territories. Healthcare services are provided by public hospitals and 
healthcare units, which are financed with national, provincial and 
municipal resources. National regulation related to the health system is 
not binding on the provinces; this is reason why the Nation must 
negotiate with the provincial ministries or secretaries of health the 
implementation of the regulatory measures in the Federal Health 
Council (COFESA). In addition, the Federal Program Incluir Salud is a 
Public Health Insurance system, which guarantees access to health 
services for mothers of seven or more children, disabled people and 
adults older than 70 years Non-Contributory Pensions (PNC) holders, 
among other groups (ARGENTINA, MINISTERIO DE SALUD, 2015). 
Although it is organized from the national level and operates under the 
214 
 
aegis of the National Ministry of Health, the implementation is 
provincial (TOBAR et al., 2012). 
 
1.2. SOCIAL INSURANCE SECTOR:  
 
The social insurance is conformed for about 280 National Obras 
Sociales (regulated by laws 23.660 and 23.661), armed forces, security, 
university Obras sociales, and the National Institute of Social Services 
for Retirees and Pensioners/Integral Medical Care Plan 
(INSSJyP/PAMI). All of them are regulated by the National Ministry of 
Health and the Superintendence of healthcare services. On the other 
hand, the Provincial OS depend on and are regulated by the ministry of 
health of each Province (CAVAGNERO et al., 2006; PROGRAMA DE 
LAS NACIONES UNIDAS PARA EL DESARROLLO - PNUD; 
ORGANIZACIÓN PANAMERICANA DE LA SALUD - OPS; 
COMISIÓN ECONÓMICA PARA AMÉRICA LATINA Y EL 
CARIBE - CEPAL, 2011). Since the National OS creation in 1940s until 
1993, they were associated with different industrial sectors that had a 
monopolistic right over the formal labour force of each sector. In 1993 
the deregulation of OS (ARGENTINA, PRESIDENCIA, 1993) broke 
the monopoly allowing that the workers could choose the insurance fund 
according to their preference, including the option of the private 
insurance companies. The deregulation also allows the OS contract 
private insurance companies for the management of resources and 
healthcare services(ABRUTZKY; BRAMUGLIA; GODIO, 2009; 
LLOYD-SHERLOCK, 2006). National social health insurance, is 
funded by a compulsory payroll contribution from employees (3%) and 
employers (6%) (CAVAGNERO et al., 2006). In Argentina there are 
almost 300 OS, the number of beneficiaries per entity vary between 
3000 and more than 1 million, almost 70% of the affiliates are 
concentrated in only 30 insurance funds, and the distribution of the 
population according to age and gender among the OS is heterogeneous 
(PROGRAMA DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS PARA EL 
DESARROLLO - PNUD; ORGANIZACIÓN PANAMERICANA DE 
LA SALUD - OPS; COMISIÓN ECONÓMICA PARA AMÉRICA 
LATINA Y EL CARIBE - CEPAL, 2011).  
 
PAMI is funded by a portion of the compulsory payroll of the 
employees, compulsory income-dependent contributions of retirees (3 to 
6%) and national resources (Belló and Montekio-Becerril, 2011; PNUD, 
2011). Provincial social health insurance is funded by civil servants 
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(3%-5%) compulsory payroll contributions and provincial governments’ 
contributions as employers (4%-6%) (BELLÓ; BECERRIL-
MONTEKIO, 2011; PROGRAMA DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS 
PARA EL DESARROLLO - PNUD; ORGANIZACIÓN 
PANAMERICANA DE LA SALUD - OPS; COMISIÓN 
ECONÓMICA PARA AMÉRICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE - CEPAL, 
2011). 
 
1.3. PRIVATE SUBSECTOR:  
 
The private subsector is constituted by private insurance 
companies of diverse nature (commercial societies, civil associations, 
for profit or not-for profit), called Empresas de medicina prepaga. 
These companies are concentrated in the bigger cities and focused on 
high-income population (PNUD, 2011). Private institutions provide the 
healthcare services in this sector. The affiliation to a private insurance 
company could be by two ways: (a) by the deregulation mechanisms, 
that means, the person is affiliated to an OS that has a covenant with a 
private insurance company or (b) voluntary private insurance that could 
be made for individual or companies. In the case of deregulation, the OS 
transfers part of the compulsory payroll contributions for the insurance 
company and the user must pay and additional premium and co-
payments to get access to the healthcare services of the insurance 
company. In the case of voluntary private insurance, the person or 
company contract the service directly with the insurance company 
(BELLÓ; BECERRIL-MONTEKIO, 2011). 
 
2. The Colombian Health system 
 
Since 1993, two subsectors, the General System of Social 
Security in Health (SGSSS) and the private sector constitute the 
Colombian health system. The basic principles of the SGSSS are 
efficiency, universality, solidarity, integrity, unity and participation. The 
SGSSS has three regimes: contributory regime focused in formal 
workers and employees; subsidized regime focussed on low-income 
population; and special regimes focused in employees of specific 
sectors. People uncovered by the health system, denominated linked 
(vinculados), depend on the public sector for access to healthcare 
services (COLOMBIA, 1993b). In 2014, 48.01% of the population was 
coverage for subsidize regime; 43.56% for contributory regime, 3.9% 
for special regimes; and 4.55% of the population was linked (ASI 
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VAMOS EN SALUD, 2015). In addition, the affiliates to contributory 
regime can buy private insurance (medicina prepagada). 
 
The health system is based on the structured pluralism model (or 
managed competition) including market logic in the system. The social 
security and healthcare services networks management was 
decentralized and entrusted to the insurance companies, denominated 
Health Promoting Enterprises (Empresas Promotoras de Salud – EPS) 
which could be public, non-profit or profit companies (Vargas et al, 
2002). Following the market logic, the people could choose an EPS, 
according with his/her preference for accessing healthcare services, and 
the institutions that provide healthcare services (public and private) have 
to compete for being contracted by the EPS (COLOMBIA, 1993b). 
 
2.1. CONTRIBUTORY AND SUBSIDIZED REGIMES:  
 
The contributory regime is funded by general taxes, oil funds, the 
Compulsory insurance for traffic accidents (SOAT), and contributions a 
compulsory payroll contribution from employees (4%) and employers 
(8,5%) which are collected by the EPS (COLOMBIA, MINISTERIO 
DE SALUD, 2014c). In this regime, there are 15 EPS; but six 
companies concentrate 75% of the affiliates (COLOMBIA, 
SUPERINTENDENCIA DE SALUD, 2015a). The subsidized regime is 
funded with fiscal transfers from the national government to the 
departments and municipalities (Sistema General de Participaciones-
SGP) and 1.5% of the mandatory payrolls of the contributory and 
special regimes affiliates. Currently there are 52 EPS in this regime, 
called EPS-S, 20 of them concentrate 90% of the affiliates 
(COLOMBIA, SUPERINTENDENCIA DE SALUD, 2015b). All these 
resources are joined in the Solidarity and Guarantee Fund (FOSYGA) 
and then redistributed among the EPS/EPS-S by means of the per-capita 
Unit (UPC) per each affiliate (HOMEDES; UGALDE, 2005). In order 
to avoid adverse selection by the insurers, the UPC is adjusted for 
variables such as gender, age and geographical location (VARGAS; 
VÁZQUEZ; JANÉ, 2002). However, the subsidized regime UPC value 
is 12% lower than the subsidized regime UPCs value (COLOMBIA, 
MINISTERIO DE SALUD Y PROTECCIÓN SOCIAL, 2014b). Each 
insurer organizes the healthcare service networks with their own clinical 
or hospitals (maximum 30% of the value of health spending) 
(COLOMBIA, 2007) or by contracting private (profit or non-profit) 
healthcare service institutions (COLOMBIA, 1993b). The EPS-S must 
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contract with public hospitals at least 60% of health spending 
(COLOMBIA, 2007). In both of the regimes, the users must pay 
prorated fees and co-payments for accessing the healthcare service and 
some medicines covered by the health system. These values depend on 
the affiliate’s income and the maximum values are defined by the 
Ministry of Health (COLOMBIA, MINISTERIO DE SALUD Y 
PROTECCIÓN SOCIAL, 2014a). 
 
2.2. SPECIAL REGIMES 
 
The special regimes are the armed forces, the National oil 
company (Ecopetrol) and public school and universities professors. The 
healthcare network as in the aforementioned regimes, could be 
organizing by contracting their own institutions, public or private (profit 
and non-profit) institutions (GUERRERO et al., 2011). 
 
2.3. POOR UNINSURED POPULATION 
 
The healthcare for poor people do not affiliated to the SGSSS is 
funding with resources of the SGP, by means of supply subsidies 
(COLOMBIA, MINISTERIO DE SALUD Y PROTECCIÓN SOCIAL, 
2015c). The Secretaries of health of each municipality, district or 
department are the responsible for organizing the healthcare network, 
which usually is constituted by public hospitals (ESE). 
 
2.4. PRIVATE SECTOR:  
 
The private sector could be divided in two parts, the private 
insurance (Medicina prepagada – Prepaid medical service) and the out 
of pocket expenditure. Prepaid medical service is a form within the 
additional health plans established by Law 100 of 1993, which 
contributory regime affiliates can acquire, in order to obtain optional 
benefits such as care for events not included in POS, or different or 
additional conditions of hospitality and technology (COLOMBIA, 
1993a). According to the regulations, prepaid medicine companies 
manage and provide care and services covered by a health plan 
prescribed, receiving in return the payment of an agreed regular price 
(COLOMBIA, 1994). This price is adjusted considering the gender, age, 
and health status of the individual (pre-existences). Finally, out of 
pocket expenditure occurs when the people do not have coverage by the 
218 
 
health system or when the access to the healthcare services or medicines 
in the health system is not opportune (GUERRERO et al., 2011). 
 
3. The Brazilian health system 
 
The health system in Brazil consists of public and private sectors. 
The public sector involves the Unified Health System (SUS) created by 
the National Constitution of 1988 considering as principles the universal 
and equitable access to comprehensiveness healthcare (LEVINO; 
CARVALHO, 2011). The private sector, called supplementary health 
system, corresponds to the insurance companies and the private 
healthcare institutions. Although all the citizens can access the public 
services, in 2013, 72.1% of the population depends on the SUS for 
access to healthcare services and 27.9% had some health insurance plan 
(GADELHA et al., 2015). 
 
3.1. PUBLIC SECTOR 
 
Since the National Constitution established the health is 
everyone’s right and duty of the state, all the citizens have right to 
access healthcare services and medicines in the SUS free of charges. 
The Unified Health System is funding by tax revenues and social 
contributions from the federal, state and municipal budgets (PAIM et al., 
2011). The management model of the system is decentralized and 
upward (from local to federal level) (BRASIL, 1990b), as well as, 
participative by considering the voice of the deliberative bodies for 
social control, such as, national health conferences, health councils and 
intermanagerial committees bipartite (state and municipalities) and 
tripartite (Union, states and municipalities) (PAIM et al., 2011). In 
addition, the health sector organization allows the government hire 
private healthcare services in order to complement the coverage of 
public health services (ABRUTZKY; BRAMUGLIA; GODIO, 2009). 
 
The municipalities are responsible by the organization of the 
primary health care network, constituted by basic healthcare units, and 
the implementation of the Family Health Program (PSF). PSF works 
through family healthcare teams (one doctor, one nurse, one auxiliary 
nurse and four to six community health workers), the teams are located 
at PSF clinics, and each team is responsible for a specific geographical 
area and a defined population of 600-1000 families. To provide 
secondary care services the SUS is highly dependent on contracts with 
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the private sector, especially for diagnostic and therapeutic support 
services. In the case of tertiary care, that include some high-cost 
procedures, the SUS contract these services also with private providers 
and public teaching hospitals. The payment of these services occurs by 
the modality fee for service, and the SUS define the price for each 
procedure (PAIM et al., 2011). 
 
3.2. PRIVATE SECTOR 
 
In the private sector three segments coexist: (i) the specific health 
insurance plans for public servants (civil and military) and their 
dependants, funded by public resources and the own beneficiaries 
resources; (ii) the health insurance plans, of elective link, funding by 
employers or families; and (iii) Autonomous private health providers, 
which can be reached directly by out-of-pocket expenditure (PIOLA et 
al., 2010). The three segments are funding in some way by public funds, 
being the most direct in the first segment. In the segments (ii) and (iii) 
the transference of public funds to the private sector occurs by means of 
tax exemptions or tax breaks that reach the households and enterprises 
spending with medical care and private health insurance (NORONHA; 
SANTOS; PEREIRA, 2010; PIOLA et al., 2010). The insurance 
companies organize the healthcare service network with their own 
providers and by hiding other private institutions. The out-of-pocket 
expenditure for consultations or diagnostic procedures usually occurs 
when the healthcare service are not opportune in the SUS or in the 
health insurance, and the patient need to meet the criteria of the PCDT 
to receive for first time or continue the treatment (ROVER et al., 2016). 
 
4. The Chilean health system 
 
The Chilean health system is constituted by three subsectors. The 
public sector corresponds to the National Health Fund (FONASA); the 
private sector corresponds to the Health Insurance Institutions 
(ISAPREs); and the third subsector is the Armed Forces’ health system. 
In 2014, 77% of the population was covered by FONASA; 17% was 
affiliated to the ISAPRES; and the Armed Forces’ health system 
covered 3% (CHILE, COMISIÓN ASESORA PRESIDENCIAL, 2014). 
However, most of the resources are concentrated in the private sector, 
since the high-income population is affiliated to ISAPREs 
(MONTOYA-AGUILAR, 2013). 
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4.1. PUBLIC SECTOR 
 
The public sector is funded by general taxes, the payroll 
mandatory contributions of the employees (equivalent to 7% of the 
salary) and the co-payments, all of these resources are joined in the 
National Health Fund (FONASA) that constitutes a solidary system 
(Chile, 2014). The FONASA affiliates are classified in four groups 
according to their income Group A are people without means; Group B 
are people which income is less than one minimum wage; Group C and 
D are people which income is higher than a minimum wage. FONASA 
offers two possible modalities for accessing the healthcare services the 
Institutional Attention Modality (MAI) and the Free Choice Modality 
(MLE) (CHILE, SUPERINTENDENCIA DE SALUD, 2015b). 
 
4.2. PRIVATE SECTOR 
 
The private sector is constituted by the Health Insurance 
Institutions (ISAPRE). In 2015, there are 6 closed ISAPRES and 7 open 
ISAPREs. Closed ISAPREs belong to public enterprises (State Bank, 
the National Copper Corporation of Chile–COTELCO and the Chemical 
and Mining Society of Chile–SQM) and only affiliate their employees 
(CHILE, COMISIÓN ASESORA PRESIDENCIAL, 2014). Open 
ISAPREs allow registration to the entire population with ability to pay 
(BECERRIL-MONTEKIO; REYES; MANUEL, 2011; CHILE, 
SUPERINTENDENCIA DE SALUD, 2015e). These health plans are 
funding by the mandatory payroll of the employees (7% of the wage) 
and additional voluntary contributions to afford the total plan price. 
Since this insurance is individual (in contrast with FONASA that is 
solidary) the plan prices depend on factors such as, age, gender and 
health status, being cheaper for men, young and healthy people 
(MONTOYA-AGUILAR, 2013). In 2014, there were more than 12.000 
health plans in the market (CHILE, COMISIÓN ASESORA 
PRESIDENCIAL, 2014). 
 
 
 
 
4.3. ARMED FORCES 
 
Since 1996 the Ministry of Defence established the Armed Forces 
Health System that covers the Armed Forces personal and their 
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dependents. This subsystem is funded by general taxes, and the 
resources are deposited in the Curative and Preventive Medicine Fund 
for the Armed Forces. The Armed Forces’ healthcare institutions are 
considered public, but usually they supply healthcare services for their 
beneficiaries and also sell healthcare services for other institutions in the 
health market. Moreover, the beneficiaries of this health subsystem also 
can access to healthcare services in the public services network, or even 
private institutions according the covenants of the Ministry of Defence 
(BECERRIL-MONTEKIO; REYES; MANUEL, 2011) . 
 
Similar to the Colombian health system, Chilean system also 
incorporate the market logic for the healthcare system. The individual 
can choose among FONASA and the ISAPREs (BECERRIL-
MONTEKIO; REYES; MANUEL, 2011). 
 
5. The Dutch Health system 
 
Since the health system reform stated by the Health insurance Act 
(Zvw) in 2006, the Dutch health system is constituted by two sectors, the 
compulsory social health insurance and the voluntary health insurance 
(SCHÄFER et al., 2010). In 2013, less than 0.2% of the Dutch 
population were uninsured, and most of the population (85%) purchases 
a mixture of complementary and supplementary voluntary insurance 
(WAMMES,; JEURISSEN; WESTERT, 2015). The Armed Forces has 
an independent health system managed by the Ministry of Defence. 
 
The changes introduced by the reform included the abolition of 
the distinction between mandatory sickness fund insurance that covered 
the employed population in a regionalized way, which salary was not 
superior to a threshold; and the voluntary private insurance that covered 
the rest of the population. In addition, the managed competition among 
the actors of the health system was introduced, thus the patients can 
choose the insurer according to their preference, and the insurers can 
negotiate the price of the health care services with the general 
practitioners (GP) and the hospitals (SCHÄFER et al., 2010). 
 
5.1. COMPULSORY SOCIAL HEALTH INSURANCE 
 
The compulsory social health insurance consists of two 
compartments, one for long-term care, regulated by the Exceptional 
Medical Expenses Act (AWBZ) and the other for “basic health 
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insurance” regulated by the Health Insurance Act (Zvw). The AWBZ is 
mainly financed by income-dependent contributions and it intends to 
provide care services for people with chronic conditions requiring 
continuous care that involves considerable financial consequences (e.g. 
disabled people with congenital physical or mental disorders). These 
services are provided both in institutions (residential care) and in 
communities (home care) (SCHÄFER et al., 2010). The basic health 
insurance is funded by means of different sources. Firstly by income-
related contributions, which are defined by the Ministry of Health. The 
income-related contribution is set at 7.75 % of annual taxable income up 
to €51,414 (as of 2014). Employers must reimburse employees for this 
contribution (employers contributions), and employees pay tax on the 
reimbursement. For those without an employer who do not receive 
unemployment benefits, such as the self-employed, the income-related 
contribution is 5.4% (WAMMES,; JEURISSEN; WESTERT, 2015).  
 
Tax Office collects these contributions and transfers the money to 
the Health Insurance Fund (Zvf) (SCHÄFER et al., 2010). The Zvf 
distributes the money among the insurers according to a risk adjusted 
capitation considering features such as age, gender, labour forced status, 
region and health risk (based on past medicines and hospital utilization). 
Other sources are the nominal premiums that an insured person must 
pay directly to the insurance company. The insurers are free for setting 
the nominal premium level, but this must be community-rated, that is, 
everyone with the same insurer pays the same premium, regardless of 
age or health status (WAMMES,; JEURISSEN; WESTERT, 2015). For 
children below 18, the government covers the premium through a 
contribution into the Zvf (SCHÄFER et al., 2010).  
 
Every insured person over age 18 must pay an annual deductible 
of €360 (USD436) (as of 2014) for health care costs, including costs of 
hospital admission and prescription drugs but excluding some services, 
such as GP visits. Apart from the overall deductible, patients are 
required to share some of the costs of selected services, such as medical 
transportation, via co-payments, coinsurance, or direct payments for 
services that are subsidized to a certain limit (WAMMES,; JEURISSEN; 
WESTERT, 2015). 
 
A reimbursement limit is set for drugs in equivalent drug groups. 
Costs above that limit are not reimbursed. Providers are not allowed to 
balance-bill patients—that is, they are not allowed to charge above the 
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fee schedule. Patients with an in-kind insurance policy may be required 
to share the costs of care from a provider that is not contracted by the 
insurance company. Out-of-pocket expenses represented 11.9 percent of 
health care spending in 2011 (WAMMES,; JEURISSEN; WESTERT, 
2015). In order to compensate for undesired effects for lower-income 
groups a health care allowance was created. This allowance is funded 
from general tax, and is set by the Ministry of Health. The value is 
calculated as the estimated average of the premiums offered by health 
insurers plus the compulsory deductible (SCHÄFER et al., 2010). 
 
The primary care services are supplied by general practitioners 
(GPs). The GPs work as gatekeepers, thus hospital care and specialists 
care are only accessible upon referral from a GP, except for emergency 
care. All citizens are registered with a GP of their choice, usually in 
their own neighbourhood. The payment for GP, by the insurance 
companies, is a combination of a fee per capita and a fee for services. 
GP consultation is free of co-payment and is excluded from the 
deductible. Specialist care is supplied by hospitals, independent 
treatment centres and top clinical centres (specialized in e.g. cancer or 
organ transplantation) (SCHÄFER et al., 2010; WAMMES,; 
JEURISSEN; WESTERT, 2015).  
 
Hospitals’ budgets are determined through negotiations between 
insurers and hospitals over price and volume. The great majority of 
payments take place through the case-based diagnosis treatment 
combination system, and the rates for approximately 70 percent of 
hospital services are freely negotiable; each hospital negotiates with 
each insurer to set the rates. The remaining 30 percent are set nationally. 
In 2012, the diagnosis treatment combination system was fundamentally 
reformed, and the number of diagnosis treatment combinations was 
reduced from 30,000 to 4,400. Diagnosis treatment combinations cover 
both outpatient and inpatient as well as specialist costs, thereby 
strengthening the integration of specialist care in the hospital 
organization (SCHÄFER et al., 2010; WAMMES,; JEURISSEN; 
WESTERT, 2015). 
 
5.2. VOLUNTARY HEALTH INSURANCE 
 
Health insurers offer voluntary health insurance in combination 
with basic health insurance, but are not allowed to deny people 
complementary insurance if they decide to take out basic health 
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insurance with another health insurer. Health insurances are allowed to 
screen applicants and refuse them based on medical risk. People with 
voluntary health insurance do not receive faster access to any type of 
care, nor do they have increased choice of specialist or hospital 
(SCHÄFER et al., 2010; WAMMES,; JEURISSEN; WESTERT, 2015).  
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ANNEX B – SPEECHES FRAGMENTS IN ORIGINAL 
LANGUAGE CITED IN CHAPTER 4  
 
Box 4-1. Examples of the categories at International level 
 
 
Right to health in the International Human Right treaties and essential 
medicines definition 
 
“Nosotros vemos desde la Federación, dos… dos puertas que se encuentran. 
Una que es la filosofía del mercado y la otra es la filosofía de los derechos 
humanos como tal… Lo que sucede con el tema del acceso a medicamentos es 
la expresión también de ese choque de esas dos filosofías” (Colombia, Patient).  
 
“… esos tres pilares [acceso a medicamentos, sostenibilidad del sistema y 
garantía del derecho fundamental] que al final hacen que, entre más caro sea el 
medicamento me inclino más por la economía que por el acceso al derecho”. 
Eso es básicamente lo que hemos visto como problema grave, que no es, 
consideramos nosotros, un problema exclusivamente colombiano, sino que es 
una tendencia globalizada, mundial a… a, digamos, tener un principio 
economicista de los derechos fundamentales, del acceso a los derechos 
fundamentales” (Colombia, Patient). 
 
“…todos sabemos, que las farmacéuticas fueron las que más hicieron lobby 
tanto en la ONU, en la OMS, en todos lados para que el derecho a la salud fuera 
un derecho fundamental en todos los países, porque tenían claro que la sociedad 
de manera individual no iba a poder comprar y pagar los costos de sus 
productos y lo mejor era que los Estados los pagaran” (Colombia, Patient). 
 
The market and the Innovation model and intellectual property protection 
– TRIPS 
 
“A primeira [causa] é a questão do mercado, o interesse no mercado, nas vendas 
e no faturamento por parte da indústria farmacêutica. Esse é o primeiro grande 
motivo, na minha opinião” (Brazil, manager). 
 
“Creo que eso [la judicialización] está muy relacionado con el modelo de 
investigación y desarrollo, con que para la industria farmacéutica el tema del 
precio se solucionó muy fácil encontrando lo que se denominaría modelos de 
tercer pagador, entonces para ellos ya no es un problema que el medicamento 
valga 600 millones de pesos o 700 millones de pesos paciente/año porque en 
últimas no es el paciente de su propio bolsillo quien tiene que acceder [pagar], 
sino que es el sistema [de salud]” (Colombia, professional). 
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“El gran conflicto que hay hoy en día, tiene que ver con los medicamentos de 
alto costo, obviamente, por los valores que hay, porque son medicamentos que 
se sabe que están en el mercado sin una evidencia científica de que logren 
mejoría. En algunos casos si hay otros medicamentos ya en el mercado, no 
aseguran que sean mejores que los que hay, que a lo mejor, no son de alto costo 
(Argentina, NGO). 
 
 
 
Box 4-2. Examples of causes related to the category right to health in the 
Political Constitution 
 
 
“Son muchas las causas [de la judicialización]. En primer lugar, 
fundamentalmente, las normas tenemos que son muy amplias. Normas 
constitucionales y tratados con rango constitucional… que son muy amplias, en 
cuanto a la cobertura, con lo cual, prácticamente, cualquier paciente que pida 
cualquier prestación, los derechos son tan amplios que, de alguna manera, [los 
derechos] lo respaldan [al paciente] para pedirla [beneficios]” (Argentina, 
Executive). 
 
“... [a nova constituição] era uma constituição muito mais aberta do que as 
anteriores, ai do regime militar, do período de repressão e uma constituição pela 
primeira vez na história do Brasil trazia uma série de direitos, entre eles ai, o 
chamado artigo 196 da constituição, que é um artigo que, de uma maneira muito 
ampla, muito genérica, ele prevê a saúde como um direito do cidadão e 
obrigação do estado, sem delimitar isso claramente” (Brazil, manager). 
 
“La Constitución del 91 hizo dos cosas fundamentales en el país, introdujo el 
mercado en la prestación de servicios sociales, de servicios públicos en el país y 
en contrapeso, garantizó los derechos... [la Constitución] dejó explícitos los 
derechos de los ciudadanos y creo el mecanismo de la tutela para reclamarlos en 
caso de... de que se considerara que se violaban esos derechos” (Colombia, 
NGO). 
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Box 4-3. Examples of consequences related to the category right to health in the 
Political Constitution 
 
 
“Pero yo diría que uno de los aspectos más negativos [de la judicialización] es 
[...] lo que yo llamo [...] la farmaceuticalización del derecho a la salud, en donde 
pareciera que todo se resuelve con fármacos” (Colombia, University lecturer) 
 
 
“La tutela es […] por el medicamento que puede ser que sea muy costoso frente 
a uno que está en el POS y le agrega muy poquito a la vida. O sea, la relación 
costo-efectividad es muy bajita pero es la persona, el derecho es individual y no 
colectivo. Entonces estamos presionando por cosas de altísimo costo, de bajo 
impacto en la salud colectiva, y la platica se nos está yendo allá. O sea, hay toda 
una discusión del derecho colectivo vs. el derecho individual” (Colombia, 
manager). 
 
“Si no tiene plata para contratar a un abogado, salen a los diarios, a los medios 
de comunicación  denunciar una situación, y la gente no acepta ser discriminada 
por ser pobre, por no tener recursos, porque el estado tiene que resolverles los 
problemas” (Chile, lawyer). 
 
Box 4-4. Examples of causes related to the category health system hardware 
 
... el problema… es más económico, porque los recursos son escasos. 
Entonces… la falta de protección… es un común denominador (Argentina, 
Executive) 
 
[se debe diferenciar] Qué parte de ese problema [judicialización] es ineficiencia 
de la EPS, mala prestación y mala gestión de la EPS, y qué parte es un problema 
estructural de déficit de recurso humano, sobretodo en especialistas y 
subespecialistas (Colombia, manager).  
 
Aquí [en Argentina], hay una Administración Nacional de la época de 
[presidente] Menen, que es el ANMAT, la Administración Nacional de 
Medicamentos, Alimentos y Tecnologías, que dice, cuando se cumplimenten 
determinadas normas, si un medicamento ...puede entrar al mercado o no. Pero 
no hay nadie, no hay ninguna organización nacional, que diga si eso lo va a 
cubrir o no la seguridad social o el Estado, está bien? No hay nada. O sea, que 
está al libre albedrío de cualquier médico, porque el médico puede recetar lo 
que quiera (Argentina, NGO). 
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Box 4-5. Examples of consequences related to the category health system 
hardware 
 
 
“Mirá, a veces [los impactos] sobre la obra social, lo malo es que [los jueces] te 
obligan a dar una prestación, económicamente a la obra social, obviamente, no 
le conviene, porque por estar obligados a brindar una determinada parte de la 
prestación, termina dando el doble o el triple de lo que tenías que dar... a la 
empresa [las acciones judiciales] le perjudica porque gastas el doble de lo que 
tenías pensado gastar para cubrir esa enfermedad” (Argentina, Manager).  
 
“[A judicialização] também prejudica obviamente o orçamento, o orçamento do 
ministério da saúde pode ser comprometido por... pelo fato de atender 
pontualmente uma determinada ação judicial, isso nos coloca numa situação de 
constrangimento frequente, porque eu tenho que automaticamente alocar 
recursos. Não existe um recurso para uma judicial... isso não está no nosso 
arcabouço de colocá-los no orçamento. Então nós temos que parar a nossa 
execução orçamentária para atender uma ação específica” (Brazil, Executive). 
 
“Do ponto de vista do estado a judicialização, ela traz uma desorganização de 
serviço na prática. Nós temos muita dificuldade em lidar como o volume das 
ações judiciais aqui no estado... Nós temos hoje uma concentração de ações 
judiciais aqui; e isso do ponto de vista da Secretaria estadual e das Secretarias 
municipais de saúde representa um volume improcessável, a gente não consegue 
dar respostas ao volume de ações judiciais que nós temos aqui. A estrutura do 
estado não está dimensionada para isso” (Brazil, manager). 
 
“Definitivamente hay un impacto negativo dentro de las finanzas del sistema, 
porque al ser desordenada la forma en que la gente accede a las prestaciones no 
contenidas en el plan de beneficios, el sistema se ve en la necesidad de gastar 
una gran cantidad de recursos... en unas tecnologías terapéuticas, incluidos 
medicamentos.... que son muy altos y que hacen que el sistema pues tenga que 
dedicar gran parte de recursos” (Colombia, professional).  
 
“Entonces, todo el mundo [con las acciones judiciales] genera ese desorden y el 
único perjudicado es el paciente, porque finalmente no se sigue la ruta que 
estamos siguiendo ahora, de incluir tecnologías en le POS que sean seguras, que 
sean efectivas, sino que... esa tutela [judicialización] comienza a darle cosas a 
todo el mundo que finalmente pueda que en algún momento sí le sirvan como 
pueda que no (Colombia, Executive). 
 
“Debe haber un organismo estatal que pueda surtir de estos medicamentos de 
alto costo, con un presupuesto dado en la parte de presupuesto fiscal porque... 
verás que para una entidad privada, sobretodo como nosotros que no 
perseguimos fines de lucro.... nosotros con una de estas sanciones [decisiones 
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judiciales] nos vamos para atrás porque de estas resoluciones judiciales para 
nosotros gastar 20 millones en un medicamento, en una persona es mucha plata 
dentro de nuestro presupuesto que siempre tiene que tender al equilibrio” 
(Chile, manager).  
 
 
Box 4-6. Examples of causes related to the category health system software 
 
 
“El segundo de ellos [causas] es un incentivo perverso que se genera en la 
creación de las EPS en Colombia. El incentivo perverso, que es el que las mata 
y mata la forma en que se diseñó el sistema en Colombia, es que... el ánimo de 
lucro de estas empresas supone que si gastan... que si dan menos servicios [...] o 
gastan menos dinero, pueden ganar más dinero... Entonces hay una opinión 
generalizada, consecuente de ese modelo de contrato, no es que las EPS siempre 
lo hagan por eso, pero cada vez que nieguen o no den un servicio la gente va a 
creer que es en función del lucro, que es para ganar más plata que le están 
negando el servicio” (Colombia NGO). 
 
“Y después en otros casos de tratamiento donde no está muy clara como va a ser 
la cobertura. Por ejemplo últimamente, fertilización asistida está [...] dentro del 
programa médico obligatorio, pero como no se reglamentaron un montón de 
cuestiones, no se sabe si esos medicamentos, que son caros, van a ser cubiertos 
al 40%, al 70% o al 100% [...] Entonces generalmente, la mayoría hoy de los 
reclamos que hay en fertilización asistida tienen que ver con reclamos de 
medicamentos al 100%, porque claro la obra social intenta cubrirlos al 40% al 
no haber reglamentación” (Argentina NGO).  
 
“A gente identificou que havia uma já na porta de entrada [do serviço de saúde] 
uma resistência, né? No sentido do servidor público não fazer o que ele tinha 
que fazer, e ai a defensoria pública [...] tinha aquela visão de que para ela se 
afirmar ela tinha que ajuizar, então ela estava entrando com a ação. Então... 
havia um movimento favorável [na defensoria], mas o servidor não queria fazer 
o trabalho dele, de certa forma o não fornecimento adequado... pelo município, 
pelo estado possibilita algum favorecimento para alguma farmácia que seja do 
parente do secretário de saúde ou do perfeito. (Brazil, Judiciary).  
 
“[En el AUGE] hay patologías que estratifican en rangos de edad el acceso a 
medicamentos... En este caso hay algunas cosas que... ciertos casos... de tal edad 
a tal edad se les dan medicamentos y a los otros no [...] Entonces los accesos no 
son estándares para todo el mundo, entonces van a haber personas que por un 
año de edad o por una situación [clínica] van a quedar fuera del acceso que tiene 
este programa” (Chile, Patient).  
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Box 4-7. Examples of consequences related to the category health system 
software 
 
 
[Como consecuencia de la judicialización] “La política pública está demasiado 
guiada por el litigio, y en el contexto macro del sistema de salud el litigio es 
marginal en términos de acceso [...] menos del 0,5% de las acciones en salud se 
acceden [...] por mecanismos judiciales” (Colombia, NGO). 
 
“En el caso del No POS los mecanismos de contratación de servicios de salud es 
fee for service, [...], nadie dice nada, nadie cuestiona nada... Entonces pues 
desde el punto de vista de un prestador, de un proveedor [incluyendo a la 
industria farmacéutica] pues esa es la lógica más razonable desde el punto de 
vista económico, y pues está amparado por una cosa que se llama tutela en 
Colombia”. (Colombia, manager). 
 
“En el caso de las prestaciones que están dentro del Programa Médico 
Obligatorio, ahí no cabe duda, están a cargo de las obras sociales, [...], si se 
llegara a judicializar algo, [...] está correcto [...]. Si el paciente no se encuentra 
conforme con lo que la obra social le brinda y está dentro del Programa Médico 
Obligatorio, está perfecto que vaya y que vía judicial solicite, porque de alguna 
manera hay un contrato que se quebró” (Argentina, manager). 
 
“Então assim, um grande número de ações individuais causam uma 
desorganização no sistema deles [dos entes responsáveis pela organização do 
sistema de saúde], que eles começam se mexer. [...] Eles começam ficar tão 
incomodados, que aí eles efetivamente começam a fazer alguma coisa, a alterar 
a política pública, entendeu? Então esse é um aspecto positivo mesmo” (Brazil, 
Judiciary). 
 
 
Box 4-8. Examples of the category Pharmaceutical marketing 
 
 
Causes 
 
“Há evidência das indústrias farmacêuticas e os médicos aí, que são de alguma 
maneira influenciados pela indústria, também [os médicos] acabaram entrando 
nessa coisa [a judicialização] na medida que perceberam que o judiciário tinha, 
digamos assim, bons olhos para esse tipo de coisa [judicialização]” (Brazil, 
manager).  
 
“Pero también hay que ver que hay intereses creados detrás de ellos 
[organizaciones de pacientes], que provocaron una judicialización también, y 
todavía importante ¿no? O sea se mueven los laboratorios muchas veces detrás 
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de los pacientes y hacen que bueno, rápidamente un medicamento que salió 
nuevo, ya al otro día lo están pidiendo. Decís ¿pero cómo puede ser? ¿no? 
Claro, el laboratorio se quiere resarcir rápido de los gastos de la investigación, y 
ya lo quiere colocar [el medicamento] en el mercado (Argentina NGO). 
 
Las transnacionales [farmacéuticas] [...] van a presionar por vender los 
medicamentos de alto costo siempre y usa todas las estrategias para ello, desde 
las asociaciones de pacientes hasta los mismos abogados pagados para las 
asociaciones de pacientes para que exijan los medicamentos. Entonces tienen las 
transnacionales empujando la tutela (Colombia, NGO). 
 
Consequences 
 
“Unos datos chéveres, que teníamos, mostraban cómo unas farmacéuticas se 
llevaban, concentraban todos unos rubros y recobros buenísimos, súper jugosos, 
o sea, claramente había unas empresas a las que sí les iba muy bien con los 
recobros” (Colombia NGO).  
 
 
Box 4-9. Examples of the category National policies for science and technology 
development, intellectual property protection and medicines prices control 
 
 
Causes 
 
“Cuando [la innovación] está en manos privadas, no podemos saber cuánto es el 
valor de esa innovación [...] el interés por el lucro se interpone en medio del 
acceso, y de alguna manera [...] se sujeta a estos países [subdesarrollados] a la 
regla del mercado, es decir, proteger patentes [...] que nosotros entendemos que 
es un estímulo para [investigar sobre] ciertas enfermedades [como] en el caso de 
los medicamentos huérfanos o en el caso de los medicamentos para pocos 
pacientes, pues resulta un estímulo interesante para innovar, pero al mismo 
tiempo no se hacen otro tipo de políticas públicas en las que se destine mucho 
dinero del estado para esa misma innovación” (Colombia, Patient).  
 
“Entonces eso sumado a los altos precios por un Estado, que en el caso 
colombiano, no intervino los precios, sino que al contrario desbordó 
absolutamente y permitió que se hiciera el abuso, pues esto sí originó un mayor 
gasto en un grupo de medicamentos, [...] una parte un poquito de 
biotecnológicos y algunos de estructura química conocida [...] Se llega a la 
judicialización por todas las variables que hemos tenido en cuenta y a eso se le 
suma que [el estado colombiano] ha sido [...] cómplice y ha vendido también su 
ética de ministros, de congresistas a la industria para permitir liberar los 
precios” (Colombia, Patient). 
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“Então, você pega o medicamento [oncológico] que saiu recentemente, que é 
monopólio, está sob patente, provavelmente esse procedimento que nós 
pagamos para o prestador não vai dar conta de financiar esse medicamento e 
acaba gerando ação judicial” (Brazil, Executive). 
 
Consequences 
 
“Uma outra questão importante, que nós temos interesse por esse conjunto de 
medicamentos [do Componente Especializado da Assistência Farmacêutica - 
CEAF] é uma ação altamente estratégica, que é o seguinte, é o fortalecimento 
do complexo industrial da saúde [...] Esse componente [CEAF] é um 
componente que contribui muito para a política brasileira no campo do 
complexo industrial em saúde. Nós já estamos numa fase em que nós não 
estamos indo no mercado apenas para comprar medicamentos, nós estamos 
estimulando a produção nacional por meio de transferência tecnológica para 
produtos deste componente” (Brazil, Executive). 
 
Lo importante [...] es que la Sentencia T-760 y el instrumento de supervisión del 
cumplimiento de esa sentencia, sí han permitido, digamos, acompañar toda la 
problemática desde el poder judicial, [incluyendo] la obligación de las 
autoridades gubernamentales de dar informes periódicos a la Corte, [...] hacen, 
digamos, seguramente por otras razones, que recientemente haya un cambio de 
la política pública sobre el control de los precios de los medicamentos, y la 
necesidad de que las empresas farmacéuticas no fijen, digamos, lo valores a su 
criterio, sino que el Estado está interesado por controlar ese tema (Colombia, 
Judicial). 
 
 
Box 4-10. Examples of causes related to the category Judiciary Power 
 
 
“Entiendo que uno [el juez] a veces no cuenta con demasiados elementos, 
digamos, el juez entiende derecho, no entiende mucho, a veces, de medicina. 
Entonces, a veces, no tenemos los suficientes elementos, ya de por sí, como para 
resolver si corresponde o no el amparo, si es urgente o no. En mi experiencia lo 
que hago, es tratar de investigar por mi cuenta... me meto a internet y empiezo a 
averiguar, sobre si realmente es urgente la situación.... pero bueno, a veces, uno 
siempre opta por, ante la duda, de concederle a la persona este amparo” 
(Argentina, Judicial). 
 
“Lo que piensa la justicia es [...] hay un médico que lo pide, esta persona lo 
necesita y hay alguien que se lo niega que es la empresa de medicina prepaga [o 
la obra social]. [...] Más allá de los argumentos que vos puedas tener como 
financiador, la justicia falla a favor de eso, del pedido y de la persona que lo 
necesita” (Argentina, manager). 
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“Eu quando judicializo, eu passo por cima de todas essas divisões [da 
organização do sistema de saúde]. Porque se elas não estão funcionando na 
prática, eu ignoro, entendeu? Porque na verdade, qual é nosso grande 
fundamento, que a Constituição Federal ela diz que a responsabilidade é da 
União do estado e do município, eles se organizarem internamente, eu acho 
ótimo, desde que esteja dando certo” (Brazil, Judicial). 
 
“La Corte [Suprema] razona sobre la base que el derecho a la protección de la 
salud tiene que aportar los medios para protegerla [...] En Chile, yo diría que 
casi todos estos recursos de protección se ganan, yo he visto la situación en 
Uruguay y en Uruguay [...] prácticamente el 15% de los recursos de protección 
se ha ganado, el resto se pierden, el poder judicial está más alineado un poco 
con el estado o las aseguradores, en cambio acá [Chile] no, el poder judicial está 
muy alineado con los consumidores, con los usuarios, con los pacientes” (Chile, 
Lawyer). 
 
[En Colombia]... “ha habido un tema que uno podría llamar de movilización 
jurídica, o sea, el reconocimiento del derecho [a la salud] en la Constitución [...] 
y los jueces [tienen] una idea de conceder el derecho [a la salud] con la idea de 
que los derechos sociales también son protegibles por vía judicial”. (Colombia, 
NGO) 
 
 
 
Box 4-11. Examples of consequences related to the category Judiciary Power 
 
 
“Porque esto perjudica [...] en lo judicial también, porque judicial nosotros, ya 
de por sí, estamos desbordados con la cantidad de causas judiciales que tenemos 
de toda índole ¿no? tanto civil, como penal. Entonces todos estos casos que 
empiezan a llegar de esta manera por supuesto suman, a lo que ya el poder 
judicial tiene” (Argentina, professional). 
 
“Yo creo que un juzgado que no debería estar recibiendo ese número [de 
acciones judiciales], es un trabajo adicional en horas/hombre sí? Y eso implica 
que debe tener más personas, porque [el juzgado] debe responder primero en 10 
días, porque [la acción judicial] es [sobre] salud y segundo las [acciones 
judiciales] que colocan medida pre-cautelar [el plazo para responder] es en 24 
horas, entonces obviamente eso implica un recargo más administrativo de la 
gente de la rama judicial, en lo cual creo que nadie lo proyectó... [Además] 
nadie tampoco previó que se le está perdiendo el respeto a la tutela [...] 
evolucionamos en que ya nadie cumple la tutela, y ya la Corte [Constitucional] 
se tiene que pronunciar frente a una tutela de desacato” (Colombia, patient). 
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“A via judicial, embora fosse muito utilizada, não era uma garantia de acesso [a 
medicamentos], por quê, porque o estado não conseguia dar conta” (Brazil, 
manager). 
 
 
Box 4-12. Examples of the category Medicines as health needs 
 
 
“Me parece que se há uma necessidade de judicialização de um pedido [de um 
medicamento] por parte de um paciente, parte do princípio [...] de que há uma 
negativa do estado para o fornecimento [do medicamento] e isso é o básico, é a 
negativa à necessidade” (Brazil, patient). 
 
“Que lo que es hoy y, sabemos como todo, que el recurso es muy limitado [y] 
las necesidades son ilimitadas, pero nosotros no podemos hacer que el sistema 
de salud caiga por la borda” (Argentina, professional). 
 
 
 
Box 4-13. Examples of causes related to the category Demand side level 
 
 
“Con el avance evidentemente de la información que reciben los pacientes [...] 
los pacientes van cambiando [... de] Los que eran pacientes común denominador 
eran pacientes pasivos, podríamos decir: Doctor, ¿Qué será lo que tengo? ¿Qué 
es lo que me tengo que tomar o qué es lo que puedo tomar? A un paciente que 
dice tengo esto, tengo esta enfermedad, tengo que tomar este medicamentos, me 
hace la receta” (Argentina, Executive). 
 
“La gente no se esmera en conocer a qué tiene derecho” (Colombia, Executive). 
 
“Esa conciencia del derecho y [de] que el mecanismo de la tutela funciona 
rápido, eficaz, para obtener concretamente el medicamentos, entonces genera 
como esa idea de ‘yo tengo ese derecho, entonces yo lo puedo reclamar, si [las 
EPS] me lo niegan [el medicamento] yo lo reclamo’...” (Colombia, NGO). 
 
“Hay en la sociedad una creencia, de que el poder judicial tiene las soluciones 
cuando el resto de los poderes [Ejecutivo y Legislativo] fallan” (Argentina, 
Judiciary). 
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Box 4-14. Examples of consequences related to the category Demand side level 
 
 
“Considero totalmente positivo lo que ha sido el mejorar el acceso a 
medicamentos [...] y defender evidentemente el derecho de los pacientes que sí 
lo necesitan” (Colombia Professional). 
 
“Para el paciente es importante, que ya entendió que tiene un derecho [...], que  
ya la mayoría de la gente conoce que hay un derecho y que hay un mecanismo 
para exigirlo” (Colombia, Patient).  
 
“Un tema [...] que generan las prestaciones a través de amparo es que no es del 
todo equitativo, no sólo por lo que afecta el presupuesto para los restantes 
pacientes, sino también porque el acceso al amparo es para determinado grupo 
de población, que de algún modo se entera, tiene cierta llegada a distintos 
grupos de abogados, a distintas organizaciones, etc.” (Argentina, Executive). 
 
“Pero también hay otro problema, que es que no todas las personas tienen 
acceso a un abogado para hacer un recurso de protección, entonces el tema es 
absolutamente perjudicial para los pacientes” (Chile, lawyer). 
 
“Outra questão que pode colocar dificuldade é a falta de segurança do usuário. 
Então [o juiz] ao tomar a decisão de atender a uma determinada ação, por 
exemplo, de um medicamento que já foi incorporado no SUS [pero para 
indicações não consideradas no CEAF], isso pode colocar em xeque a própria 
segurança do usuário” (Brazil, Executive). 
 
 
 
  
 
